[38526] trunk/dports/net/openssh
wsiegrist at apple.com
wsiegrist at apple.com
Wed Jul 23 21:33:04 PDT 2008
Revision: 38526
http://trac.macosforge.org/projects/macports/changeset/38526
Author: wsiegrist at apple.com
Date: 2008-07-23 21:33:03 -0700 (Wed, 23 Jul 2008)
Log Message:
-----------
Adding patches from Apple for various fixes. Primarily this commit fixes keychain integration.
Modified Paths:
--------------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile
Added Paths:
-----------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5229538+5383306+5446006+5567447+5806868_keychain.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5491854-fix_unsafe_usage_of_getpwuid.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-3977221_manpage_tweaks.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4122722+5277818_new_EA.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4135812_add_SACLSupport_to_sshd_conf_manpage.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4157448+4920695_corrected_UsePAM_comment.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4212542_auth_error_logging_fix.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4648874_preserve_EA_mtime.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4694589_16_group_limit_fix.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4748610+4897588_ssh-agent_via_launchd.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4920695_remove_nullok_comment_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5142987_launchd_DISPLAY_for_X11.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5258734_pty_permission_fix.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5462402_enable_SSH1_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5755519_use_GSS_C_NO_NAME_with_gss_acquire_cred.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/lastlog.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-5.0p1-gsskex-20080404.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/sacl.patch
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2008-07-24 03:33:34 UTC (rev 38525)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
name openssh
version 5.0p1
+revision 1
categories net
maintainers wms
description OpenSSH secure login server
@@ -20,9 +21,9 @@
homepage http://www.openssh.com/
platforms darwin
checksums ${distfiles} \
- md5 1f1dfaa775f33dd3328169de9bdc292a \
- sha1 121cea3a730c0b0353334b6f46f438de30ab4928 \
- rmd160 b813234014e339fe2d9d10a5adad9f8e065918fc
+ md5 1f1dfaa775f33dd3328169de9bdc292a \
+ sha1 121cea3a730c0b0353334b6f46f438de30ab4928 \
+ rmd160 b813234014e339fe2d9d10a5adad9f8e065918fc
master_sites openbsd:OpenSSH/portable \
http://mirror.mcs.anl.gov/openssh/portable/ \
@@ -34,6 +35,24 @@
ftp://openbsd.secsup.org/pub/openbsd/OpenSSH/portable/
depends_lib port:openssl port:zlib
+patchfiles pam.patch \
+ sacl.patch \
+ DVG-4122722+5277818_new_EA.patch \
+ DVG-3977221_manpage_tweaks.patch \
+ DVG-4212542_auth_error_logging_fix.patch \
+ DVG-4157448+4920695_corrected_UsePAM_comment.patch \
+ lastlog.patch \
+ openssh-5.0p1-gsskex-20080404.patch \
+ DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI.patch \
+ DVG-4648874_preserve_EA_mtime.patch \
+ DVG-4748610+4897588_ssh-agent_via_launchd.patch \
+ DVG-4694589_16_group_limit_fix.patch \
+ DVG-5142987_launchd_DISPLAY_for_X11.patch \
+ DVG-5258734_pty_permission_fix.patch \
+ AJ-5491854-fix_unsafe_usage_of_getpwuid.patch \
+ DVG-4135812_add_SACLSupport_to_sshd_conf_manpage.patch \
+ DVG-5755519_use_GSS_C_NO_NAME_with_gss_acquire_cred.patch
+
# Specified -fno-builtin because GCC 3.3 has log() as a builtin
# (from math.h) while OpenSSH has its own log() function
# -- from fink.
@@ -43,8 +62,9 @@
--with-pid-dir=${prefix}/var/run --with-tcp-wrappers \
--with-pam --disable-suid-ssh --with-random=/dev/urandom \
--mandir=${prefix}/share/man --with-zlib=${prefix} \
- --with-kerberos5=/usr
+ --with-kerberos5
+
destroot.target install-nokeys
post-destroot {
@@ -81,13 +101,18 @@
}
}
+set keychain_patch AJ-5229538+5383306+5446006+5567447+5806868_keychain.patch
+
platform darwin 9 {
- patch_sites-append http://www.opensource.apple.com/darwinsource/10.5/OpenSSH-87/patches/
- patchfiles-append DVG-5142987_launchd_DISPLAY_for_X11.patch
- checksums-append DVG-5142987_launchd_DISPLAY_for_X11.patch \
- md5 e188ebbba95c4cde61e0e1b2edc9f992 \
- sha1 62735c5bfbbe1fa41433993435ded7767cc5f1f9 \
- rmd160 eb5262f554583f4925f6f91f6a6d0034c70098ad
+ pre-patch {
+ reinplace "s|/usr/bin/|${prefix}/bin/|g" "${filespath}/${keychain_patch}"
+ }
+ patchfiles-append ${keychain_patch}
+ configure.args-append --with-keychain=apple
+ configure.cflags-append -fPIE -Wl,-pie -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
+ configure.ldflags-append -L. -Lopenbsd-compat -Wl,-pie
+ configure.cppflags-append -D__APPLE_SACL__ -D_UTMPX_COMPAT -D__APPLE_UTMPX__ -DUSE_CCAPI \
+ -D__APPLE_LAUNCHD__ -D__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ -D__BROKEN_GLOB__ -Dcannot_audit
}
startupitem.create yes
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5229538+5383306+5446006+5567447+5806868_keychain.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5229538+5383306+5446006+5567447+5806868_keychain.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5229538+5383306+5446006+5567447+5806868_keychain.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,1457 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/Makefile.in ./Makefile.in
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/Makefile.in 2008-03-12 18:41:31.000000000 -0700
++++ ./Makefile.in 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
++KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS=@KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS@
+
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
+ INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER@
+@@ -88,6 +89,8 @@
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o
+
++KEYCHAINOBJS=keychain.o
++
+ MANPAGES = scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-rand-helper.8.out ssh-keysign.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+ MANPAGES_IN = scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-rand-helper.8 ssh-keysign.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+ MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
+@@ -119,6 +122,7 @@
+ $(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+ $(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+ $(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
++$(KEYCHAINOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+
+ .c.o:
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+@@ -132,8 +136,8 @@
+ $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+ $(RANLIB) $@
+
+-ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+- $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) $(KEYCHAINOBJS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(KEYCHAINOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS)
+@@ -141,11 +145,11 @@
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+-ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
+- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o $(KEYCHAINOBJS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(KEYCHAINOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+-ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o
+- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o $(KEYCHAINOBJS)
++ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o $(KEYCHAINOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/authfd.c ./authfd.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/authfd.c 2006-08-31 22:38:36.000000000 -0700
++++ ./authfd.c 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -652,6 +652,29 @@
+ return decode_reply(type);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * Adds identities using passphrases stored in the keychain. This call is not
++ * meant to be used by normal applications.
++ */
++
++int
++ssh_add_from_keychain(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
++{
++ Buffer msg;
++ int type;
++
++ buffer_init(&msg);
++ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_FROM_KEYCHAIN);
++
++ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
++ buffer_free(&msg);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
++ buffer_free(&msg);
++ return decode_reply(type);
++}
++
+ int
+ decode_reply(int type)
+ {
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/authfd.h ./authfd.h
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/authfd.h 2006-08-04 19:39:39.000000000 -0700
++++ ./authfd.h 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
+ #define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
+ #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
+
++/* keychain */
++#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_FROM_KEYCHAIN 27
++
+ #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
+ #define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
+
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/configure ./configure
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/configure 2008-04-03 03:01:50.000000000 -0700
++++ ./configure 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -723,6 +723,7 @@
+ mansubdir
+ user_path
+ piddir
++KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS
+ LIBOBJS
+ LTLIBOBJS'
+ ac_subst_files=''
+@@ -1364,6 +1365,7 @@
+ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support
+ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file
+ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location common locations
++ --with-keychain=apple Use Mac OS X Keychain
+
+ Some influential environment variables:
+ CC C compiler command
+@@ -7133,6 +7135,7 @@
+ #define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1
+ _ACEOF
+
++ KEYCHAIN="apple"
+ ;;
+ *-*-dgux*)
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+@@ -28605,6 +28608,181 @@
+ echo "$as_me: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&2;}
+ fi
+
++# Check whether --with-keychain was given.
++if test "${with_keychain+set}" = set; then
++ withval=$with_keychain;
++ case "$withval" in
++ apple|no)
++ KEYCHAIN=$withval
++ ;;
++ *)
++ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: invalid keychain type: $withval" >&5
++echo "$as_me: error: invalid keychain type: $withval" >&2;}
++ { (exit 1); exit 1; }; }
++ ;;
++ esac
++
++
++fi
++
++if test ! -z "$KEYCHAIN" -a "$KEYCHAIN" != "no"; then
++ case "$KEYCHAIN" in
++ apple)
++
++for ac_header in Security/Security.h
++do
++as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
++if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
++if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
++ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
++fi
++ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
++else
++ # Is the header compilable?
++{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
++cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* confdefs.h. */
++_ACEOF
++cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
++cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* end confdefs.h. */
++$ac_includes_default
++#include <$ac_header>
++_ACEOF
++rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
++if { (ac_try="$ac_compile"
++case "(($ac_try" in
++ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
++ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
++esac
++eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
++ (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.er1
++ ac_status=$?
++ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
++ rm -f conftest.er1
++ cat conftest.err >&5
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); } && {
++ test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
++ test ! -s conftest.err
++ } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext; then
++ ac_header_compiler=yes
++else
++ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
++sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
++
++ ac_header_compiler=no
++fi
++
++rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
++{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
++
++# Is the header present?
++{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
++cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* confdefs.h. */
++_ACEOF
++cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
++cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* end confdefs.h. */
++#include <$ac_header>
++_ACEOF
++if { (ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
++case "(($ac_try" in
++ *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
++ *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
++esac
++eval "echo \"\$as_me:$LINENO: $ac_try_echo\"") >&5
++ (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.er1
++ ac_status=$?
++ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
++ rm -f conftest.er1
++ cat conftest.err >&5
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null && {
++ test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
++ test ! -s conftest.err
++ }; then
++ ac_header_preproc=yes
++else
++ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
++sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
++
++ ac_header_preproc=no
++fi
++
++rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
++{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
++
++# So? What about this header?
++case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
++ yes:no: )
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
++ ac_header_preproc=yes
++ ;;
++ no:yes:* )
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
++ ( cat <<\_ASBOX
++## ------------------------------------------- ##
++## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
++## ------------------------------------------- ##
++_ASBOX
++ ) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
++ ;;
++esac
++{ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6; }
++if { as_var=$as_ac_Header; eval "test \"\${$as_var+set}\" = set"; }; then
++ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
++else
++ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
++fi
++ac_res=`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_res" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_res" >&6; }
++
++fi
++if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
++ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
++#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
++_ACEOF
++
++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__"
++ KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS="-framework Security -framework CoreFoundation"
++
++
++else
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: Security framework not found. Disabling Mac OS X Keychain support." >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: Security framework not found. Disabling Mac OS X Keychain support." >&2;}
++fi
++
++done
++
++ ;;
++ esac
++fi
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
+
+@@ -29230,7 +29408,6 @@
+ _ACEOF
+
+
+-
+ ac_delim='%!_!# '
+ for ac_last_try in false false false false false :; do
+ cat >conf$$subs.sed <<_ACEOF
+@@ -29382,11 +29559,12 @@
+ mansubdir!$mansubdir$ac_delim
+ user_path!$user_path$ac_delim
+ piddir!$piddir$ac_delim
++KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS!$KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS$ac_delim
+ LIBOBJS!$LIBOBJS$ac_delim
+ LTLIBOBJS!$LTLIBOBJS$ac_delim
+ _ACEOF
+
+- if test `sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.sed | grep -c X` = 12; then
++ if test `sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.sed | grep -c X` = 13; then
+ break
+ elif $ac_last_try; then
+ { { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: error: could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/configure.ac ./configure.ac
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/configure.ac 2008-03-26 18:33:07.000000000 -0700
++++ ./configure.ac 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -594,6 +594,7 @@
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_NO_L2, 1, [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++ KEYCHAIN="apple"
+ ;;
+ *-*-freebsd*)
+ check_for_libcrypt_later=1
+@@ -4035,6 +4036,33 @@
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
+ fi
+
++dnl Keychain support
++AC_ARG_WITH(keychain,
++ [ --with-keychain=apple Use Mac OS X Keychain],
++ [
++ case "$withval" in
++ apple|no)
++ KEYCHAIN=$withval
++ ;;
++ *)
++ AC_MSG_ERROR(invalid keychain type: $withval)
++ ;;
++ esac
++ ]
++)
++if test ! -z "$KEYCHAIN" -a "$KEYCHAIN" != "no"; then
++ case "$KEYCHAIN" in
++ apple)
++ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(Security/Security.h, [
++ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__"
++ KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS="-framework Security -framework CoreFoundation"
++ AC_SUBST(KEYCHAIN_LDFLAGS)
++ ],
++ AC_MSG_WARN([Security framework not found. Disabling Mac OS X Keychain support.]))
++ ;;
++ esac
++fi
++
+ dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
+ dnl Add now.
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/keychain.c ./keychain.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/keychain.c 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ ./keychain.c 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,675 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of its
++ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
++ * this software without specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
++ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
++ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
++ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
++ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "authfd.h"
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++#include <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h>
++#include <Security/Security.h>
++#include <Security/SecPassword.h>
++
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Platform-specific helper functions.
++ */
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++static int get_boolean_preference(const char *key, int default_value,
++ int foreground)
++{
++ int value = default_value;
++ CFStringRef keyRef = NULL;
++ CFPropertyListRef valueRef = NULL;
++
++ keyRef = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, key, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
++ if (keyRef != NULL)
++ valueRef = CFPreferencesCopyAppValue(keyRef,
++ CFSTR("org.openbsd.openssh"));
++ if (valueRef != NULL)
++ if (CFGetTypeID(valueRef) == CFBooleanGetTypeID())
++ value = CFBooleanGetValue(valueRef);
++ else if (foreground)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Ignoring nonboolean %s preference.\n", key);
++
++ if (keyRef)
++ CFRelease(keyRef);
++ if (valueRef)
++ CFRelease(valueRef);
++
++ return value;
++}
++
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Store the passphrase for a given identity in the keychain.
++ */
++void
++store_in_keychain(const char *filename, const char *passphrase)
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * store_in_keychain
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
++ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
++ CFIndex filename_len;
++ UInt8 *label = NULL;
++ UInt8 *utf8_filename;
++ OSStatus rv;
++ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef = NULL;
++ SecTrustedApplicationRef apps[] = {NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ CFArrayRef trustedlist = NULL;
++ SecAccessRef initialAccess = NULL;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain integration is disabled.\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
++ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
++ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
++ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
++ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
++ if ((label = xmalloc(filename_len + 5)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "xmalloc failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ memcpy(label, "SSH: ", 5);
++ utf8_filename = label + 5;
++ CFDataGetBytes(cfdata_filename, CFRangeMake(0, filename_len),
++ utf8_filename);
++
++ /* Check if we already have this passphrase. */
++ rv = SecKeychainFindGenericPassword(NULL, 3, "SSH", filename_len,
++ (char *)utf8_filename, NULL, NULL, &itemRef);
++ if (rv == errSecItemNotFound) {
++ /* Add a new keychain item. */
++ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
++ {kSecLabelItemAttr, filename_len + 5, label},
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
++ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
++ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
++ if (SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/opt/local/bin/ssh-agent",
++ &apps[0]) != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/opt/local/bin/ssh-add",
++ &apps[1]) != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/opt/local/bin/ssh",
++ &apps[2]) != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((trustedlist = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **)apps,
++ sizeof(apps) / sizeof(apps[0]), &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFArrayCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecAccessCreate(cfstr_filename, trustedlist,
++ &initialAccess) != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecAccessCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecKeychainItemCreateFromContent(
++ kSecGenericPasswordItemClass, &attrList, strlen(passphrase),
++ passphrase, NULL, initialAccess, NULL) == noErr)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase stored in keychain: %s\n", filename);
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not create keychain item\n");
++ } else if (rv == noErr) {
++ /* Update an existing keychain item. */
++ if (SecKeychainItemModifyAttributesAndData(itemRef, NULL,
++ strlen(passphrase), passphrase) == noErr)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase updated in keychain: %s\n", filename);
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not modify keychain item\n");
++ } else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not access keychain\n");
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (cfdata_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
++ if (label)
++ xfree(label);
++ if (itemRef)
++ CFRelease(itemRef);
++ if (apps[0])
++ CFRelease(apps[0]);
++ if (apps[1])
++ CFRelease(apps[1]);
++ if (apps[2])
++ CFRelease(apps[2]);
++ if (trustedlist)
++ CFRelease(trustedlist);
++ if (initialAccess)
++ CFRelease(initialAccess);
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * store_in_keychain
++ * no keychain implementation
++ */
++
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain is not available on this system\n");
++
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/*
++ * Remove the passphrase for a given identity from the keychain.
++ */
++void
++remove_from_keychain(const char *filename)
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * remove_from_keychain
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
++ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
++ CFIndex filename_len;
++ const UInt8 *utf8_filename;
++ OSStatus rv;
++ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef = NULL;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain integration is disabled.\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
++ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
++ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
++ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
++ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
++ utf8_filename = CFDataGetBytePtr(cfdata_filename);
++
++ /* Check if we already have this passphrase. */
++ rv = SecKeychainFindGenericPassword(NULL, 3, "SSH", filename_len,
++ (const char *)utf8_filename, NULL, NULL, &itemRef);
++ if (rv == noErr) {
++ /* Remove the passphrase from the keychain. */
++ if (SecKeychainItemDelete(itemRef) == noErr)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase removed from keychain: %s\n", filename);
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove keychain item\n");
++ } else if (rv != errSecItemNotFound)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not access keychain\n");
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (cfdata_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
++ if (itemRef)
++ CFRelease(itemRef);
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * remove_from_keychain
++ * no keychain implementation
++ */
++
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain is not available on this system\n");
++
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add identities to ssh-agent using passphrases stored in the keychain.
++ * Returns zero on success and nonzero on failure.
++ * add_identity is a callback into ssh-agent. It takes a filename and a
++ * passphrase, and attempts to add the identity to the agent. It returns
++ * zero on success and nonzero on failure.
++ */
++int
++add_identities_using_keychain(int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *))
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * add_identities_using_keychain
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ OSStatus rv;
++ SecKeychainSearchRef searchRef;
++ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef;
++ UInt32 length;
++ void *data;
++ CFIndex maxsize;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 0) == 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* Search for SSH passphrases in the keychain */
++ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
++ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
++ if ((rv = SecKeychainSearchCreateFromAttributes(NULL,
++ kSecGenericPasswordItemClass, &attrList, &searchRef)) != noErr)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* Iterate through the search results. */
++ while ((rv = SecKeychainSearchCopyNext(searchRef, &itemRef)) == noErr) {
++ UInt32 tag = kSecAccountItemAttr;
++ UInt32 format = kSecFormatUnknown;
++ SecKeychainAttributeInfo info = {1, &tag, &format};
++ SecKeychainAttributeList *itemAttrList = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ char *filename = NULL;
++ char *passphrase = NULL;
++
++ /* Retrieve filename and passphrase. */
++ if ((rv = SecKeychainItemCopyAttributesAndData(itemRef, &info,
++ NULL, &itemAttrList, &length, &data)) != noErr)
++ goto err;
++ if (itemAttrList->count != 1)
++ goto err;
++ cfstr_filename = CFStringCreateWithBytes(NULL,
++ itemAttrList->attr->data, itemAttrList->attr->length,
++ kCFStringEncodingUTF8, true);
++ maxsize = CFStringGetMaximumSizeOfFileSystemRepresentation(
++ cfstr_filename);
++ if ((filename = xmalloc(maxsize)) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++ if (CFStringGetFileSystemRepresentation(cfstr_filename,
++ filename, maxsize) == false)
++ goto err;
++ if ((passphrase = xmalloc(length + 1)) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++ memcpy(passphrase, data, length);
++ passphrase[length] = '\0';
++
++ /* Add the identity. */
++ add_identity(filename, passphrase);
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (itemRef)
++ CFRelease(itemRef);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (filename)
++ xfree(filename);
++ if (passphrase)
++ xfree(passphrase);
++ if (itemAttrList)
++ SecKeychainItemFreeAttributesAndData(itemAttrList,
++ data);
++ }
++
++ CFRelease(searchRef);
++
++ return 0;
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * add_identities_using_keychain
++ * no implementation
++ */
++
++ return 1;
++
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/*
++ * Prompt the user for a key's passphrase. The user will be offered the option
++ * of storing the passphrase in their keychain. Returns the passphrase
++ * (which the caller is responsible for xfreeing), or NULL if this function
++ * fails or is not implemented. If this function is not implemented, ssh will
++ * fall back on the standard read_passphrase function, and the user will need
++ * to use ssh-add -K to add their keys to the keychain.
++ */
++char *
++keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename)
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * keychain_read_passphrase
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
++ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
++ CFIndex filename_len;
++ UInt8 *label = NULL;
++ UInt8 *utf8_filename;
++ SecPasswordRef passRef = NULL;
++ SecTrustedApplicationRef apps[] = {NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ CFArrayRef trustedlist = NULL;
++ SecAccessRef initialAccess = NULL;
++ CFURLRef path = NULL;
++ CFStringRef pathFinal = NULL;
++ CFURLRef bundle_url = NULL;
++ CFBundleRef bundle = NULL;
++ CFStringRef promptTemplate = NULL, prompt = NULL;
++ UInt32 length;
++ const void *data;
++ AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
++ char *result = NULL;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0)
++ goto err;
++
++ /* Bail out if the user set AskPassGUI preference to -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("AskPassGUI", 1, 1) == 0)
++ goto err;
++
++ /* Bail out if we can't communicate with ssh-agent */
++ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection()) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++
++ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
++ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
++ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
++ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
++ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
++ if ((label = xmalloc(filename_len + 5)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "xmalloc failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ memcpy(label, "SSH: ", 5);
++ utf8_filename = label + 5;
++ CFDataGetBytes(cfdata_filename, CFRangeMake(0, filename_len),
++ utf8_filename);
++
++ /* Build a SecPasswordRef. */
++ SecKeychainAttribute searchAttrs[] = {
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
++ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList searchAttrList =
++ {sizeof(searchAttrs) / sizeof(searchAttrs[0]), searchAttrs};
++ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
++ {kSecLabelItemAttr, filename_len + 5, label},
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
++ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
++ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
++ if (SecGenericPasswordCreate(&searchAttrList, &attrList, &passRef) !=
++ noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecGenericPasswordCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/opt/local/bin/ssh-agent", &apps[0])
++ != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/opt/local/bin/ssh-add", &apps[1])
++ != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/opt/local/bin/ssh", &apps[2])
++ != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((trustedlist = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **)apps,
++ sizeof(apps) / sizeof(apps[0]), &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFArrayCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecAccessCreate(cfstr_filename, trustedlist, &initialAccess)
++ != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecAccessCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecPasswordSetInitialAccess(passRef, initialAccess) != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecPasswordSetInitialAccess failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /* Request the passphrase from the user. */
++ if ((path = CFURLCreateFromFileSystemRepresentation(NULL,
++ (UInt8 *)filename, strlen(filename), false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateFromFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((pathFinal = CFURLCopyLastPathComponent(path)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyLastPathComponent failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (!((bundle_url = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ CFSTR("/System/Library/CoreServices/"), kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, true))
++ != NULL && (bundle = CFBundleCreate(NULL, bundle_url)) != NULL &&
++ (promptTemplate = CFCopyLocalizedStringFromTableInBundle(
++ CFSTR("Enter your password for the SSH key \"%@\"."),
++ CFSTR("OpenSSH"), bundle, "Text of the dialog asking the user for"
++ "their passphrase. The %@ will be replaced with the filename of a"
++ "specific key.")) != NULL) &&
++ (promptTemplate = CFStringCreateCopy(NULL,
++ CFSTR("Enter your password for the SSH key \"%@\"."))) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateCopy failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((prompt = CFStringCreateWithFormat(NULL, NULL, promptTemplate,
++ pathFinal)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFormat failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ switch (SecPasswordAction(passRef, prompt,
++ kSecPasswordGet|kSecPasswordFail, &length, &data)) {
++ case noErr:
++ result = xmalloc(length + 1);
++ memcpy(result, data, length);
++ result[length] = '\0';
++
++ /* Save password in keychain if requested. */
++ if (SecPasswordAction(passRef, CFSTR(""), kSecPasswordSet,
++ &length, &data) == noErr)
++ ssh_add_from_keychain(ac);
++ break;
++ case errAuthorizationCanceled:
++ result = xmalloc(1);
++ *result = '\0';
++ break;
++ default:
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (cfdata_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
++ if (label)
++ xfree(label);
++ if (passRef)
++ CFRelease(passRef);
++ if (apps[0])
++ CFRelease(apps[0]);
++ if (apps[1])
++ CFRelease(apps[1]);
++ if (apps[2])
++ CFRelease(apps[2]);
++ if (trustedlist)
++ CFRelease(trustedlist);
++ if (initialAccess)
++ CFRelease(initialAccess);
++ if (path)
++ CFRelease(path);
++ if (pathFinal)
++ CFRelease(pathFinal);
++ if (bundle_url)
++ CFRelease(bundle_url);
++ if (bundle)
++ CFRelease(bundle);
++ if (promptTemplate)
++ CFRelease(promptTemplate);
++ if (prompt)
++ CFRelease(prompt);
++ if (ac)
++ ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++
++ return result;
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * keychain_read_passphrase
++ * no implementation
++ */
++
++ return NULL;
++
++#endif
++
++}
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/keychain.h ./keychain.h
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/keychain.h 1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
++++ ./keychain.h 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of its
++ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
++ * this software without specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
++ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
++ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
++ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
++ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
++ */
++
++/*
++ * KEYCHAIN indicates that keychain functionality is present.
++ * KEYCHAIN_* indicates the implementation to use, and implies KEYCHAIN.
++ */
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++#define KEYCHAIN
++#endif
++
++void store_in_keychain(const char *filename, const char *passphrase);
++void remove_from_keychain(const char *filename);
++int add_identities_using_keychain(
++ int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *));
++char *keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename);
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-add.0 ./ssh-add.0
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-add.0 2008-04-03 03:01:50.000000000 -0700
++++ ./ssh-add.0 2008-04-15 18:35:24.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
+ SSH-ADD(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-ADD(1)
+
+ NAME
+- ssh-add - adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent
++ ssh-add -- adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent
+
+ SYNOPSIS
+- ssh-add [-cDdLlXx] [-t life] [file ...]
++ ssh-add [-cDdLlXxKk] [-t life] [file ...]
+ ssh-add -s reader
+ ssh-add -e reader
+
+@@ -58,6 +58,13 @@
+
+ -x Lock the agent with a password.
+
++ -K When adding identities, each passphrase will also be stored in
++ your keychain. When removing identities with -d, each passphrase
++ will be removed from your keychain.
++
++ -k Add identities to the agent using any passphrases stored in your
++ keychain.
++
+ ENVIRONMENT
+ DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
+ If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-add.1 ./ssh-add.1
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-add.1 2007-06-12 07:00:27.000000000 -0700
++++ ./ssh-add.1 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
+ .Nd adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm ssh-add
+-.Op Fl cDdLlXx
++.Op Fl cDdLlXxKk
+ .Op Fl t Ar life
+ .Op Ar
+ .Nm ssh-add
+@@ -121,6 +121,12 @@
+ Unlock the agent.
+ .It Fl x
+ Lock the agent with a password.
++.It Fl K
++When adding identities, each passphrase will also be stored in your
++keychain. When removing identities with -d, each passphrase will be
++removed from your keychain.
++.It Fl k
++Add identities to the agent using any passphrases stored in your keychain.
+ .El
+ .Sh ENVIRONMENT
+ .Bl -tag -width Ds
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-add.c ./ssh-add.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-add.c 2008-02-28 00:13:52.000000000 -0800
++++ ./ssh-add.c 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ #include "authfile.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "keychain.h"
+
+ /* argv0 */
+ extern char *__progname;
+@@ -93,12 +94,24 @@
+ }
+
+ static int
+-delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
++add_from_keychain(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
++{
++ if (ssh_add_from_keychain(ac) == 0)
++ return -1;
++
++ fprintf(stderr, "Added keychain identities.\n");
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int keychain, const char *filename)
+ {
+ Key *public;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+
++ if (keychain)
++ remove_from_keychain(filename);
+ public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
+ if (public == NULL) {
+ printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename);
+@@ -136,7 +149,7 @@
+ }
+
+ static int
+-add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
++add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int keychain, const char *filename)
+ {
+ Key *private;
+ char *comment = NULL;
+@@ -159,11 +172,16 @@
+
+ /* At first, try empty passphrase */
+ private = key_load_private(filename, "", &comment);
++ if (keychain && private != NULL)
++ store_in_keychain(filename, "");
+ if (comment == NULL)
+ comment = xstrdup(filename);
+ /* try last */
+- if (private == NULL && pass != NULL)
++ if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
+ private = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL);
++ if (keychain && private != NULL)
++ store_in_keychain(filename, pass);
++ }
+ if (private == NULL) {
+ /* clear passphrase since it did not work */
+ clear_pass();
+@@ -177,8 +195,11 @@
+ return -1;
+ }
+ private = key_load_private(filename, pass, &comment);
+- if (private != NULL)
++ if (private != NULL) {
++ if (keychain)
++ store_in_keychain(filename, pass);
+ break;
++ }
+ clear_pass();
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
+ "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
+@@ -295,13 +316,13 @@
+ }
+
+ static int
+-do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, char *file)
++do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, int keychain, char *file)
+ {
+ if (deleting) {
+- if (delete_file(ac, file) == -1)
++ if (delete_file(ac, keychain, file) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+- if (add_file(ac, file) == -1)
++ if (add_file(ac, keychain, file) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+@@ -324,6 +345,11 @@
+ fprintf(stderr, " -s reader Add key in smartcard reader.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -e reader Remove key in smartcard reader.\n");
+ #endif
++#ifdef KEYCHAIN
++ fprintf(stderr, " -k Add all identities stored in your keychain.\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, " -K Store passphrases in your keychain.\n");
++ fprintf(stderr, " With -d, remove passphrases from your keychain.\n");
++#endif
+ }
+
+ int
+@@ -334,6 +360,7 @@
+ AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
+ char *sc_reader_id = NULL;
+ int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0;
++ int keychain = 0;
+
+ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+@@ -351,7 +378,7 @@
+ "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
+ exit(2);
+ }
+- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLcdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) {
++ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "lLcdDxXe:s:kKt:")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'l':
+ case 'L':
+@@ -373,6 +400,13 @@
+ if (delete_all(ac) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
++ case 'k':
++ if (add_from_keychain(ac) == -1)
++ ret = 1;
++ goto done;
++ case 'K':
++ keychain = 1;
++ break;
+ case 's':
+ sc_reader_id = optarg;
+ break;
+@@ -418,7 +452,7 @@
+ default_files[i]);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ continue;
+- if (do_file(ac, deleting, buf) == -1)
++ if (do_file(ac, deleting, keychain, buf) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ else
+ count++;
+@@ -427,7 +461,7 @@
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+- if (do_file(ac, deleting, argv[i]) == -1)
++ if (do_file(ac, deleting, keychain, argv[i]) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ }
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-agent.c ./ssh-agent.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/ssh-agent.c 2008-02-28 00:13:52.000000000 -0800
++++ ./ssh-agent.c 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -72,9 +72,11 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "key.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
++#include "authfile.h"
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "keychain.h"
+
+ #ifdef SMARTCARD
+ #include "scard.h"
+@@ -703,6 +705,61 @@
+ }
+ #endif /* SMARTCARD */
+
++static int
++add_identity_callback(const char *filename, const char *passphrase)
++{
++ Key *k;
++ int version;
++ Idtab *tab;
++
++ if ((k = key_load_private(filename, passphrase, NULL)) == NULL)
++ return 1;
++ switch (k->type) {
++ case KEY_RSA:
++ case KEY_RSA1:
++ if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
++ key_free(k);
++ return 1;
++ }
++ break;
++ }
++ version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
++ tab = idtab_lookup(version);
++ if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
++ Identity *id = xmalloc(sizeof(Identity));
++ id->key = k;
++ id->comment = xstrdup(filename);
++ if (id->comment == NULL) {
++ key_free(k);
++ return 1;
++ }
++ id->death = 0;
++ id->confirm = 0;
++ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
++ tab->nentries++;
++ } else {
++ key_free(k);
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static void
++process_add_from_keychain(SocketEntry *e)
++{
++ int result;
++
++ result = add_identities_using_keychain(&add_identity_callback);
++
++ /* e will be NULL when ssh-agent adds keys on its own at startup */
++ if (e) {
++ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
++ buffer_put_char(&e->output,
++ result ? SSH_AGENT_FAILURE : SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS);
++ }
++}
++
+ /* dispatch incoming messages */
+
+ static void
+@@ -795,6 +852,9 @@
+ process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
+ break;
+ #endif /* SMARTCARD */
++ case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_FROM_KEYCHAIN:
++ process_add_from_keychain(e);
++ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
+ error("Unknown message %d", type);
+@@ -1258,6 +1318,10 @@
+ signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+ nalloc = 0;
+
++#ifdef KEYCHAIN
++ process_add_from_keychain(NULL);
++#endif
++
+ while (1) {
+ prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
+ result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/sshconnect1.c ./sshconnect1.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/sshconnect1.c 2006-11-07 04:14:42.000000000 -0800
++++ ./sshconnect1.c 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
+ #include "canohost.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "auth.h"
++#include "keychain.h"
+
+ /* Session id for the current session. */
+ u_char session_id[16];
+@@ -260,7 +261,9 @@
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+- passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
++ passphrase = keychain_read_passphrase(comment);
++ if (passphrase == NULL)
++ passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
+ authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c ./sshconnect2.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/sshconnect2.c 2008-02-10 03:25:53.000000000 -0800
++++ ./sshconnect2.c 2008-04-15 18:32:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
++#include "keychain.h"
+
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+@@ -990,7 +991,9 @@
+ snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
+ "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
+ for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+- passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
++ passphrase = keychain_read_passphrase(filename);
++ if (passphrase == NULL)
++ passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
+ private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
+ filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5491854-fix_unsafe_usage_of_getpwuid.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5491854-fix_unsafe_usage_of_getpwuid.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/AJ-5491854-fix_unsafe_usage_of_getpwuid.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+diff -ru ../openssh-4.5p1.old/ssh-add.c ./ssh-add.c
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.old/ssh-add.c 2006-08-31 22:38:37.000000000 -0700
++++ ./ssh-add.c 2007-09-21 13:11:56.000000000 -0700
+@@ -402,6 +402,7 @@
+ if (argc == 0) {
+ char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ struct passwd *pw;
++ char *pw_dir;
+ struct stat st;
+ int count = 0;
+
+@@ -412,8 +413,10 @@
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++ pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
++
+ for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
+- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw_dir,
+ default_files[i]);
+ if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+ continue;
+@@ -424,6 +427,8 @@
+ }
+ if (count == 0)
+ ret = 1;
++
++ xfree(pw_dir);
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+ if (do_file(ac, deleting, argv[i]) == -1)
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-3977221_manpage_tweaks.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-3977221_manpage_tweaks.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-3977221_manpage_tweaks.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd.0 ./sshd.0
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd.0 2007-09-03 23:50:10.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd.0 2007-09-05 20:44:16.000000000 -0700
+@@ -527,8 +527,8 @@
+
+ SEE ALSO
+ scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
+- ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), hosts_access(5), login.conf(5), moduli(5),
+- sshd_config(5), inetd(8), sftp-server(8)
++ ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), hosts_access(5), sshd_config(5)
++ sftp-server(8)
+
+ AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd.8 ./sshd.8
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd.8 2007-08-16 16:42:33.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd.8 2007-09-05 20:43:10.000000000 -0700
+@@ -833,10 +833,7 @@
+ .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+ .Xr chroot 2 ,
+ .Xr hosts_access 5 ,
+-.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+-.Xr moduli 5 ,
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+-.Xr inetd 8 ,
+ .Xr sftp-server 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.0 ./sshd_config.0
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.0 2007-09-03 23:50:11.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd_config.0 2007-09-05 20:44:58.000000000 -0700
+@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@
+
+ ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed.
+- All authentication styles from login.conf(5) are supported. The
+- default is ``yes''.
++ The default is ``yes''.
+
+ Ciphers
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. Multiple
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 ./sshd_config.5
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 2007-06-10 21:07:13.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd_config.5 2007-09-05 20:45:25.000000000 -0700
+@@ -167,9 +167,6 @@
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed.
+-All authentication styles from
+-.Xr login.conf 5
+-are supported.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4122722+5277818_new_EA.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4122722+5277818_new_EA.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4122722+5277818_new_EA.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+diff -ruN ../openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in ./config.h.in
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1/config.h.in 2007-09-03 23:50:04.000000000 -0700
++++ ./config.h.in 2007-10-01 20:02:51.000000000 -0700
+@@ -56,6 +56,18 @@
+ /* Define if your snprintf is busted */
+ #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+
++/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
++#undef USE_CCAPI
++
++/* platform has a Security Authorization Session API */
++#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++
++/* Define to 1 if you have the `copyfile' function. */
++#undef HAVE_COPYFILE
++
++/* Define to 1 if you have the <copyfile.h> header file. */
++#undef HAVE_COPYFILE_H
++
+ /* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
+ #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
+
+diff -ruN ../openssh-4.7p1/configure ./configure
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1/configure 2007-09-03 23:50:09.000000000 -0700
++++ ./configure 2007-10-01 20:02:51.000000000 -0700
+@@ -28390,6 +28390,259 @@
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
+
++for ac_func in copyfile
++do
++as_ac_var=`echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_func" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_func... $ECHO_C" >&6
++if eval "test \"\${$as_ac_var+set}\" = set"; then
++ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
++else
++ cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* confdefs.h. */
++_ACEOF
++cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
++cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* end confdefs.h. */
++/* Define $ac_func to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $ac_func.
++ For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
++#define $ac_func innocuous_$ac_func
++
++/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
++ which can conflict with char $ac_func (); below.
++ Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
++ <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
++
++#ifdef __STDC__
++# include <limits.h>
++#else
++# include <assert.h>
++#endif
++
++#undef $ac_func
++
++/* Override any gcc2 internal prototype to avoid an error. */
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C"
++{
++#endif
++/* We use char because int might match the return type of a gcc2
++ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
++char $ac_func ();
++/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
++ to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
++ something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
++#if defined (__stub_$ac_func) || defined (__stub___$ac_func)
++choke me
++#else
++char (*f) () = $ac_func;
++#endif
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++#endif
++
++int
++main ()
++{
++return f != $ac_func;
++ ;
++ return 0;
++}
++_ACEOF
++rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
++if { (eval echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \"$ac_link\"") >&5
++ (eval $ac_link) 2>conftest.er1
++ ac_status=$?
++ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
++ rm -f conftest.er1
++ cat conftest.err >&5
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); } &&
++ { ac_try='test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag"
++ || test ! -s conftest.err'
++ { (eval echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \"$ac_try\"") >&5
++ (eval $ac_try) 2>&5
++ ac_status=$?
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); }; } &&
++ { ac_try='test -s conftest$ac_exeext'
++ { (eval echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \"$ac_try\"") >&5
++ (eval $ac_try) 2>&5
++ ac_status=$?
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
++ eval "$as_ac_var=yes"
++else
++ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
++sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
++
++eval "$as_ac_var=no"
++fi
++rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
++ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
++fi
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}`eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'`" >&6
++if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_var'}'` = yes; then
++ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
++#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
++_ACEOF
++
++fi
++done
++
++
++for ac_header in copyfile.h
++do
++as_ac_Header=`echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
++if eval "test \"\${$as_ac_Header+set}\" = set"; then
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6
++if eval "test \"\${$as_ac_Header+set}\" = set"; then
++ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
++fi
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`" >&6
++else
++ # Is the header compilable?
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header usability" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header usability... $ECHO_C" >&6
++cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* confdefs.h. */
++_ACEOF
++cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
++cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* end confdefs.h. */
++$ac_includes_default
++#include <$ac_header>
++_ACEOF
++rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
++if { (eval echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \"$ac_compile\"") >&5
++ (eval $ac_compile) 2>conftest.er1
++ ac_status=$?
++ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
++ rm -f conftest.er1
++ cat conftest.err >&5
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); } &&
++ { ac_try='test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag"
++ || test ! -s conftest.err'
++ { (eval echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \"$ac_try\"") >&5
++ (eval $ac_try) 2>&5
++ ac_status=$?
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); }; } &&
++ { ac_try='test -s conftest.$ac_objext'
++ { (eval echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \"$ac_try\"") >&5
++ (eval $ac_try) 2>&5
++ ac_status=$?
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); }; }; then
++ ac_header_compiler=yes
++else
++ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
++sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
++
++ac_header_compiler=no
++fi
++rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_compiler" >&6
++
++# Is the header present?
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking $ac_header presence" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking $ac_header presence... $ECHO_C" >&6
++cat >conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* confdefs.h. */
++_ACEOF
++cat confdefs.h >>conftest.$ac_ext
++cat >>conftest.$ac_ext <<_ACEOF
++/* end confdefs.h. */
++#include <$ac_header>
++_ACEOF
++if { (eval echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \"$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext\"") >&5
++ (eval $ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext) 2>conftest.er1
++ ac_status=$?
++ grep -v '^ *+' conftest.er1 >conftest.err
++ rm -f conftest.er1
++ cat conftest.err >&5
++ echo "$as_me:$LINENO: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
++ (exit $ac_status); } >/dev/null; then
++ if test -s conftest.err; then
++ ac_cpp_err=$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag
++ ac_cpp_err=$ac_cpp_err$ac_c_werror_flag
++ else
++ ac_cpp_err=
++ fi
++else
++ ac_cpp_err=yes
++fi
++if test -z "$ac_cpp_err"; then
++ ac_header_preproc=yes
++else
++ echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
++sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
++
++ ac_header_preproc=no
++fi
++rm -f conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}$ac_header_preproc" >&6
++
++# So? What about this header?
++case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in
++ yes:no: )
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
++ ac_header_preproc=yes
++ ;;
++ no:yes:* )
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: proceeding with the preprocessor's result" >&2;}
++ { echo "$as_me:$LINENO: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&5
++echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_header: in the future, the compiler will take precedence" >&2;}
++ (
++ cat <<\_ASBOX
++## ------------------------------------------- ##
++## Report this to openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ##
++## ------------------------------------------- ##
++_ASBOX
++ ) |
++ sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
++ ;;
++esac
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: checking for $ac_header" >&5
++echo $ECHO_N "checking for $ac_header... $ECHO_C" >&6
++if eval "test \"\${$as_ac_Header+set}\" = set"; then
++ echo $ECHO_N "(cached) $ECHO_C" >&6
++else
++ eval "$as_ac_Header=\$ac_header_preproc"
++fi
++echo "$as_me:$LINENO: result: `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`" >&5
++echo "${ECHO_T}`eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'`" >&6
++
++fi
++if test `eval echo '${'$as_ac_Header'}'` = yes; then
++ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
++#define `echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
++_ACEOF
++
++fi
++
++done
++
++
++
+ ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile scard/Makefile ssh_prng_cmds survey.sh"
+
+ cat >confcache <<\_ACEOF
+diff -ruN ../openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac ./configure.ac
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1/configure.ac 2007-08-09 21:36:12.000000000 -0700
++++ ./configure.ac 2007-10-01 20:02:51.000000000 -0700
+@@ -3982,6 +3982,9 @@
+ dnl Add now.
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
++AC_CHECK_FUNCS(copyfile)
++AC_CHECK_HEADERS(copyfile.h)
++
+ AC_EXEEXT
+ AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
+ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
+diff -ruN ../openssh-4.7p1/scp.1 ./scp.1
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1/scp.1 2007-08-07 21:29:58.000000000 -0700
++++ ./scp.1 2007-10-01 20:02:51.000000000 -0700
+@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm scp
+ .Bk -words
+-.Op Fl 1246BCpqrv
++.Op Fl 1246BCEpqrv
+ .Op Fl c Ar cipher
+ .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+ .Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@
+ flag to
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ to enable compression.
++.It Fl E
++Preserves extended attributes, resource forks, and ACLs. Requires both ends to be running Mac OS X 10.4 or later.
+ .It Fl c Ar cipher
+ Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
+ This option is directly passed to
+diff -ruN ../openssh-4.7p1/scp.c ./scp.c
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1/scp.c 2007-08-07 21:29:58.000000000 -0700
++++ ./scp.c 2007-10-01 20:29:54.000000000 -0700
+@@ -107,6 +107,11 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "progressmeter.h"
+
++#ifdef HAVE_COPYFILE_H
++#include <libgen.h>
++#include <copyfile.h>
++#endif
++
+ extern char *__progname;
+
+ int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
+@@ -134,6 +139,12 @@
+ /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
+ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
+
++#ifdef HAVE_COPYFILE
++int copy_xattr = 0;
++int md_flag = 0;
++#endif
++
++
+ static void
+ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+@@ -313,7 +324,11 @@
+ addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+
+ fflag = tflag = 0;
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCEc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
++#else
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q1246S:o:F:")) != -1)
++#endif
+ switch (ch) {
+ /* User-visible flags. */
+ case '1':
+@@ -359,6 +374,11 @@
+ showprogress = 0;
+ break;
+
++#ifdef HAVE_COPYFILE
++ case 'E':
++ copy_xattr = 1;
++ break;
++#endif
+ /* Server options. */
+ case 'd':
+ targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+@@ -408,7 +428,12 @@
+ remin = remout = -1;
+ do_cmd_pid = -1;
+ /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s%s",
++ copy_xattr ? " -E" : "",
++#else
+ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
++#endif
+ verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+ iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
+ targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
+@@ -587,6 +612,10 @@
+ int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
+ char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int len;
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++ char md_name[MAXPATHLEN];
++ char *md_tmp;
++#endif
+
+ for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+ name = argv[indx];
+@@ -594,12 +623,26 @@
+ len = strlen(name);
+ while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
+ name[--len] = '\0';
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++md_next:
++ statbytes = 0;
++ if (md_flag) {
++ fd = open(md_tmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
++ unlink(md_tmp);
++ free(md_tmp);
++ if (fd < 0)
++ goto syserr;
++ } else {
++#endif
+ if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0)
+ goto syserr;
+ if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
+ strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
+ name = encname;
+ }
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++ }
++#endif
+ if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
+ syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+ goto next;
+@@ -688,6 +731,36 @@
+ else
+ run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
+ (void) response();
++#ifdef HAVE_COPYFILE
++ if (copy_xattr && md_flag == 0)
++ {
++ if (!copyfile(name, NULL, 0,
++ COPYFILE_ACL | COPYFILE_XATTR | COPYFILE_CHECK))
++ continue;
++
++ /*
++ * this file will hold the actual metadata
++ * to be transferred
++ */
++ md_tmp = strdup("/tmp/scp.md.XXXXXX");
++ md_tmp = mktemp(md_tmp);
++
++ if(copyfile(name, md_tmp, 0,
++ COPYFILE_ACL | COPYFILE_XATTR | COPYFILE_PACK) == 0)
++ {
++ /*
++ * this is the fake name to display
++ */
++ snprintf(md_name, sizeof md_name, "%s/._%s", dirname(name), basename(name));
++ name = md_name;
++ md_flag = 1;
++ if (verbose_mode)
++ fprintf(stderr, "copyfile(%s, %s, PACK)\n", name, md_tmp);
++ goto md_next;
++ }
++ } else
++ md_flag = 0;
++#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -836,6 +909,10 @@
+ if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+ targisdir = 1;
+ for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++ char md_src[MAXPATHLEN];
++ char md_dst[MAXPATHLEN];
++#endif
+ cp = buf;
+ if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+ return;
+@@ -969,6 +1046,32 @@
+ }
+ omode = mode;
+ mode |= S_IWRITE;
++
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++ if (copy_xattr && !strncmp(basename(curfile), "._", 2))
++ {
++ int mdfd;
++ if (targisdir)
++ {
++ snprintf(md_src, sizeof md_src, "%s.XXXXXX", np);
++ snprintf(md_dst, sizeof md_dst, "%s/%s",
++ dirname(np), basename(np) + 2);
++ if((mdfd = mkstemp(md_src)) < 0)
++ continue;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ snprintf(md_src, sizeof md_src, "%s/._%s.XXXXXX",
++ dirname(np), basename(np));
++ snprintf(md_dst, sizeof md_dst, "%s", np);
++ if((mdfd = mkstemp(md_src)) < 0)
++ continue;
++ }
++ if (mdfd >= 0)
++ close(mdfd);
++ np = md_src;
++ }
++#endif
+ if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+ bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+ continue;
+@@ -1057,6 +1160,21 @@
+ wrerrno = errno;
+ }
+ (void) response();
++#ifdef HAVE_COPYFILE
++ if (copy_xattr && strncmp(basename(np), "._", 2) == 0)
++ {
++ if (verbose_mode)
++ fprintf(stderr, "copyfile(%s, %s, UNPACK)\n", md_src, md_dst);
++ if(!copyfile(md_src, md_dst, 0,
++ COPYFILE_ACL | COPYFILE_XATTR | COPYFILE_UNPACK) < 0)
++ {
++ snprintf(md_dst, sizeof md_dst, "%s/._%s",
++ dirname(md_dst), basename(md_dst));
++ rename(md_src, md_dst);
++ } else
++ unlink(md_src);
++ } else
++#endif
+ if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
+ setimes = 0;
+ if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
+@@ -1118,7 +1236,11 @@
+ usage(void)
+ {
+ (void) fprintf(stderr,
++#if HAVE_COPYFILE
++ "usage: scp [-1246BCEpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
++#else
+ "usage: scp [-1246BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
++#endif
+ " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
+ " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
+ exit(1);
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4135812_add_SACLSupport_to_sshd_conf_manpage.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4135812_add_SACLSupport_to_sshd_conf_manpage.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4135812_add_SACLSupport_to_sshd_conf_manpage.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.0 ./sshd_config.0
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.0 2007-09-03 23:50:11.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd_config.0 2008-01-31 17:32:40.000000000 -0800
+@@ -414,6 +414,9 @@
+ fault is ``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 1 on-
+ ly.
+
++ SACLSupport
++ Enables use of Service ACLs on Mac OS X.
++
+ ServerKeyBits
+ Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
+ server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 ./sshd_config.5
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.5 2007-06-10 21:07:13.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd_config.5 2008-01-31 17:33:17.000000000 -0800
+@@ -722,6 +722,8 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ This option applies to protocol version 1 only.
++.It Cm SACLSupport
++Enables use of Service ACLs on Mac OS X.
+ .It Cm ServerKeyBits
+ Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key.
+ The minimum value is 512, and the default is 768.
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4157448+4920695_corrected_UsePAM_comment.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4157448+4920695_corrected_UsePAM_comment.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4157448+4920695_corrected_UsePAM_comment.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/sshd_config ./sshd_config
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/sshd_config 2006-07-23 21:06:47.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd_config 2007-01-11 17:05:47.000000000 -0800
+@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@
+ # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+ #IgnoreRhosts yes
+
+-# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
++# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here! Also,
++# remember to set the UsePAM setting to 'no'.
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+
+@@ -78,7 +79,10 @@
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-#UsePAM no
++# Also, PAM will deny null passwords by default. If you need to allow
++# null passwords, add the " nullok" option to the end of the
++# securityserver.so line in /etc/pam.d/sshd.
++#UsePAM yes
+
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ #GatewayPorts no
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4212542_auth_error_logging_fix.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4212542_auth_error_logging_fix.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4212542_auth_error_logging_fix.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.3p2.orig/sshd_config ./sshd_config
+--- ../openssh-4.3p2.orig/sshd_config 2005-12-13 00:29:03.000000000 -0800
++++ ./sshd_config 2006-10-18 16:47:04.000000000 -0700
+@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
+
+ # Logging
+ # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
+-#SyslogFacility AUTH
++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
+ #LogLevel INFO
+
+ # Authentication:
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4648874_preserve_EA_mtime.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4648874_preserve_EA_mtime.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4648874_preserve_EA_mtime.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/scp.c ./scp.c
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/scp.c 2006-12-12 13:08:35.000000000 -0800
++++ ./scp.c 2006-12-12 15:53:57.000000000 -0800
+@@ -1163,6 +1163,14 @@
+ rename(md_src, md_dst);
+ } else
+ unlink(md_src);
++ if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
++ setimes = 0;
++ if (utimes(md_dst, tv) < 0) {
++ run_err("%s: set times: %s",
++ np, strerror(errno));
++ wrerr = DISPLAYED;
++ }
++ }
+ } else
+ #endif
+ if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4694589_16_group_limit_fix.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4694589_16_group_limit_fix.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4694589_16_group_limit_fix.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/uidswap.c ./uidswap.c
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/uidswap.c 2006-08-04 19:39:41.000000000 -0700
++++ ./uidswap.c 2007-01-12 19:26:22.000000000 -0800
+@@ -233,6 +239,9 @@
+ fatal("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+ #endif
+
++ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0)
++ fatal("setgid %.100s %u: %.100s", pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
++
+ #if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
+ if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0)
+ fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4748610+4897588_ssh-agent_via_launchd.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4748610+4897588_ssh-agent_via_launchd.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4748610+4897588_ssh-agent_via_launchd.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+diff -ru ../openssh-4.7p1.old/ssh-agent.c ./ssh-agent.c
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.old/ssh-agent.c 2007-03-21 02:45:07.000000000 -0700
++++ ./ssh-agent.c 2007-10-01 01:01:39.000000000 -0700
+@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
+ #include <time.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
++#include <launch.h>
++#endif
+
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ #include "ssh.h"
+@@ -1031,7 +1034,11 @@
+ int
+ main(int ac, char **av)
+ {
++#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
++ int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0, l_flag = 0;
++#else
+ int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
++#endif
+ int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
+ u_int nalloc;
+ char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
+@@ -1065,7 +1072,11 @@
+ init_rng();
+ seed_rng();
+
++#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
++ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdklsa:t:")) != -1) {
++#else
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:t:")) != -1) {
++#endif
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'c':
+ if (s_flag)
+@@ -1075,6 +1086,11 @@
+ case 'k':
+ k_flag++;
+ break;
++#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
++ case 'l':
++ l_flag++;
++ break;
++#endif
+ case 's':
+ if (c_flag)
+ usage();
+@@ -1101,7 +1117,11 @@
+ ac -= optind;
+ av += optind;
+
++#ifdef __APPPLE_LAUNCHD__
++ if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || l_flag))
++#else
+ if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag))
++#endif
+ usage();
+
+ if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
+@@ -1157,6 +1177,53 @@
+ * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
+ * the parent.
+ */
++#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
++ if (l_flag) {
++ launch_data_t resp, msg, tmp;
++ size_t listeners_i;
++
++ msg = launch_data_new_string(LAUNCH_KEY_CHECKIN);
++
++ resp = launch_msg(msg);
++
++ if (NULL == resp) {
++ perror("launch_msg");
++ exit(1);
++ }
++ launch_data_free(msg);
++ switch (launch_data_get_type(resp)) {
++ case LAUNCH_DATA_ERRNO:
++ errno = launch_data_get_errno(resp);
++ perror("launch_msg response");
++ exit(1);
++ case LAUNCH_DATA_DICTIONARY:
++ break;
++ default:
++ fprintf(stderr, "launch_msg unknown response");
++ exit(1);
++ }
++ tmp = launch_data_dict_lookup(resp, LAUNCH_JOBKEY_SOCKETS);
++
++ if (NULL == tmp) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "no sockets\n");
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
++ tmp = launch_data_dict_lookup(tmp, "Listeners");
++
++ if (NULL == tmp) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "no known listeners\n");
++ exit(1);
++ }
++
++ for (listeners_i = 0; listeners_i < launch_data_array_get_count(tmp); listeners_i++) {
++ launch_data_t obj_at_ind = launch_data_array_get_index(tmp, listeners_i);
++ new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, launch_data_get_fd(obj_at_ind));
++ }
++
++ launch_data_free(resp);
++ } else {
++#endif
+ sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (sock < 0) {
+ perror("socket");
+@@ -1178,6 +1245,9 @@
+ perror("listen");
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+ }
++#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
++ }
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
+@@ -1191,6 +1261,12 @@
+ printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
+ goto skip;
+ }
++
++#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
++ if (l_flag)
++ goto skip2;
++#endif
++
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ perror("fork");
+@@ -1246,6 +1322,7 @@
+
+ skip:
+ new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
++skip2:
+ if (ac > 0)
+ parent_alive_interval = 10;
+ idtab_init();
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/readconf.c ./readconf.c
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/readconf.c 2006-12-05 21:05:28.000000000 -0800
++++ ./readconf.c 2006-12-05 21:10:59.000000000 -0800
+@@ -1113,10 +1113,17 @@
+ options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
++#ifdef __APPLE_GSSAPI_ENABLE__
++ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
++ options->gss_authentication = 1;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 1;
++#else
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
++#endif
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/servconf.c ./servconf.c
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/servconf.c 2006-12-05 21:05:28.000000000 -0800
++++ ./servconf.c 2006-12-05 21:08:44.000000000 -0800
+@@ -204,10 +204,17 @@
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+ if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
++#ifdef __APPLE_GSSAPI_ENABLE__
++ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
++ options->gss_authentication = 1;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 1;
++#else
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
++#endif
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4853931_enable_GSSAPI_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+diff -ur ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/ssh_config.5.out ./ssh_config.5.out
+--- ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/ssh_config.5.out 2008-02-07 13:25:33.000000000 -0800
++++ ./ssh_config.5.out 2008-02-07 13:31:16.000000000 -0800
+@@ -475,13 +475,13 @@
+ .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+-.Dq no .
++.Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
+ GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
+ The default is
+-.Dq no .
++.Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+diff -ur ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/ssh_config.out ./ssh_config.out
+--- ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/ssh_config.out 2008-02-07 13:25:32.000000000 -0800
++++ ./ssh_config.out 2008-02-07 13:29:57.000000000 -0800
+@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@
+ # RSAAuthentication yes
+ # PasswordAuthentication yes
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+-# GSSAPIAuthentication no
++# GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+-# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
+ # GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+diff -ur ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/sshd_config.5.out ./sshd_config.5.out
+--- ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/sshd_config.5.out 2008-02-07 13:25:33.000000000 -0800
++++ ./sshd_config.5.out 2008-02-07 13:31:43.000000000 -0800
+@@ -313,13 +313,13 @@
+ .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+ The default is
+-.Dq no .
++.Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
+ doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
+ The default is
+-.Dq no .
++.Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+diff -ur ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/sshd_config.out ./sshd_config.out
+--- ../OpenSSH-5729681~obj.orig/sshd_config.out 2008-02-07 13:26:28.000000000 -0800
++++ ./sshd_config.out 2008-02-07 13:30:22.000000000 -0800
+@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@
+ #KerberosGetAFSToken no
+
+ # GSSAPI options
+-#GSSAPIAuthentication no
++#GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+ #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
+-#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange yes
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4920695_remove_nullok_comment_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4920695_remove_nullok_comment_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-4920695_remove_nullok_comment_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config ./sshd_config
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1.orig/sshd_config.out 2008-02-06 10:27:36.000000000 -0800
++++ ./sshd_config.out 2008-02-06 10:26:39.000000000 -0800
+@@ -83,9 +83,6 @@
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+-# Also, PAM will deny null passwords by default. If you need to allow
+-# null passwords, add the " nullok" option to the end of the
+-# securityserver.so line in /etc/pam.d/sshd.
+ #UsePAM yes
+
+ #AllowTcpForwarding yes
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5142987_launchd_DISPLAY_for_X11.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5142987_launchd_DISPLAY_for_X11.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5142987_launchd_DISPLAY_for_X11.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/channels.c ./channels.c
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/channels.c 2006-08-29 18:07:40.000000000 -0700
++++ ./channels.c 2007-04-19 18:59:28.000000000 -0700
+@@ -2954,7 +2954,7 @@
+ }
+
+ static int
+-connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
++connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+ {
+ int sock;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr;
+@@ -2964,7 +2964,7 @@
+ error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+- snprintf(addr.sun_path, sizeof addr.sun_path, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
++ strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+ return sock;
+ close(sock);
+@@ -2972,6 +2972,14 @@
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++static int
++connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
++{
++ char buf[1024];
++ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
++ return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
++}
++
+ int
+ x11_connect_display(void)
+ {
+@@ -2994,9 +3002,18 @@
+ */
+
+ /*
++ * Check if the display is from launchd, then...
+ * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
+ * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
+ */
++ if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
++ sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
++ if (sock < 0)
++ return -1;
++
++ /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
++ return sock;
++ }
+ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
+ display[0] == ':') {
+ /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5258734_pty_permission_fix.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5258734_pty_permission_fix.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5258734_pty_permission_fix.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/session.c ./session.c
+--- ../openssh-4.5p1.orig/session.c 2006-10-23 10:01:56.000000000 -0700
++++ ./session.c 2007-06-15 11:23:17.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1846,8 +1846,10 @@
+ n_bytes = packet_remaining();
+ tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
+
++#ifndef __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
+ if (!use_privsep)
+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
++#endif
+
+ /* Set window size from the packet. */
+ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+@@ -2085,9 +2087,11 @@
+ if (s->pid != 0)
+ record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
+
++#ifndef __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
+ /* Release the pseudo-tty. */
+ if (getuid() == 0)
+ pty_release(s->tty);
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5462402_enable_SSH1_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5462402_enable_SSH1_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5462402_enable_SSH1_for_pre-Leopard---BuildPhase.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+--- ../openssh-4.7p1/sshd_config.out 2007-03-21 02:42:25.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd_config.out 2006-07-23 21:06:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -11,15 +11,11 @@
+ # default value.
+
+ #Port 22
++#Protocol 2,1
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+ #ListenAddress ::
+
+-# Disable legacy (protocol version 1) support in the server for new
+-# installations. In future the default will change to require explicit
+-# activation of protocol 1
+-Protocol 2
+-
+ # HostKey for protocol version 1
+ #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+ # HostKeys for protocol version 2
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5755519_use_GSS_C_NO_NAME_with_gss_acquire_cred.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5755519_use_GSS_C_NO_NAME_with_gss_acquire_cred.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/DVG-5755519_use_GSS_C_NO_NAME_with_gss_acquire_cred.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/gss-serv.c ./gss-serv.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/gss-serv.c 2008-04-15 17:48:41.000000000 -0700
++++ ./gss-serv.c 2008-04-15 17:49:27.000000000 -0700
+@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
++ GSS_C_NO_NAME, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
+ NULL, NULL)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/lastlog.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/lastlog.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/lastlog.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff -uNr ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/loginrec.c ./loginrec.c
+--- ../openssh-5.0p1.orig/loginrec.c 2007-04-28 19:10:58.000000000 -0700
++++ ./loginrec.c 2008-04-17 12:43:18.000000000 -0700
+@@ -1456,6 +1456,38 @@
+ **/
+
+ #ifdef USE_LASTLOG
++#ifdef __APPLE_UTMPX__
++int
++lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
++{
++ switch(li->type) {
++ case LTYPE_LOGIN:
++ return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
++ default:
++ logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
++ return 0;
++ }
++}
++
++int
++lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
++{
++ struct lastlogx l, *ll;
++
++ if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
++ memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
++ ll = &l;
++ }
++ line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
++ strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
++ MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
++ li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
++ li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
++ return (1);
++}
++
++#else /* !__APPLE_UTMPX__ */
++
+ #define LL_FILE 1
+ #define LL_DIR 2
+ #define LL_OTHER 3
+@@ -1613,6 +1645,7 @@
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return (0);
+ }
++#endif /* __APPLE_UTMPX__ */
+ #endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+
+ #ifdef USE_BTMP
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-5.0p1-gsskex-20080404.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-5.0p1-gsskex-20080404.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-5.0p1-gsskex-20080404.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,2295 @@
+? gss-genr.c.pre14
+? kex.c.pre14
+? kex.h.pre14
+? kexgssc.c.pre14
+? kexgsss.c.pre14
+? monitor.c.pre14
+? new.patch
+? ssh-gss.h.pre14
+? sshconnect2.c.pre14
+? sshd.c.pre14
+Index: ChangeLog.gssapi
+===================================================================
+RCS file: ChangeLog.gssapi
+diff -N ChangeLog.gssapi
+--- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
++++ ChangeLog.gssapi 4 Apr 2008 12:52:27 -0000
+@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
++20080404
++ - [ gss-serv.c ]
++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++ Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
++ function
++
++20061220
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++ ssh-gss.h ]
++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++ <Bugzilla #928>
++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++ configuration files
++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++ only, where they belong
++ <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
++ variable
++
++20060828
++ - [ gss-genr.c ]
++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
++ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++ fix compiler errors/warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ fix uninitialized variable warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ gssgenr.c ]
++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Bugzilla #1220 >
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+Index: Makefile.in
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/Makefile.in,v
+retrieving revision 1.289
+diff -u -r1.289 Makefile.in
+--- Makefile.in 13 Mar 2008 01:41:31 -0000 1.289
++++ Makefile.in 4 Apr 2008 12:52:27 -0000
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
+ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o kexdh.o \
+ kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o scard.o msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o \
+- entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o
++ entropy.o scard-opensc.o gss-genr.o umac.o kexgssc.o
+
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o \
+ auth-krb5.o \
+- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ audit.o audit-bsm.o platform.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o
+
+Index: auth-krb5.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.35
+diff -u -r1.35 auth-krb5.c
+--- auth-krb5.c 5 Aug 2006 02:39:39 -0000 1.35
++++ auth-krb5.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:28 -0000
+@@ -166,8 +166,13 @@
+
+ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -219,15 +224,22 @@
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+- int tmpfd, ret;
++ int ret;
+ char ccname[40];
+ mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++ int tmpfd;
++#endif
+
+ ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++ cctemplate, geteuid());
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ return ENOMEM;
+
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ umask(old_umask);
+@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@
+ return errno;
+ }
+ close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+Index: auth.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.78
+diff -u -r1.78 auth.h
+--- auth.h 26 Oct 2007 04:25:13 -0000 1.78
++++ auth.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:28 -0000
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */
+ int attempt;
+ int failures;
++ int server_caused_failure;
+ int force_pwchange;
+ char *user; /* username sent by the client */
+ char *service;
+Index: auth2-gss.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2-gss.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.19
+diff -u -r1.19 auth2-gss.c
+--- auth2-gss.c 2 Dec 2007 11:59:45 -0000 1.19
++++ auth2-gss.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:28 -0000
+@@ -52,6 +52,39 @@
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
++/*
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ int authenticated = 0;
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++ u_int len;
++
++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++ mic.length = len;
++
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++ &gssbuf, &mic))))
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ xfree(mic.value);
++
++ return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -102,6 +135,7 @@
+
+ if (!present) {
+ xfree(doid);
++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+@@ -109,6 +143,7 @@
+ if (ctxt != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+ xfree(doid);
++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+@@ -291,6 +326,12 @@
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ }
++
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++ "gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication
++};
+
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+Index: auth2.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/auth2.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.145
+diff -u -r1.145 auth2.c
+--- auth2.c 26 Oct 2007 04:26:16 -0000 1.145
++++ auth2.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:28 -0000
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+
+@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@
+ &method_none,
+ &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ &method_gsskeyex,
+ &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ &method_passwd,
+@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@
+ #endif
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
++ authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+
+ /* try to authenticate user */
+ m = authmethod_lookup(method);
+@@ -264,7 +267,9 @@
+ /* now we can break out */
+ authctxt->success = 1;
+ } else {
+- if (authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
++ /* Dont count server configuration issues against the client */
++ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
++ authctxt->failures++ > options.max_authtries) {
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+ #endif
+Index: configure.ac
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/configure.ac,v
+retrieving revision 1.397
+diff -u -r1.397 configure.ac
+--- configure.ac 27 Mar 2008 01:33:07 -0000 1.397
++++ configure.ac 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -459,6 +459,30 @@
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF, 1,
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++ [cc_context_t c;
++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
++ fi],
++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
++ )
+ m4_pattern_allow(AU_IPv)
+ AC_CHECK_DECL(AU_IPv4, [],
+ AC_DEFINE(AU_IPv4, 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+Index: gss-genr.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-genr.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.21
+diff -u -r1.21 gss-genr.c
+--- gss-genr.c 12 Jun 2007 13:44:36 -0000 1.21
++++ gss-genr.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -39,12 +39,160 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
++typedef struct {
++ char *encoded;
++ gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host) {
++ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++ OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++ gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported);
++
++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++ host));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++ const char *data) {
++ Buffer buf;
++ size_t i;
++ int oidpos, enclen;
++ char *mechs, *encoded;
++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ char deroid[2];
++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++ EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++ xfree(gss_enc2oid);
++ }
++
++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++ (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++ buffer_init(&buf);
++
++ oidpos = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), data)) {
++
++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++ if (oidpos != 0)
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++ oidpos++;
++ }
++ }
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_free(&buf);
++
++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++ xfree(mechs);
++ mechs = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++ int i = 0;
++
++ switch (kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ }
++
++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++ i++;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -229,6 +377,9 @@
+ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -236,6 +387,19 @@
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++ return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+@@ -254,6 +418,10 @@
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ ctx = &intctx;
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -272,7 +440,7 @@
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+Index: gss-serv-krb5.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-serv-krb5.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.17
+diff -u -r1.17 gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- gss-serv-krb5.c 1 Sep 2006 05:38:36 -0000 1.17
++++ gss-serv-krb5.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
+ krb5_principal princ;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ int len;
++ const char *new_ccname;
+
+ if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
+- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+Index: gss-serv.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/gss-serv.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.23
+diff -u -r1.23 gss-serv.c
+--- gss-serv.c 12 Jun 2007 13:40:39 -0000 1.23
++++ gss-serv.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.21 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2008 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -44,8 +44,12 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+@@ -80,25 +84,32 @@
+ char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (-1);
++ }
+
+- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (-1);
+- }
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
++ NULL, NULL)))
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
++ } else {
++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ }
+-
+- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (ctx->major);
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -113,6 +124,28 @@
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
++ gss_OID_set supported;
++
++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++ NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data) {
++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++ int res;
++
++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++ return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -349,16 +382,6 @@
+ else
+ debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
+ return (0);
+-}
+-
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+-{
+- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+-
+- return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ #endif
+Index: kex.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.86
+diff -u -r1.86 kex.c
+--- kex.c 5 Jun 2007 08:30:18 -0000 1.86
++++ kex.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -49,6 +49,10 @@
+ #include "dispatch.h"
+ #include "monitor.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
+
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+@@ -326,6 +330,20 @@
+ } else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
+ k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
+ k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
++#endif
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
++ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
++ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
++ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
+ #endif
+ } else
+ fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
+Index: kex.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/kex.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.49
+diff -u -r1.49 kex.h
+--- kex.h 11 Jun 2007 04:01:42 -0000 1.49
++++ kex.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
+ KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_MAX
+ };
+
+@@ -119,6 +122,11 @@
+ sig_atomic_t done;
+ int flags;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ int gss_deleg_creds;
++ int gss_trust_dns;
++ char *gss_host;
++#endif
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+@@ -140,6 +148,11 @@
+ void kexdh_server(Kex *);
+ void kexgex_client(Kex *);
+ void kexgex_server(Kex *);
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++void kexgss_client(Kex *);
++void kexgss_server(Kex *);
++#endif
+
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+Index: kexgssc.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: kexgssc.c
+diff -N kexgssc.c
+--- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
++++ kexgssc.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++void
++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
++ DH *dh;
++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++ char *msg;
++ char *lang;
++ int type = 0;
++ int first = 1;
++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++
++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
++ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ packet_put_int(min);
++ packet_put_int(nbits);
++ packet_put_int(max);
++
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(p);
++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(g);
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++
++ do {
++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++ &ret_flags);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++ }
++
++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++ xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity check failed");
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++ */
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ if (first) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ first = 0;
++ } else {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++ do {
++ type = packet_read();
++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++ serverhostkey =
++ packet_get_string(&slen);
++ }
++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ msg_tok.length = strlen;
++
++ /* Is there a token included? */
++ if (packet_get_char()) {
++ recv_tok.value=
++ packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++ } else {
++ /* No token included */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++ }
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++ debug("Received Error");
++ maj_status = packet_get_int();
++ min_status = packet_get_int();
++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++ } else {
++ /* No data, and not complete */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ /*
++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
++ */
++
++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ BN_bin2bn(kbuf,kout, shared_secret);
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ xfree(kbuf);
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ serverhostkey, slen, /* server host key */
++ dh->pub_key, /* e */
++ dh_server_pub, /* f */
++ shared_secret, /* K */
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->evp_md,
++ kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ serverhostkey, slen,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ dh_server_pub,
++ shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++ xfree(msg_tok.value);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ xfree(serverhostkey);
++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++ /* save session id */
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ kex_finish(kex);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+Index: kexgsss.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: kexgsss.c
+diff -N kexgsss.c
+--- /dev/null 1 Jan 1970 00:00:00 -0000
++++ kexgsss.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2006 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++void
++kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
++{
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ /*
++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
++ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++ */
++
++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
++ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++ DH *dh;
++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++ int type = 0;
++ gss_OID oid;
++
++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++ * into life
++ */
++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
++ ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++
++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange");
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ min = packet_get_int();
++ nbits = packet_get_int();
++ max = packet_get_int();
++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++ packet_check_eom();
++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, nbits, max);
++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++ if (dh == NULL)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_write_wait();
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ do {
++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++ type = packet_read();
++ switch(type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++
++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++ break;
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect(
++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++
++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++ xfree(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("No client public key");
++
++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ }
++ fatal("accept_ctx died");
++ }
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret);
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ xfree(kbuf);
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash(
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->evp_md,
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ NULL, 0,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh_client_pub,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ BN_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ } else {
++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++ }
++ packet_send();
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++
++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ kex_finish(kex);
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+Index: key.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.72
+diff -u -r1.72 key.c
+--- key.c 28 Feb 2008 08:22:04 -0000 1.72
++++ key.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -649,6 +649,8 @@
+ return KEY_RSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
+ return KEY_DSA;
++ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
++ return KEY_NULL;
+ }
+ debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
+ return KEY_UNSPEC;
+Index: key.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/key.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.28
+diff -u -r1.28 key.h
+--- key.h 5 Aug 2006 02:39:40 -0000 1.28
++++ key.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ KEY_RSA1,
+ KEY_RSA,
+ KEY_DSA,
++ KEY_NULL,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ enum fp_type {
+Index: monitor.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.127
+diff -u -r1.127 monitor.c
+--- monitor.c 11 Mar 2008 11:58:25 -0000 1.127
++++ monitor.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -163,6 +163,7 @@
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -232,11 +233,17 @@
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+@@ -341,6 +348,10 @@
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+@@ -418,6 +429,10 @@
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1670,6 +1685,11 @@
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+@@ -1911,6 +1931,7 @@
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1961,4 +1982,42 @@
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc data;
++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 major, minor;
++ u_int len;
++
++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ data.length = len;
++ if (data.length != 20)
++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__, data.length);
++
++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++ session_id2_len = data.length;
++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++ }
++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++ xfree(data.value);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, major);
++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+Index: monitor.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.21
+diff -u -r1.21 monitor.h
+--- monitor.h 26 Mar 2006 03:30:02 -0000 1.21
++++ monitor.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK,
+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC,
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX,
+Index: monitor_wrap.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.76
+diff -u -r1.76 monitor_wrap.c
+--- monitor_wrap.c 2 Dec 2007 12:02:15 -0000 1.76
++++ monitor_wrap.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -1238,4 +1238,27 @@
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ OM_uint32 major;
++ u_int len;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++ hash->length = len;
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return(major);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+Index: monitor_wrap.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/monitor_wrap.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.27
+diff -u -r1.27 monitor_wrap.h
+--- monitor_wrap.h 5 Aug 2006 02:39:40 -0000 1.27
++++ monitor_wrap.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+ int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+Index: readconf.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.142
+diff -u -r1.142 readconf.c
+--- readconf.c 10 Feb 2008 11:25:52 -0000 1.142
++++ readconf.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -127,6 +127,8 @@
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++ oGssKeyEx,
++ oGssTrustDns,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
+ oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+@@ -163,10 +165,14 @@
+ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -442,10 +448,18 @@
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssTrustDns:
++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1010,7 +1024,9 @@
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication = -1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1099,8 +1115,12 @@
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+Index: readconf.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/readconf.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.64
+diff -u -r1.64 readconf.h
+--- readconf.h 10 Feb 2008 11:25:52 -0000 1.64
++++ readconf.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:29 -0000
+@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+Index: servconf.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/servconf.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.168
+diff -u -r1.168 servconf.c
+--- servconf.c 10 Feb 2008 11:48:55 -0000 1.168
++++ servconf.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -90,7 +90,9 @@
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication=-1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -205,8 +207,12 @@
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -291,7 +297,9 @@
+ sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++ sGssKeyEx,
++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
+ sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+@@ -352,9 +360,13 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -875,8 +887,16 @@
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+Index: servconf.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/servconf.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.74
+diff -u -r1.74 servconf.h
+--- servconf.h 7 Mar 2008 07:31:24 -0000 1.74
++++ servconf.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -90,7 +90,9 @@
+ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+Index: ssh-gss.h
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh-gss.h,v
+retrieving revision 1.12
+diff -u -r1.12 ssh-gss.h
+--- ssh-gss.h 12 Jun 2007 13:40:39 -0000 1.12
++++ ssh-gss.h 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@
+
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ char *filename;
+ char *envvar;
+@@ -97,6 +108,7 @@
+ } Gssctxt;
+
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -119,6 +131,11 @@
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+@@ -126,6 +143,8 @@
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+Index: ssh_config
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh_config,v
+retrieving revision 1.25
+diff -u -r1.25 ssh_config
+--- ssh_config 11 Jun 2007 04:04:42 -0000 1.25
++++ ssh_config 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+ # AddressFamily any
+Index: ssh_config.5
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/ssh_config.5,v
+retrieving revision 1.105
+diff -u -r1.105 ssh_config.5
+--- ssh_config.5 2 Dec 2007 12:09:30 -0000 1.105
++++ ssh_config.5 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -477,11 +477,28 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes
++to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no ,
++the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+Index: sshconnect2.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshconnect2.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.156
+diff -u -r1.156 sshconnect2.c
+--- sshconnect2.c 10 Feb 2008 11:25:53 -0000 1.156
++++ sshconnect2.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -99,9 +99,34 @@
+ {
+ Kex *kex;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++ char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = host;
++
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host);
++ if (gss) {
++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+ logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -129,6 +154,16 @@
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++ "%s,null", orig);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.rekey_limit)
+ packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
+
+@@ -138,10 +173,21 @@
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++#endif
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++#endif
++
+ xxx_kex = kex;
+
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+@@ -224,6 +270,7 @@
+ void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+
+ void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -239,6 +286,10 @@
+
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ {"gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication,
++ NULL},
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ &options.gss_authentication,
+@@ -501,6 +552,12 @@
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
++ char *gss_host = NULL;
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = (char *)authctxt->host;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+@@ -513,7 +570,7 @@
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+@@ -609,8 +666,8 @@
+ {
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+- int oidlen;
+- char *oidv;
++ u_int oidlen;
++ u_char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -717,6 +774,48 @@
+ xfree(msg);
+ xfree(lang);
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 ms;
++
++ static int attempt = 0;
++ if (attempt++ >= 1)
++ return (0);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++ packet_send();
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++ return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ int
+Index: sshd.c
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd.c,v
+retrieving revision 1.372
+diff -u -r1.372 sshd.c
+--- sshd.c 11 Mar 2008 11:58:25 -0000 1.372
++++ sshd.c 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -119,6 +119,10 @@
+ #include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef LIBWRAP
+ #include <tcpd.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+@@ -1501,10 +1505,13 @@
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ }
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ }
++#endif
+ if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+@@ -1777,6 +1784,60 @@
+ /* Log the connection. */
+ verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++ /*
++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++ *
++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
++ * same session (bad).
++ *
++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++ * automatically.
++ *
++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++ */
++ {
++ OSStatus err = 0;
++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++ else {
++ debug("Creating new security session...");
++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
++ &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2153,12 +2214,59 @@
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {
++ char *orig;
++ char *gss = NULL;
++ char *newstr = NULL;
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ /*
++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++ * the other key exchange algorithms
++ */
++
++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++ orig = NULL;
++
++ if (options.gss_keyex)
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++ else
++ gss = NULL;
++
++ if (gss && orig)
++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ else if (gss)
++ newstr = gss;
++ else if (orig)
++ newstr = orig;
++
++ /*
++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++ * host key algorithm we support
++ */
++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++ if (newstr)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++ else
++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+Index: sshd_config
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd_config,v
+retrieving revision 1.79
+diff -u -r1.79 sshd_config
+--- sshd_config 10 Feb 2008 11:40:12 -0000 1.79
++++ sshd_config 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+Index: sshd_config.5
+===================================================================
+RCS file: /cvs/openssh/sshd_config.5,v
+retrieving revision 1.90
+diff -u -r1.90 sshd_config.5
+--- sshd_config.5 27 Mar 2008 00:02:02 -0000 1.90
++++ sshd_config.5 4 Apr 2008 12:52:30 -0000
+@@ -365,12 +365,35 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
++a client authenticates against. If
++.Dq yes
++then the client must authenticate against the
++.Pa host
++service on the current hostname. If
++.Dq no
++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
++on multi homed machines.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
++and setting it to
++.Dq no
++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -Naur ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/servconf.c ./servconf.c
+--- ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/servconf.c 2006-08-18 07:23:15.000000000 -0700
++++ ./servconf.c 2006-10-19 17:12:43.000000000 -0700
+@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
+ {
+ /* Portable-specific options */
+ if (options->use_pam == -1)
+- options->use_pam = 0;
++ options->use_pam = 1;
+
+ /* Standard Options */
+ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/sacl.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/sacl.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/sacl.patch 2008-07-24 04:33:03 UTC (rev 38526)
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+diff -Naur ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/auth.c ./auth.c
+--- ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/auth.c 2006-09-06 17:36:43.000000000 -0700
++++ ./auth.c 2006-10-19 17:22:43.000000000 -0700
+@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+ #include <libgen.h>
+ #endif
++
++#ifdef __APPLE_SACL__
++#include <membershipPriv.h>
++#endif
++
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -233,6 +238,46 @@
+ }
+ ga_free();
+ }
++
++ if( options.sacl_support )
++ {
++#ifdef __APPLE_SACL__
++ /*
++ * Here we check with memberd if the Service ACLs allow this user to
++ * use the ssh service.
++ */
++
++ debug("Checking with Service ACLs for ssh login restrictions");
++
++ uuid_t user_uuid;
++ int isMember = 0;
++ int mbrErr = 0;
++
++ // get the uuid
++ if ( mbr_user_name_to_uuid(pw->pw_name, user_uuid) )
++ {
++ debug("call to mbr_user_name_to_uuid with <%s> failed to retrieve user_uuid", pw->pw_name);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ debug("call to mbr_user_name_to_uuid with <%s> suceeded to retrieve user_uuid", pw->pw_name);
++
++ // check the sacl
++ if((mbrErr = mbr_check_service_membership(user_uuid, "ssh", &isMember)))
++ {
++ debug("Called mbr_check_service_membership with isMember <%d> with status <%d>", isMember, mbrErr);
++ if(mbrErr == ENOENT) // no ACL exists
++ {
++ return 1;
++ } else {
++ return 0;
++ }
++ }
++ debug("Call to mbr_check_service_membership failed with status <%d>", mbrErr);
++ return isMember;
++#endif /* __APPLE_SACL__ */
++ }
++
++
+
+ #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
+ if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
+diff -Naur ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/servconf.c ./servconf.c
+--- ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/servconf.c 2006-08-18 07:23:15.000000000 -0700
++++ ./servconf.c 2006-10-19 17:24:47.000000000 -0700
+@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@
+ options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+ options->permit_user_env = -1;
+ options->use_login = -1;
++ options->sacl_support = -1;
+ options->compression = -1;
+ options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
+ options->num_allow_users = 0;
+@@ -293,6 +294,7 @@
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
++ sSACLSupport,
+ sDeprecated, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+
+@@ -398,6 +400,7 @@
+ { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "saclsupport", sSACLSupport },
+ { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -912,6 +915,10 @@
+ charptr = &options->xauth_location;
+ goto parse_filename;
+
++ case sSACLSupport:
++ intptr = &options->sacl_support;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sStrictModes:
+ intptr = &options->strict_modes;
+ goto parse_flag;
+diff -Naur ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/servconf.h ./servconf.h
+--- ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/servconf.h 2006-08-18 07:23:15.000000000 -0700
++++ ./servconf.h 2006-10-19 17:25:18.000000000 -0700
+@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@
+ char *adm_forced_command;
+
+ int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
++ int sacl_support; /* Enable use of SACLs */
+
+ int permit_tun;
+
+diff -Naur ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/sshd_config ./sshd_config
+--- ../openssh-4.4p1.orig/sshd_config 2006-07-23 21:06:47.000000000 -0700
++++ ./sshd_config 2006-10-19 17:26:01.000000000 -0700
+@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@
+ #PasswordAuthentication yes
+ #PermitEmptyPasswords no
+
++# SACL options
++#SACLSupport yes
++
+ # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+
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