[112514] trunk/dports/net/openssh
sean at macports.org
sean at macports.org
Thu Oct 24 21:14:15 PDT 2013
Revision: 112514
https://trac.macports.org/changeset/112514
Author: sean at macports.org
Date: 2013-10-24 21:14:14 -0700 (Thu, 24 Oct 2013)
Log Message:
-----------
openssh: update to 6.3p1 fixes #40804
Modified Paths:
--------------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch
Added Paths:
-----------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch
Removed Paths:
-------------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.2p2-gsskex-all-20110125.patch
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2013-10-24 21:47:52 UTC (rev 112513)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2013-10-25 04:14:14 UTC (rev 112514)
@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@
PortSystem 1.0
name openssh
-version 6.2p2
-revision 3
+version 6.3p1
categories net
platforms darwin
@@ -29,8 +28,8 @@
homepage http://www.openbsd.org/openssh/
checksums ${distfiles} \
- rmd160 1fab1ae5f2db71b6f9e8bbbab574334c3985bd2d \
- sha256 7f29b9d2ad672ae0f9e1dcbff871fc5c2e60a194e90c766432e32161b842313b
+ rmd160 df9e0946a1775c0e78669447f044724fdfc11e49 \
+ sha256 aea575ededd3ebd45c05d42d0a87af22c79131a847ea440c54e3fdd223f5a420
master_sites openbsd:OpenSSH/portable \
http://mirror.mcs.anl.gov/openssh/portable/ \
@@ -101,12 +100,12 @@
variant hpn conflicts gsskex description {Apply high performance patch} {
# http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh
- patch_sites-append http://distfiles.gentoo.org/distfiles/:hpn
- set hpn_patchfile ${distname}-hpn14v1.diff.gz
- patchfiles-append ${hpn_patchfile}:hpn
+ patch_sites-append sourceforge:hpnssh
+ set hpn_patchfile ${distname}-hpnssh14v2.diff.gz
+ patchfiles-append ${hpn_patchfile}
checksums-append ${hpn_patchfile} \
- rmd160 6e1593e58b093d0908a98f3bba5c3b187eabffc8 \
- sha256 5243c76ceecb2fd0934d87fd9c33604ff0241c00156e456bf5b7e40e407d8c90
+ rmd160 8af79c3f63609da96d04b8e162f2b53cf7543be9 \
+ sha256 23ae9307b58629ccf76a8ed5d9cf7215a45d6b7533d6b17eef17279fb9c48dca
}
variant gsskex conflicts hpn requires kerberos5 description "Add OpenSSH GSSAPI key exchange patch" {
@@ -116,8 +115,8 @@
"-D_UTMPX_COMPAT -D__APPLE_LAUNCHD__ -D__APPLE_MEMBERSHIP__" \
"-D__APPLE_XSAN__"]
use_autoreconf yes
- patchfiles-append openssh-6.2p2-gsskex-all-20110125.patch \
- 0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch
+ patchfiles-append 0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch \
+ openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch
configure.args-append --with-4in6 \
--with-audit=bsm \
--with-keychain=apple \
@@ -179,4 +178,6 @@
fi"
livecheck.type regex
+# remove this after they update to p2 since there is a typo in the webpage
+livecheck.version 6.3p2
livecheck.regex OpenSSH ((\[5-9\].\[0-9\])(p\[0-9\]))
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch 2013-10-24 21:47:52 UTC (rev 112513)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch 2013-10-25 04:14:14 UTC (rev 112514)
@@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/Makefile.in ./Makefile.in
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/Makefile.in 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./Makefile.in 2013-07-20 16:23:40.000000000 +0200
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Sean Farley <sean.michael.farley at gmail.com>
+# Date 1382624667 -28800
+# Thu Oct 24 22:24:27 2013 +0800
+# Node ID dd6d51b7e12be5fab94a8779e890c5558e4d4001
+# Parent 86a3bc5c8ff689a291e86950a3d8fd327f42b870
+partial import
+
+
+wiggled scp
+
+
+wiggled readconf
+
+
+wiggled readconf.c
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -56,10 +56,11 @@
+ PERL=@PERL@
+ SED=@SED@
ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
@@ -9,7 +28,11 @@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
-@@ -96,6 +97,8 @@
+ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+
+@@ -93,10 +94,12 @@
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
sandbox-seccomp-filter.o
@@ -18,7 +41,11 @@
MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
-@@ -128,6 +131,7 @@
+
+ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
+@@ -127,10 +130,11 @@
+ all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+
$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
@@ -26,7 +53,11 @@
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
-@@ -141,8 +145,8 @@
+
+ LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+@@ -140,24 +144,24 @@
+
+ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
@@ -37,7 +68,7 @@
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-@@ -150,11 +154,11 @@
+
scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
@@ -53,7 +84,11 @@
ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-@@ -265,7 +269,7 @@
+
+ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o
+@@ -265,11 +269,11 @@
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
@@ -62,11 +97,14 @@
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
-Only in .: Makefile.in.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/audit-bsm.c ./audit-bsm.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/audit-bsm.c 2012-02-24 00:40:43.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./audit-bsm.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -263,7 +263,12 @@
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
+--- a/audit-bsm.c
++++ b/audit-bsm.c
+@@ -261,11 +261,16 @@
+ uid_t uid = -1;
+ gid_t gid = -1;
pid_t pid = getpid();
AuditInfoTermID tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
@@ -80,12 +118,15 @@
uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
}
-Only in .: audit-bsm.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/auth-pam.c ./auth-pam.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/auth-pam.c 2009-07-12 14:07:21.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./auth-pam.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -793,10 +793,11 @@
- xfree(msg);
+
+ rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1;
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -789,14 +789,15 @@
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+ free(msg);
return (0);
}
- error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
@@ -98,10 +139,14 @@
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
*num = 0;
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/auth.c ./auth.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/auth.c 2013-03-12 01:31:05.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./auth.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@
+ **echo_on = 0;
+ free(msg);
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+--- a/auth.c
++++ b/auth.c
+@@ -209,11 +209,11 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
@@ -110,11 +155,14 @@
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
-Only in .: auth.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/authfd.c ./authfd.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/authfd.c 2011-08-05 22:16:00.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./authfd.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -689,6 +689,29 @@
+ }
+
+diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
+--- a/authfd.c
++++ b/authfd.c
+@@ -687,10 +687,33 @@
+ type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
+ buffer_free(&msg);
return decode_reply(type);
}
@@ -144,10 +192,14 @@
int
decode_reply(int type)
{
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/authfd.h ./authfd.h
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/authfd.h 2009-10-06 23:47:02.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./authfd.h 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
+ switch (type) {
+ case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE:
+diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h
+--- a/authfd.h
++++ b/authfd.h
+@@ -47,10 +47,13 @@
+ /* add key with constraints */
+ #define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
@@ -157,10 +209,14 @@
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/config.h.in ./config.h.in
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/config.h.in 2013-05-16 03:35:08.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./config.h.in 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -77,6 +77,18 @@
+ /* extended failure messages */
+ #define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30
+diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
+--- a/config.h.in
++++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -75,10 +75,22 @@
+ #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+
/* FreeBSD strnvis does not do what we need */
#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
@@ -179,11 +235,14 @@
/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
-Only in .: config.h.in.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/configure.ac ./configure.ac
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/configure.ac 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./configure.ac 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -4534,10 +4534,40 @@
+ /* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
+ #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -4548,14 +4548,44 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+ #include <lastlog.h>
#endif
])
@@ -224,13 +283,15 @@
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
else
-Only in .: configure.ac.orig
-Common subdirectories: ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/contrib and ./contrib
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/groupaccess.c ./groupaccess.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/groupaccess.c 2008-07-04 05:51:12.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./groupaccess.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -33,38 +33,67 @@
+ TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
+ fi
+diff --git a/groupaccess.c b/groupaccess.c
+--- a/groupaccess.c
++++ b/groupaccess.c
+@@ -32,62 +32,107 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#ifdef __APPLE_MEMBERSHIP__
@@ -279,17 +340,17 @@
ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX;
#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)
ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX));
--#endif
--
+#endif
- groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
++ groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
+#else
+ if (-1 == (ngroups = getgrouplist_2(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid,
+ &groups_bygid))) {
+ logit("getgrouplist_2 failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
-+#endif
+ #endif
+-
+- groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname));
-
- if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1)
@@ -297,14 +358,17 @@
+#ifndef __APPLE_MEMBERSHIP__
+ if (getgrouplist(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1) {
+ logit("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
-+ xfree(groups_bygid);
++ free(groups_bygid);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
-@@ -75,16 +104,32 @@
+ free(groups_bygid);
+ return (ngroups = j);
+ }
+
/*
* Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
* Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
@@ -337,10 +401,14 @@
return 0;
}
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/groupaccess.h ./groupaccess.h
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/groupaccess.h 2008-07-04 05:51:12.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./groupaccess.h 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
+ /*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list.
+diff --git a/groupaccess.h b/groupaccess.h
+--- a/groupaccess.h
++++ b/groupaccess.h
+@@ -25,11 +25,11 @@
+ */
+
#ifndef GROUPACCESS_H
#define GROUPACCESS_H
@@ -349,26 +417,780 @@
int ga_match(char * const *, int);
int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *);
void ga_free(void);
-Only in .: keychain.c
-Only in .: keychain.h
-Common subdirectories: ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/openbsd-compat and ./openbsd-compat
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/readconf.c ./readconf.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/readconf.c 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./readconf.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/keychain.c b/keychain.c
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/keychain.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of its
++ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
++ * this software without specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
++ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
++ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
++ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
++ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "authfd.h"
++#include "authfile.h"
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++#include <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h>
++#include <Security/Security.h>
++
++/* Our Security/SecPassword.h is not yet API, so I will define the constants that I am using here. */
++int kSecPasswordGet = 1<<0; // Get password from keychain or user
++int kSecPasswordSet = 1<<1; // Set password (passed in if kSecPasswordGet not set, otherwise from user)
++int kSecPasswordFail = 1<<2; // Wrong password (ignore item in keychain and flag error)
++OSStatus SecGenericPasswordCreate(SecKeychainAttributeList *searchAttrList, SecKeychainAttributeList *itemAttrList, SecPasswordRef *itemRef);
++OSStatus SecPasswordAction(SecPasswordRef itemRef, CFTypeRef message, UInt32 flags, UInt32 *length, const void **data);
++OSStatus SecPasswordSetInitialAccess(SecPasswordRef itemRef, SecAccessRef accessRef);
++
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Platform-specific helper functions.
++ */
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++static int get_boolean_preference(const char *key, int default_value,
++ int foreground)
++{
++ int value = default_value;
++ CFStringRef keyRef = NULL;
++ CFPropertyListRef valueRef = NULL;
++
++ keyRef = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, key, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
++ if (keyRef != NULL)
++ valueRef = CFPreferencesCopyAppValue(keyRef,
++ CFSTR("org.openbsd.openssh"));
++ if (valueRef != NULL)
++ if (CFGetTypeID(valueRef) == CFBooleanGetTypeID())
++ value = CFBooleanGetValue(valueRef);
++ else if (foreground)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Ignoring nonboolean %s preference.\n", key);
++
++ if (keyRef)
++ CFRelease(keyRef);
++ if (valueRef)
++ CFRelease(valueRef);
++
++ return value;
++}
++
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Store the passphrase for a given identity in the keychain.
++ */
++void
++store_in_keychain(const char *filename, const char *passphrase)
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * store_in_keychain
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
++ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
++ CFIndex filename_len;
++ UInt8 *label = NULL;
++ UInt8 *utf8_filename;
++ OSStatus rv;
++ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef = NULL;
++ SecTrustedApplicationRef apps[] = {NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ CFArrayRef trustedlist = NULL;
++ SecAccessRef initialAccess = NULL;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain integration is disabled.\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
++ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
++ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
++ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
++ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
++ if ((label = xmalloc(filename_len + 5)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "xmalloc failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ memcpy(label, "SSH: ", 5);
++ utf8_filename = label + 5;
++ CFDataGetBytes(cfdata_filename, CFRangeMake(0, filename_len),
++ utf8_filename);
++
++ /* Check if we already have this passphrase. */
++ rv = SecKeychainFindGenericPassword(NULL, 3, "SSH", filename_len,
++ (char *)utf8_filename, NULL, NULL, &itemRef);
++ if (rv == errSecItemNotFound) {
++ /* Add a new keychain item. */
++ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
++ {kSecLabelItemAttr, filename_len + 5, label},
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
++ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
++ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
++ if (SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-agent",
++ &apps[0]) != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-add",
++ &apps[1]) != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh",
++ &apps[2]) != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((trustedlist = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **)apps,
++ sizeof(apps) / sizeof(apps[0]), &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFArrayCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecAccessCreate(cfstr_filename, trustedlist,
++ &initialAccess) != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecAccessCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecKeychainItemCreateFromContent(
++ kSecGenericPasswordItemClass, &attrList, strlen(passphrase),
++ passphrase, NULL, initialAccess, NULL) == noErr)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase stored in keychain: %s\n", filename);
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not create keychain item\n");
++ } else if (rv == noErr) {
++ /* Update an existing keychain item. */
++ if (SecKeychainItemModifyAttributesAndData(itemRef, NULL,
++ strlen(passphrase), passphrase) == noErr)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase updated in keychain: %s\n", filename);
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not modify keychain item\n");
++ } else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not access keychain\n");
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (cfdata_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
++ if (label)
++ free(label);
++ if (itemRef)
++ CFRelease(itemRef);
++ if (apps[0])
++ CFRelease(apps[0]);
++ if (apps[1])
++ CFRelease(apps[1]);
++ if (apps[2])
++ CFRelease(apps[2]);
++ if (trustedlist)
++ CFRelease(trustedlist);
++ if (initialAccess)
++ CFRelease(initialAccess);
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * store_in_keychain
++ * no keychain implementation
++ */
++
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain is not available on this system\n");
++
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/*
++ * Remove the passphrase for a given identity from the keychain.
++ */
++void
++remove_from_keychain(const char *filename)
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * remove_from_keychain
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
++ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
++ CFIndex filename_len;
++ const UInt8 *utf8_filename;
++ OSStatus rv;
++ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef = NULL;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain integration is disabled.\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
++ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
++ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
++ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
++ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
++ utf8_filename = CFDataGetBytePtr(cfdata_filename);
++
++ /* Check if we already have this passphrase. */
++ rv = SecKeychainFindGenericPassword(NULL, 3, "SSH", filename_len,
++ (const char *)utf8_filename, NULL, NULL, &itemRef);
++ if (rv == noErr) {
++ /* Remove the passphrase from the keychain. */
++ if (SecKeychainItemDelete(itemRef) == noErr)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase removed from keychain: %s\n", filename);
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove keychain item\n");
++ } else if (rv != errSecItemNotFound)
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not access keychain\n");
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (cfdata_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
++ if (itemRef)
++ CFRelease(itemRef);
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * remove_from_keychain
++ * no keychain implementation
++ */
++
++ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain is not available on this system\n");
++
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/*
++ * Add identities to ssh-agent using passphrases stored in the keychain.
++ * Returns zero on success and nonzero on failure.
++ * add_identity is a callback into ssh-agent. It takes a filename and a
++ * passphrase, and attempts to add the identity to the agent. It returns
++ * zero on success and nonzero on failure.
++ */
++int
++add_identities_using_keychain(int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *))
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * add_identities_using_keychain
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ OSStatus rv;
++ SecKeychainSearchRef searchRef;
++ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef;
++ UInt32 length;
++ void *data;
++ CFIndex maxsize;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 0) == 0)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* Search for SSH passphrases in the keychain */
++ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
++ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
++ if ((rv = SecKeychainSearchCreateFromAttributes(NULL,
++ kSecGenericPasswordItemClass, &attrList, &searchRef)) != noErr)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* Iterate through the search results. */
++ while ((rv = SecKeychainSearchCopyNext(searchRef, &itemRef)) == noErr) {
++ UInt32 tag = kSecAccountItemAttr;
++ UInt32 format = kSecFormatUnknown;
++ SecKeychainAttributeInfo info = {1, &tag, &format};
++ SecKeychainAttributeList *itemAttrList = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ char *filename = NULL;
++ char *passphrase = NULL;
++
++ /* Retrieve filename and passphrase. */
++ if ((rv = SecKeychainItemCopyAttributesAndData(itemRef, &info,
++ NULL, &itemAttrList, &length, &data)) != noErr)
++ goto err;
++ if (itemAttrList->count != 1)
++ goto err;
++ cfstr_filename = CFStringCreateWithBytes(NULL,
++ itemAttrList->attr->data, itemAttrList->attr->length,
++ kCFStringEncodingUTF8, true);
++ maxsize = CFStringGetMaximumSizeOfFileSystemRepresentation(
++ cfstr_filename);
++ if ((filename = xmalloc(maxsize)) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++ if (CFStringGetFileSystemRepresentation(cfstr_filename,
++ filename, maxsize) == false)
++ goto err;
++ if ((passphrase = xmalloc(length + 1)) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++ memcpy(passphrase, data, length);
++ passphrase[length] = '\0';
++
++ /* Add the identity. */
++ add_identity(filename, passphrase);
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (itemRef)
++ CFRelease(itemRef);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (filename)
++ free(filename);
++ if (passphrase)
++ free(passphrase);
++ if (itemAttrList)
++ SecKeychainItemFreeAttributesAndData(itemAttrList,
++ data);
++ }
++
++ CFRelease(searchRef);
++
++ return 0;
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * add_identities_using_keychain
++ * no implementation
++ */
++
++ return 1;
++
++#endif
++
++}
++
++/*
++ * Prompt the user for a key's passphrase. The user will be offered the option
++ * of storing the passphrase in their keychain. Returns the passphrase
++ * (which the caller is responsible for freeing), or NULL if this function
++ * fails or is not implemented. If this function is not implemented, ssh will
++ * fall back on the standard read_passphrase function, and the user will need
++ * to use ssh-add -K to add their keys to the keychain.
++ */
++char *
++keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename, int oAskPassGUI)
++{
++
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++
++ /*
++ * keychain_read_passphrase
++ * Mac OS X implementation
++ */
++
++ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
++ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
++ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
++ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
++ CFIndex filename_len;
++ UInt8 *label = NULL;
++ UInt8 *utf8_filename;
++ SecPasswordRef passRef = NULL;
++ SecTrustedApplicationRef apps[] = {NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ CFArrayRef trustedlist = NULL;
++ SecAccessRef initialAccess = NULL;
++ CFURLRef path = NULL;
++ CFStringRef pathFinal = NULL;
++ CFURLRef bundle_url = NULL;
++ CFBundleRef bundle = NULL;
++ CFStringRef promptTemplate = NULL, prompt = NULL;
++ UInt32 length;
++ const void *data;
++ AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
++ char *result = NULL;
++
++ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0)
++ goto err;
++
++ /* Bail out if the user set AskPassGUI preference to -bool NO */
++ if (get_boolean_preference("AskPassGUI", 1, 1) == 0 || oAskPassGUI == 0)
++ goto err;
++
++ /* Bail out if we can't communicate with ssh-agent */
++ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection()) == NULL)
++ goto err;
++
++ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
++ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
++ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
++ {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
++ NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
++ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
++ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
++ if ((label = xmalloc(filename_len + 5)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "xmalloc failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ memcpy(label, "SSH: ", 5);
++ utf8_filename = label + 5;
++ CFDataGetBytes(cfdata_filename, CFRangeMake(0, filename_len),
++ utf8_filename);
++
++ /* Build a SecPasswordRef. */
++ SecKeychainAttribute searchAttrs[] = {
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
++ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList searchAttrList =
++ {sizeof(searchAttrs) / sizeof(searchAttrs[0]), searchAttrs};
++ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
++ {kSecLabelItemAttr, filename_len + 5, label},
++ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
++ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
++ };
++ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
++ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
++ if (SecGenericPasswordCreate(&searchAttrList, &attrList, &passRef) !=
++ noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecGenericPasswordCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-agent", &apps[0])
++ != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-add", &apps[1])
++ != noErr ||
++ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh", &apps[2])
++ != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((trustedlist = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **)apps,
++ sizeof(apps) / sizeof(apps[0]), &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFArrayCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecAccessCreate(cfstr_filename, trustedlist, &initialAccess)
++ != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecAccessCreate failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (SecPasswordSetInitialAccess(passRef, initialAccess) != noErr) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "SecPasswordSetInitialAccess failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++ /* Request the passphrase from the user. */
++ if ((path = CFURLCreateFromFileSystemRepresentation(NULL,
++ (UInt8 *)filename, strlen(filename), false)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateFromFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((pathFinal = CFURLCopyLastPathComponent(path)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyLastPathComponent failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if (!((bundle_url = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
++ CFSTR("/System/Library/CoreServices/"), kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, true))
++ != NULL && (bundle = CFBundleCreate(NULL, bundle_url)) != NULL &&
++ (promptTemplate = CFCopyLocalizedStringFromTableInBundle(
++ CFSTR("Enter your password for the SSH key \"%@\"."),
++ CFSTR("OpenSSH"), bundle, "Text of the dialog asking the user for"
++ "their passphrase. The %@ will be replaced with the filename of a"
++ "specific key.")) != NULL) &&
++ (promptTemplate = CFStringCreateCopy(NULL,
++ CFSTR("Enter your password for the SSH key \"%@\"."))) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateCopy failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ if ((prompt = CFStringCreateWithFormat(NULL, NULL, promptTemplate,
++ pathFinal)) == NULL) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFormat failed\n");
++ goto err;
++ }
++ switch (SecPasswordAction(passRef, prompt,
++ kSecPasswordGet|kSecPasswordFail, &length, &data)) {
++ case noErr:
++ result = xmalloc(length + 1);
++ memcpy(result, data, length);
++ result[length] = '\0';
++
++ /* Save password in keychain if requested. */
++ if (noErr != SecPasswordAction(passRef, CFSTR(""), kSecPasswordSet, &length, &data))
++ fprintf(stderr, "Saving password to keychain failed\n");
++
++ /* Add password to agent. */
++ char *comment = NULL;
++ Key *private = key_load_private(filename, result, &comment);
++ if (NULL == private)
++ break;
++ if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, 0, 0))
++ fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
++ else
++ fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
++ free(comment);
++ key_free(private);
++ break;
++ case errAuthorizationCanceled:
++ result = xmalloc(1);
++ *result = '\0';
++ break;
++ default:
++ goto err;
++ }
++
++err: /* Clean up. */
++ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
++ if (cfurl_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
++ if (cfstr_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
++ if (cfdata_filename)
++ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
++ if (label)
++ free(label);
++ if (passRef)
++ CFRelease(passRef);
++ if (apps[0])
++ CFRelease(apps[0]);
++ if (apps[1])
++ CFRelease(apps[1]);
++ if (apps[2])
++ CFRelease(apps[2]);
++ if (trustedlist)
++ CFRelease(trustedlist);
++ if (initialAccess)
++ CFRelease(initialAccess);
++ if (path)
++ CFRelease(path);
++ if (pathFinal)
++ CFRelease(pathFinal);
++ if (bundle_url)
++ CFRelease(bundle_url);
++ if (bundle)
++ CFRelease(bundle);
++ if (promptTemplate)
++ CFRelease(promptTemplate);
++ if (prompt)
++ CFRelease(prompt);
++ if (ac)
++ ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++
++ return result;
++
++#else
++
++ /*
++ * keychain_read_passphrase
++ * no implementation
++ */
++
++ return NULL;
++
++#endif
++
++}
+diff --git a/keychain.h b/keychain.h
+new file mode 100644
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/keychain.h
+@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of its
++ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
++ * this software without specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
++ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
++ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
++ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
++ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
++ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
++ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ *
++ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
++ */
++
++/*
++ * KEYCHAIN indicates that keychain functionality is present.
++ * KEYCHAIN_* indicates the implementation to use, and implies KEYCHAIN.
++ */
++#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
++#define KEYCHAIN
++#endif
++
++void store_in_keychain(const char *filename, const char *passphrase);
++void remove_from_keychain(const char *filename);
++int add_identities_using_keychain(
++ int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *));
++char *keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename, int oAskPassGUI);
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -136,10 +136,13 @@
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
- oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY,
+ oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown,
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ oAskPassGUI,
+#endif
- oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
} OpCodes;
-@@ -257,7 +260,9 @@
+ /* Textual representations of the tokens. */
+
+@@ -248,11 +251,13 @@
+ #endif
{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
+ { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
-
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ { "askpassgui", oAskPassGUI },
@@ -376,10 +1198,14 @@
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
-@@ -1093,6 +1098,12 @@
- *intptr = value;
- break;
+ /*
+ * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
+@@ -1070,10 +1075,16 @@
+ case oIgnoreUnknown:
+ charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
+ goto parse_string;
+
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ case oAskPassGUI:
+ intptr = &options->ask_pass_gui;
@@ -389,17 +1215,25 @@
case oDeprecated:
debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
-@@ -1258,6 +1269,9 @@
+ return 0;
+
+@@ -1232,10 +1243,13 @@
+ options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->request_tty = -1;
+ options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ options->ask_pass_gui = -1;
+#endif
}
/*
-@@ -1415,6 +1429,10 @@
+ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
+ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
+@@ -1383,10 +1397,14 @@
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
+ if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
if (options->request_tty == -1)
options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
@@ -410,14 +1244,17 @@
/* options->local_command should not be set by default */
/* options->proxy_command should not be set by default */
/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
-Only in .: readconf.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/readconf.h ./readconf.h
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/readconf.h 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./readconf.h 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -141,6 +141,10 @@
+ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -137,10 +137,14 @@
int use_roaming;
int request_tty;
+
+ char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
+
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ int ask_pass_gui;
@@ -425,13 +1262,14 @@
} Options;
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
-Only in .: readconf.h.orig
-Common subdirectories: ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/regress and ./regress
-Common subdirectories: ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/scard and ./scard
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/scp.1 ./scp.1
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/scp.1 2011-09-22 13:34:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./scp.1 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
+ #define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1
+ #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+--- a/scp.1
++++ b/scp.1
+@@ -17,11 +17,11 @@
+ .Nm scp
+ .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm scp
.Bk -words
@@ -440,7 +1278,11 @@
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
-@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@
+ .Op Fl l Ar limit
+ .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+@@ -95,10 +95,12 @@
+ Passes the
+ .Fl C
flag to
.Xr ssh 1
to enable compression.
@@ -449,10 +1291,14 @@
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
This option is directly passed to
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/scp.c ./scp.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/scp.c 2013-03-20 02:55:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./scp.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@
+ .Xr ssh 1 .
+ .It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -76,10 +76,13 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
@@ -462,7 +1308,11 @@
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
-@@ -114,6 +117,11 @@
+ # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+ # include <sys/poll.h>
+@@ -112,10 +115,15 @@
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
@@ -474,7 +1324,11 @@
extern char *__progname;
#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384
-@@ -150,6 +158,12 @@
+
+ int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
+@@ -148,10 +156,16 @@
+ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
+
/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
@@ -487,7 +1341,11 @@
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
-@@ -395,7 +409,11 @@
+ if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+ kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+@@ -393,11 +407,15 @@
+ addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
+ addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
fflag = tflag = 0;
@@ -499,7 +1357,11 @@
switch (ch) {
/* User-visible flags. */
case '1':
-@@ -456,6 +474,11 @@
+ case '2':
+ case '4':
+@@ -454,10 +472,15 @@
+ addargs(&args, "-q");
+ addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
showprogress = 0;
break;
@@ -511,7 +1373,11 @@
/* Server options. */
case 'd':
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
-@@ -505,7 +528,12 @@
+ break;
+ case 'f': /* "from" */
+@@ -503,11 +526,16 @@
+ targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+
remin = remout = -1;
do_cmd_pid = -1;
/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
@@ -524,7 +1390,11 @@
verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
-@@ -733,6 +761,10 @@
+
+ (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+@@ -749,23 +777,41 @@
+ off_t i, statbytes;
+ size_t amt;
int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[MAXPATHLEN];
int len;
@@ -535,7 +1405,7 @@
for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
name = argv[indx];
-@@ -740,12 +772,26 @@
+ statbytes = 0;
len = strlen(name);
while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
name[--len] = '\0';
@@ -562,7 +1432,11 @@
if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
goto next;
-@@ -842,6 +888,36 @@
+ }
+ if (stb.st_size < 0) {
+@@ -844,10 +890,40 @@
+ if (!haderr)
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
else
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
(void) response();
@@ -599,7 +1473,11 @@
}
}
-@@ -936,6 +1012,10 @@
+ void
+ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+@@ -935,10 +1011,14 @@
+
+ (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
targisdir = 1;
for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
@@ -610,10 +1488,14 @@
cp = buf;
if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
return;
-@@ -1069,10 +1149,51 @@
+ if (*cp++ == '\n')
+ SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
+@@ -1080,14 +1160,55 @@
+ free(vect[0]);
+ continue;
}
omode = mode;
- mode |= S_IWRITE;
+ mode |= S_IWUSR;
+
+#if HAVE_COPYFILE
+ if (copy_xattr && !strncmp(basename(curfile), "._", 2))
@@ -662,7 +1544,11 @@
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
(void) close(ofd);
-@@ -1157,6 +1278,29 @@
+ continue;
+ }
+@@ -1168,10 +1289,33 @@
+ if (close(ofd) == -1) {
+ wrerr = YES;
wrerrno = errno;
}
(void) response();
@@ -692,7 +1578,11 @@
if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
setimes = 0;
if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
-@@ -1218,7 +1362,11 @@
+ run_err("%s: set times: %s",
+ np, strerror(errno));
+@@ -1229,11 +1373,15 @@
+
+ void
usage(void)
{
(void) fprintf(stderr,
@@ -704,11 +1594,14 @@
" [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
" [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
exit(1);
-Only in .: scp.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/servconf.c ./servconf.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/servconf.c 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./servconf.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@
+ }
+
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -158,11 +158,11 @@
+ void
+ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
@@ -717,16 +1610,24 @@
/* Standard Options */
if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN)
-@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
- if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
- options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2;
+ if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+@@ -241,11 +241,11 @@
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
+ options->password_authentication = 0;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
-@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
+@@ -621,11 +621,11 @@
+ goto out;
+
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
"not exist", line, user);
@@ -735,11 +1636,14 @@
debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
"at line %d", user, line);
} else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
-Only in .: servconf.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/session.c ./session.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/session.c 2013-03-15 01:22:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./session.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -2071,8 +2071,10 @@
+ debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
+ user, grps, line);
+diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+--- a/session.c
++++ b/session.c
+@@ -2081,12 +2081,14 @@
+ /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */
+ if (!compat20)
n_bytes = packet_remaining();
tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
@@ -750,7 +1654,11 @@
/* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
-@@ -2312,9 +2314,11 @@
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+@@ -2322,13 +2324,15 @@
+
+ /* Record that the user has logged out. */
if (s->pid != 0)
record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
@@ -762,11 +1670,14 @@
/*
* Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
-Only in .: session.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-add.0 ./ssh-add.0
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-add.0 2013-05-16 03:35:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./ssh-add.0 2013-07-20 16:39:57.000000000 +0200
-@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
+ * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
+ * while we're still cleaning up.
+diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0
+--- a/ssh-add.0
++++ b/ssh-add.0
+@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
+
+ NAME
ssh-add - adds private key identities to the authentication agent
SYNOPSIS
@@ -775,7 +1686,11 @@
ssh-add -s pkcs11
ssh-add -e pkcs11
-@@ -55,6 +55,13 @@
+ DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
+@@ -53,10 +53,17 @@
+ represented by the agent.
+
-l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
agent.
@@ -789,11 +1704,14 @@
-s pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
-Only in .: ssh-add.0.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-add.1 ./ssh-add.1
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-add.1 2012-12-07 03:06:13.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./ssh-add.1 2013-07-20 16:39:35.000000000 +0200
-@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
+ -t life
+ Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The
+diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
+--- a/ssh-add.1
++++ b/ssh-add.1
+@@ -41,11 +41,11 @@
+ .Sh NAME
+ .Nm ssh-add
.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-add
@@ -802,7 +1720,11 @@
.Op Fl t Ar life
.Op Ar
.Nm ssh-add
-@@ -118,6 +118,13 @@
+ .Fl s Ar pkcs11
+ .Nm ssh-add
+@@ -116,10 +116,17 @@
+ .It Fl L
+ Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
by the agent.
.It Fl l
Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
@@ -816,11 +1738,14 @@
.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
-Only in .: ssh-add.1.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-add.c ./ssh-add.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-add.c 2012-12-07 03:07:03.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./ssh-add.c 2013-07-20 16:42:26.000000000 +0200
-@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ .It Fl t Ar life
+ Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
+diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
+--- a/ssh-add.c
++++ b/ssh-add.c
+@@ -60,10 +60,11 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
@@ -828,7 +1753,11 @@
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
-@@ -96,12 +97,24 @@
+
+ /* Default files to add */
+@@ -94,16 +95,28 @@
+ pass = NULL;
+ }
}
static int
@@ -854,7 +1783,11 @@
public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
if (public == NULL) {
printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename);
-@@ -164,7 +177,7 @@
+ return -1;
+ }
+@@ -162,11 +175,11 @@
+
+ return ret;
}
static int
@@ -863,7 +1796,11 @@
{
Key *private, *cert;
char *comment = NULL;
-@@ -201,11 +214,16 @@
+ char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
+ int fd, perms_ok, ret = -1;
+@@ -199,15 +212,20 @@
+ }
+ close(fd);
/* At first, try empty passphrase */
private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, "", &comment);
@@ -881,7 +1818,11 @@
if (private == NULL) {
/* clear passphrase since it did not work */
clear_pass();
-@@ -221,8 +239,11 @@
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s: ",
+ comment);
+@@ -219,12 +237,15 @@
+ buffer_free(&keyblob);
+ return -1;
}
private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, pass,
&comment);
@@ -894,7 +1835,11 @@
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
"Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
-@@ -376,13 +397,13 @@
+ }
+ }
+@@ -374,17 +395,17 @@
+ free(p1);
+ return (ret);
}
static int
@@ -911,7 +1856,11 @@
return -1;
}
return 0;
-@@ -404,6 +425,11 @@
+ }
+
+@@ -402,20 +423,26 @@
+ fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n");
@@ -923,7 +1872,10 @@
}
int
-@@ -414,6 +440,7 @@
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ extern char *optarg;
+ extern int optind;
AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
@@ -931,7 +1883,11 @@
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
-@@ -430,7 +457,7 @@
+
+ __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+@@ -428,11 +455,11 @@
+ if (ac == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
"Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
exit(2);
}
@@ -940,7 +1896,11 @@
switch (ch) {
case 'k':
key_only = 1;
-@@ -469,6 +496,13 @@
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+@@ -467,10 +494,17 @@
+ fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+ ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
@@ -954,7 +1914,11 @@
default:
usage();
ret = 1;
-@@ -500,7 +534,7 @@
+ goto done;
+ }
+@@ -498,20 +532,20 @@
+ for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
default_files[i]);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
continue;
@@ -963,7 +1927,8 @@
ret = 1;
else
count++;
-@@ -509,7 +543,7 @@
+ }
+ if (count == 0)
ret = 1;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
@@ -972,11 +1937,14 @@
ret = 1;
}
}
-Only in .: ssh-add.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-agent.c ./ssh-agent.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-agent.c 2011-06-03 06:14:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./ssh-agent.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@
+ clear_pass();
+
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -63,20 +63,25 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -986,7 +1954,7 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
-@@ -72,9 +75,11 @@
+ #include "rsa.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "authfd.h"
@@ -998,7 +1966,11 @@
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-@@ -793,6 +798,61 @@
+ #endif
+
+@@ -788,10 +793,65 @@
+ buffer_put_char(&e->output,
+ success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
@@ -1060,7 +2032,11 @@
/* dispatch incoming messages */
static void
-@@ -885,6 +945,9 @@
+ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
+ {
+@@ -880,10 +940,13 @@
+ break;
+ case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
@@ -1070,7 +2046,11 @@
default:
/* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
error("Unknown message %d", type);
-@@ -1126,7 +1189,11 @@
+ buffer_clear(&e->request);
+ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1);
+@@ -1120,11 +1183,15 @@
+ }
+
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
@@ -1082,7 +2062,11 @@
int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
u_int nalloc;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
-@@ -1160,7 +1227,11 @@
+ fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
+ struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+@@ -1154,20 +1221,29 @@
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
seed_rng();
@@ -1094,7 +2078,9 @@
switch (ch) {
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
-@@ -1170,6 +1241,11 @@
+ usage();
+ c_flag++;
+ break;
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
@@ -1106,7 +2092,11 @@
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
-@@ -1196,7 +1272,11 @@
+ s_flag++;
+ break;
+@@ -1190,11 +1266,15 @@
+ }
+ }
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
@@ -1118,7 +2108,11 @@
usage();
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
-@@ -1252,6 +1332,53 @@
+ shell = getenv("SHELL");
+ if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+@@ -1246,10 +1326,57 @@
+
+ /*
* Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
* the parent.
*/
@@ -1172,7 +2166,11 @@
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
perror("socket");
-@@ -1273,6 +1400,14 @@
+ *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
+ cleanup_exit(1);
+@@ -1267,10 +1394,18 @@
+ umask(prev_mask);
+ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) {
perror("listen");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
@@ -1187,7 +2185,11 @@
/*
* Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
-@@ -1345,6 +1480,7 @@
+ * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
+ */
+@@ -1339,19 +1474,24 @@
+
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(0);
#endif
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
@@ -1195,7 +2197,9 @@
if (ac > 0)
parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
-@@ -1355,6 +1491,10 @@
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGINT, d_flag ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+ signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
nalloc = 0;
@@ -1206,10 +2210,14 @@
while (1) {
prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-keysign.8 ./ssh-keysign.8
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/ssh-keysign.8 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./ssh-keysign.8 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
+--- a/ssh-keysign.8
++++ b/ssh-keysign.8
+@@ -69,10 +69,13 @@
+ They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+ accessible to others.
Since they are readable only by root,
.Nm
must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
@@ -1219,10 +2227,14 @@
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshconnect1.c ./sshconnect1.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshconnect1.c 2006-11-07 13:14:42.000000000 +0100
-+++ ./sshconnect1.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
+ .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
+ If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
+diff --git a/sshconnect1.c b/sshconnect1.c
+--- a/sshconnect1.c
++++ b/sshconnect1.c
+@@ -45,10 +45,11 @@
+ #include "authfile.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
@@ -1230,7 +2242,11 @@
/* Session id for the current session. */
u_char session_id[16];
-@@ -260,6 +261,10 @@
+ u_int supported_authentications = 0;
+
+@@ -258,10 +259,14 @@
+ &perm_ok);
+ if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
@@ -1241,10 +2257,14 @@
passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshconnect2.c ./sshconnect2.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshconnect2.c 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./sshconnect2.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
+ authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
+ quit = 0;
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -70,10 +70,11 @@
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+ #include "uidswap.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "schnorr.h"
#include "jpake.h"
@@ -1252,7 +2272,11 @@
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
-@@ -1449,6 +1450,10 @@
+ #endif
+
+@@ -1331,10 +1332,14 @@
+ if (options.batch_mode)
+ return NULL;
snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
"Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
@@ -1263,11 +2287,14 @@
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
-Only in .: sshconnect2.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd.0 ./sshd.0
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd.0 2013-05-16 03:35:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./sshd.0 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -619,8 +619,8 @@
+ filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL);
+ quit = 0;
+diff --git a/sshd.0 b/sshd.0
+--- a/sshd.0
++++ b/sshd.0
+@@ -620,12 +620,12 @@
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-
+ readable.
SEE ALSO
scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
@@ -1278,11 +2305,14 @@
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
-Only in .: sshd.0.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd.8 ./sshd.8
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd.8 2012-10-05 03:02:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./sshd.8 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -955,10 +955,7 @@
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -954,14 +954,11 @@
+ .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
.Xr hosts_access 5 ,
@@ -1293,11 +2323,14 @@
.Xr sftp-server 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-Only in .: sshd.8.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd.c ./sshd.c
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd.c 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./sshd.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -2108,6 +2108,12 @@
+ ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+ Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -2106,23 +2106,23 @@
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
#endif
@@ -1310,7 +2343,7 @@
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_authentication) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-@@ -2115,12 +2121,6 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
restore_uid();
}
#endif
@@ -1323,11 +2356,14 @@
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
-Only in .: sshd.c.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd_config ./sshd_config
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd_config 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./sshd_config 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
+ * file descriptor passing.
+ */
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@
+ # Ciphers and keying
+ #RekeyLimit default none
# Logging
# obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging
@@ -1336,7 +2372,11 @@
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
-@@ -64,8 +64,9 @@
+
+ #LoginGraceTime 2m
+@@ -65,12 +65,13 @@
+ # RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication
+ #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes
@@ -1348,7 +2388,11 @@
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
-@@ -92,7 +93,10 @@
+ #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
+
+@@ -91,11 +92,14 @@
+ # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass
+ # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password".
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
@@ -1360,10 +2404,14 @@
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd_config.0 ./sshd_config.0
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd_config.0 2013-05-16 03:35:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./sshd_config.0 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@
+ #GatewayPorts no
+ #X11Forwarding no
+diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
+--- a/sshd_config.0
++++ b/sshd_config.0
+@@ -505,11 +505,11 @@
+ increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the
+ number of unauthenticated connections reaches ``full'' (60).
PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The
@@ -1372,7 +2420,11 @@
PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
-@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@
+ server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The
+ default is ``no''.
+@@ -707,11 +707,11 @@
+ Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
+ equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
@@ -1381,11 +2433,14 @@
UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
-Only in .: sshd_config.0.orig
-diff -u ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd_config.5 ./sshd_config.5
---- ../openssh-6.2p2.orig/sshd_config.5 2013-07-20 16:20:16.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./sshd_config.5 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@
+ unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
+ After successful authentication, another process will be created
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -854,11 +854,11 @@
+ .Dq full
+ (60).
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
The default is
@@ -1394,7 +2449,11 @@
.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
-@@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+@@ -1181,11 +1181,11 @@
+ .Cm UsePAM
+ is enabled, you will not be able to run
.Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user.
The default is
@@ -1403,750 +2462,5 @@
.It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
-Only in .: sshd_config.5.orig
-Only in .: sshd_config.orig
---- /dev/null 2013-07-20 16:48:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./keychain.c 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of its
-+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
-+ * this software without specific prior written permission.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
-+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
-+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "authfd.h"
-+#include "authfile.h"
-+
-+#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
-+
-+#include <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h>
-+#include <Security/Security.h>
-+
-+/* Our Security/SecPassword.h is not yet API, so I will define the constants that I am using here. */
-+int kSecPasswordGet = 1<<0; // Get password from keychain or user
-+int kSecPasswordSet = 1<<1; // Set password (passed in if kSecPasswordGet not set, otherwise from user)
-+int kSecPasswordFail = 1<<2; // Wrong password (ignore item in keychain and flag error)
-+OSStatus SecGenericPasswordCreate(SecKeychainAttributeList *searchAttrList, SecKeychainAttributeList *itemAttrList, SecPasswordRef *itemRef);
-+OSStatus SecPasswordAction(SecPasswordRef itemRef, CFTypeRef message, UInt32 flags, UInt32 *length, const void **data);
-+OSStatus SecPasswordSetInitialAccess(SecPasswordRef itemRef, SecAccessRef accessRef);
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Platform-specific helper functions.
-+ */
-+
-+#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
-+
-+static int get_boolean_preference(const char *key, int default_value,
-+ int foreground)
-+{
-+ int value = default_value;
-+ CFStringRef keyRef = NULL;
-+ CFPropertyListRef valueRef = NULL;
-+
-+ keyRef = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, key, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
-+ if (keyRef != NULL)
-+ valueRef = CFPreferencesCopyAppValue(keyRef,
-+ CFSTR("org.openbsd.openssh"));
-+ if (valueRef != NULL)
-+ if (CFGetTypeID(valueRef) == CFBooleanGetTypeID())
-+ value = CFBooleanGetValue(valueRef);
-+ else if (foreground)
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Ignoring nonboolean %s preference.\n", key);
-+
-+ if (keyRef)
-+ CFRelease(keyRef);
-+ if (valueRef)
-+ CFRelease(valueRef);
-+
-+ return value;
-+}
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Store the passphrase for a given identity in the keychain.
-+ */
-+void
-+store_in_keychain(const char *filename, const char *passphrase)
-+{
-+
-+#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
-+
-+ /*
-+ * store_in_keychain
-+ * Mac OS X implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
-+ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
-+ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
-+ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
-+ CFIndex filename_len;
-+ UInt8 *label = NULL;
-+ UInt8 *utf8_filename;
-+ OSStatus rv;
-+ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef = NULL;
-+ SecTrustedApplicationRef apps[] = {NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ CFArrayRef trustedlist = NULL;
-+ SecAccessRef initialAccess = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
-+ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain integration is disabled.\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
-+ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
-+ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
-+ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
-+ NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
-+ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
-+ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
-+ if ((label = xmalloc(filename_len + 5)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "xmalloc failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ memcpy(label, "SSH: ", 5);
-+ utf8_filename = label + 5;
-+ CFDataGetBytes(cfdata_filename, CFRangeMake(0, filename_len),
-+ utf8_filename);
-+
-+ /* Check if we already have this passphrase. */
-+ rv = SecKeychainFindGenericPassword(NULL, 3, "SSH", filename_len,
-+ (char *)utf8_filename, NULL, NULL, &itemRef);
-+ if (rv == errSecItemNotFound) {
-+ /* Add a new keychain item. */
-+ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
-+ {kSecLabelItemAttr, filename_len + 5, label},
-+ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
-+ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
-+ };
-+ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
-+ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
-+ if (SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-agent",
-+ &apps[0]) != noErr ||
-+ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-add",
-+ &apps[1]) != noErr ||
-+ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh",
-+ &apps[2]) != noErr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((trustedlist = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **)apps,
-+ sizeof(apps) / sizeof(apps[0]), &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks)) ==
-+ NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFArrayCreate failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (SecAccessCreate(cfstr_filename, trustedlist,
-+ &initialAccess) != noErr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "SecAccessCreate failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (SecKeychainItemCreateFromContent(
-+ kSecGenericPasswordItemClass, &attrList, strlen(passphrase),
-+ passphrase, NULL, initialAccess, NULL) == noErr)
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase stored in keychain: %s\n", filename);
-+ else
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not create keychain item\n");
-+ } else if (rv == noErr) {
-+ /* Update an existing keychain item. */
-+ if (SecKeychainItemModifyAttributesAndData(itemRef, NULL,
-+ strlen(passphrase), passphrase) == noErr)
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase updated in keychain: %s\n", filename);
-+ else
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not modify keychain item\n");
-+ } else
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not access keychain\n");
-+
-+err: /* Clean up. */
-+ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
-+ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
-+ if (cfurl_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
-+ if (cfstr_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
-+ if (cfdata_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
-+ if (label)
-+ xfree(label);
-+ if (itemRef)
-+ CFRelease(itemRef);
-+ if (apps[0])
-+ CFRelease(apps[0]);
-+ if (apps[1])
-+ CFRelease(apps[1]);
-+ if (apps[2])
-+ CFRelease(apps[2]);
-+ if (trustedlist)
-+ CFRelease(trustedlist);
-+ if (initialAccess)
-+ CFRelease(initialAccess);
-+
-+#else
-+
-+ /*
-+ * store_in_keychain
-+ * no keychain implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain is not available on this system\n");
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Remove the passphrase for a given identity from the keychain.
-+ */
-+void
-+remove_from_keychain(const char *filename)
-+{
-+
-+#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
-+
-+ /*
-+ * remove_from_keychain
-+ * Mac OS X implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
-+ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
-+ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
-+ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
-+ CFIndex filename_len;
-+ const UInt8 *utf8_filename;
-+ OSStatus rv;
-+ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
-+ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain integration is disabled.\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
-+ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
-+ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
-+ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
-+ NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
-+ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
-+ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
-+ utf8_filename = CFDataGetBytePtr(cfdata_filename);
-+
-+ /* Check if we already have this passphrase. */
-+ rv = SecKeychainFindGenericPassword(NULL, 3, "SSH", filename_len,
-+ (const char *)utf8_filename, NULL, NULL, &itemRef);
-+ if (rv == noErr) {
-+ /* Remove the passphrase from the keychain. */
-+ if (SecKeychainItemDelete(itemRef) == noErr)
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Passphrase removed from keychain: %s\n", filename);
-+ else
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove keychain item\n");
-+ } else if (rv != errSecItemNotFound)
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not access keychain\n");
-+
-+err: /* Clean up. */
-+ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
-+ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
-+ if (cfurl_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
-+ if (cfstr_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
-+ if (cfdata_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
-+ if (itemRef)
-+ CFRelease(itemRef);
-+
-+#else
-+
-+ /*
-+ * remove_from_keychain
-+ * no keychain implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Keychain is not available on this system\n");
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Add identities to ssh-agent using passphrases stored in the keychain.
-+ * Returns zero on success and nonzero on failure.
-+ * add_identity is a callback into ssh-agent. It takes a filename and a
-+ * passphrase, and attempts to add the identity to the agent. It returns
-+ * zero on success and nonzero on failure.
-+ */
-+int
-+add_identities_using_keychain(int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *))
-+{
-+
-+#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
-+
-+ /*
-+ * add_identities_using_keychain
-+ * Mac OS X implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ OSStatus rv;
-+ SecKeychainSearchRef searchRef;
-+ SecKeychainItemRef itemRef;
-+ UInt32 length;
-+ void *data;
-+ CFIndex maxsize;
-+
-+ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
-+ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 0) == 0)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ /* Search for SSH passphrases in the keychain */
-+ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
-+ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"}
-+ };
-+ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
-+ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
-+ if ((rv = SecKeychainSearchCreateFromAttributes(NULL,
-+ kSecGenericPasswordItemClass, &attrList, &searchRef)) != noErr)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ /* Iterate through the search results. */
-+ while ((rv = SecKeychainSearchCopyNext(searchRef, &itemRef)) == noErr) {
-+ UInt32 tag = kSecAccountItemAttr;
-+ UInt32 format = kSecFormatUnknown;
-+ SecKeychainAttributeInfo info = {1, &tag, &format};
-+ SecKeychainAttributeList *itemAttrList = NULL;
-+ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
-+ char *filename = NULL;
-+ char *passphrase = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Retrieve filename and passphrase. */
-+ if ((rv = SecKeychainItemCopyAttributesAndData(itemRef, &info,
-+ NULL, &itemAttrList, &length, &data)) != noErr)
-+ goto err;
-+ if (itemAttrList->count != 1)
-+ goto err;
-+ cfstr_filename = CFStringCreateWithBytes(NULL,
-+ itemAttrList->attr->data, itemAttrList->attr->length,
-+ kCFStringEncodingUTF8, true);
-+ maxsize = CFStringGetMaximumSizeOfFileSystemRepresentation(
-+ cfstr_filename);
-+ if ((filename = xmalloc(maxsize)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+ if (CFStringGetFileSystemRepresentation(cfstr_filename,
-+ filename, maxsize) == false)
-+ goto err;
-+ if ((passphrase = xmalloc(length + 1)) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+ memcpy(passphrase, data, length);
-+ passphrase[length] = '\0';
-+
-+ /* Add the identity. */
-+ add_identity(filename, passphrase);
-+
-+err: /* Clean up. */
-+ if (itemRef)
-+ CFRelease(itemRef);
-+ if (cfstr_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
-+ if (filename)
-+ xfree(filename);
-+ if (passphrase)
-+ xfree(passphrase);
-+ if (itemAttrList)
-+ SecKeychainItemFreeAttributesAndData(itemAttrList,
-+ data);
-+ }
-+
-+ CFRelease(searchRef);
-+
-+ return 0;
-+
-+#else
-+
-+ /*
-+ * add_identities_using_keychain
-+ * no implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ return 1;
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Prompt the user for a key's passphrase. The user will be offered the option
-+ * of storing the passphrase in their keychain. Returns the passphrase
-+ * (which the caller is responsible for xfreeing), or NULL if this function
-+ * fails or is not implemented. If this function is not implemented, ssh will
-+ * fall back on the standard read_passphrase function, and the user will need
-+ * to use ssh-add -K to add their keys to the keychain.
-+ */
-+char *
-+keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename, int oAskPassGUI)
-+{
-+
-+#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
-+
-+ /*
-+ * keychain_read_passphrase
-+ * Mac OS X implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ CFStringRef cfstr_relative_filename = NULL;
-+ CFURLRef cfurl_relative_filename = NULL, cfurl_filename = NULL;
-+ CFStringRef cfstr_filename = NULL;
-+ CFDataRef cfdata_filename = NULL;
-+ CFIndex filename_len;
-+ UInt8 *label = NULL;
-+ UInt8 *utf8_filename;
-+ SecPasswordRef passRef = NULL;
-+ SecTrustedApplicationRef apps[] = {NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ CFArrayRef trustedlist = NULL;
-+ SecAccessRef initialAccess = NULL;
-+ CFURLRef path = NULL;
-+ CFStringRef pathFinal = NULL;
-+ CFURLRef bundle_url = NULL;
-+ CFBundleRef bundle = NULL;
-+ CFStringRef promptTemplate = NULL, prompt = NULL;
-+ UInt32 length;
-+ const void *data;
-+ AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
-+ char *result = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
-+ if (get_boolean_preference("KeychainIntegration", 1, 1) == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Bail out if the user set AskPassGUI preference to -bool NO */
-+ if (get_boolean_preference("AskPassGUI", 1, 1) == 0 || oAskPassGUI == 0)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Bail out if we can't communicate with ssh-agent */
-+ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection()) == NULL)
-+ goto err;
-+
-+ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
-+ if ((cfstr_relative_filename =
-+ CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation(NULL, filename)) == NULL)
-+ {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfurl_relative_filename = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
-+ cfstr_relative_filename, kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, false)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfurl_filename = CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL(cfurl_relative_filename)) ==
-+ NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfstr_filename = CFURLCopyFileSystemPath(cfurl_filename,
-+ kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyFileSystemPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((cfdata_filename = CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation(NULL,
-+ cfstr_filename, kCFStringEncodingUTF8, 0)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateExternalRepresentation failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ filename_len = CFDataGetLength(cfdata_filename);
-+ if ((label = xmalloc(filename_len + 5)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "xmalloc failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ memcpy(label, "SSH: ", 5);
-+ utf8_filename = label + 5;
-+ CFDataGetBytes(cfdata_filename, CFRangeMake(0, filename_len),
-+ utf8_filename);
-+
-+ /* Build a SecPasswordRef. */
-+ SecKeychainAttribute searchAttrs[] = {
-+ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
-+ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
-+ };
-+ SecKeychainAttributeList searchAttrList =
-+ {sizeof(searchAttrs) / sizeof(searchAttrs[0]), searchAttrs};
-+ SecKeychainAttribute attrs[] = {
-+ {kSecLabelItemAttr, filename_len + 5, label},
-+ {kSecServiceItemAttr, 3, "SSH"},
-+ {kSecAccountItemAttr, filename_len, utf8_filename}
-+ };
-+ SecKeychainAttributeList attrList =
-+ {sizeof(attrs) / sizeof(attrs[0]), attrs};
-+ if (SecGenericPasswordCreate(&searchAttrList, &attrList, &passRef) !=
-+ noErr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "SecGenericPasswordCreate failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-agent", &apps[0])
-+ != noErr ||
-+ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh-add", &apps[1])
-+ != noErr ||
-+ SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath("/usr/bin/ssh", &apps[2])
-+ != noErr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "SecTrustedApplicationCreateFromPath failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((trustedlist = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **)apps,
-+ sizeof(apps) / sizeof(apps[0]), &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFArrayCreate failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (SecAccessCreate(cfstr_filename, trustedlist, &initialAccess)
-+ != noErr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "SecAccessCreate failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (SecPasswordSetInitialAccess(passRef, initialAccess) != noErr) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "SecPasswordSetInitialAccess failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Request the passphrase from the user. */
-+ if ((path = CFURLCreateFromFileSystemRepresentation(NULL,
-+ (UInt8 *)filename, strlen(filename), false)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCreateFromFileSystemRepresentation failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((pathFinal = CFURLCopyLastPathComponent(path)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFURLCopyLastPathComponent failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if (!((bundle_url = CFURLCreateWithFileSystemPath(NULL,
-+ CFSTR("/System/Library/CoreServices/"), kCFURLPOSIXPathStyle, true))
-+ != NULL && (bundle = CFBundleCreate(NULL, bundle_url)) != NULL &&
-+ (promptTemplate = CFCopyLocalizedStringFromTableInBundle(
-+ CFSTR("Enter your password for the SSH key \"%@\"."),
-+ CFSTR("OpenSSH"), bundle, "Text of the dialog asking the user for"
-+ "their passphrase. The %@ will be replaced with the filename of a"
-+ "specific key.")) != NULL) &&
-+ (promptTemplate = CFStringCreateCopy(NULL,
-+ CFSTR("Enter your password for the SSH key \"%@\"."))) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateCopy failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ if ((prompt = CFStringCreateWithFormat(NULL, NULL, promptTemplate,
-+ pathFinal)) == NULL) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "CFStringCreateWithFormat failed\n");
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+ switch (SecPasswordAction(passRef, prompt,
-+ kSecPasswordGet|kSecPasswordFail, &length, &data)) {
-+ case noErr:
-+ result = xmalloc(length + 1);
-+ memcpy(result, data, length);
-+ result[length] = '\0';
-+
-+ /* Save password in keychain if requested. */
-+ if (noErr != SecPasswordAction(passRef, CFSTR(""), kSecPasswordSet, &length, &data))
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Saving password to keychain failed\n");
-+
-+ /* Add password to agent. */
-+ char *comment = NULL;
-+ Key *private = key_load_private(filename, result, &comment);
-+ if (NULL == private)
-+ break;
-+ if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, 0, 0))
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
-+ else
-+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
-+ xfree(comment);
-+ key_free(private);
-+ break;
-+ case errAuthorizationCanceled:
-+ result = xmalloc(1);
-+ *result = '\0';
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ goto err;
-+ }
-+
-+err: /* Clean up. */
-+ if (cfstr_relative_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfstr_relative_filename);
-+ if (cfurl_relative_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfurl_relative_filename);
-+ if (cfurl_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfurl_filename);
-+ if (cfstr_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfstr_filename);
-+ if (cfdata_filename)
-+ CFRelease(cfdata_filename);
-+ if (label)
-+ xfree(label);
-+ if (passRef)
-+ CFRelease(passRef);
-+ if (apps[0])
-+ CFRelease(apps[0]);
-+ if (apps[1])
-+ CFRelease(apps[1]);
-+ if (apps[2])
-+ CFRelease(apps[2]);
-+ if (trustedlist)
-+ CFRelease(trustedlist);
-+ if (initialAccess)
-+ CFRelease(initialAccess);
-+ if (path)
-+ CFRelease(path);
-+ if (pathFinal)
-+ CFRelease(pathFinal);
-+ if (bundle_url)
-+ CFRelease(bundle_url);
-+ if (bundle)
-+ CFRelease(bundle);
-+ if (promptTemplate)
-+ CFRelease(promptTemplate);
-+ if (prompt)
-+ CFRelease(prompt);
-+ if (ac)
-+ ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-+
-+ return result;
-+
-+#else
-+
-+ /*
-+ * keychain_read_passphrase
-+ * no implementation
-+ */
-+
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+#endif
-+
-+}
---- /dev/null 2013-07-20 16:48:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./keychain.h 2013-07-20 16:21:12.000000000 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_START@
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ *
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of its
-+ * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
-+ * this software without specific prior written permission.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
-+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
-+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
-+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
-+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
-+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
-+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ *
-+ * @APPLE_BSD_LICENSE_HEADER_END@
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * KEYCHAIN indicates that keychain functionality is present.
-+ * KEYCHAIN_* indicates the implementation to use, and implies KEYCHAIN.
-+ */
-+#if defined(__APPLE_KEYCHAIN__)
-+#define KEYCHAIN
-+#endif
-+
-+void store_in_keychain(const char *filename, const char *passphrase);
-+void remove_from_keychain(const char *filename);
-+int add_identities_using_keychain(
-+ int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *));
-+char *keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename, int oAskPassGUI);
+ separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process
+ to deal with incoming network traffic.
Deleted: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.2p2-gsskex-all-20110125.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.2p2-gsskex-all-20110125.patch 2013-10-24 21:47:52 UTC (rev 112513)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.2p2-gsskex-all-20110125.patch 2013-10-25 04:14:14 UTC (rev 112514)
@@ -1,2992 +0,0 @@
-commit c2f0a172fa9eadec04b92296707764db7887b45e
-Author: Bryan Drewery <bryan at shatow.net>
-Date: Sat May 25 10:33:10 2013 -0500
-
- KEX PATCH
-
-diff --git ChangeLog.gssapi ChangeLog.gssapi
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..f117a33
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+20110101
-+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
-+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
-+
-+20100308
-+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
-+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
-+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
-+ Watson.
-+ -
-+
-+20100124
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
-+ Colin Watson
-+
-+20090615
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
-+ sshd.c ]
-+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
-+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
-+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
-+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
-+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
-+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
-+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
-+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
-+ Cast data.length before printing
-+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
-+
-+20090201
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
-+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
-+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
-+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
-+
-+20080404
-+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
-+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
-+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
-+ Stoichkov
-+
-+20070317
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
-+ function
-+
-+20061220
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
-+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
-+
-+20060910
-+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
-+ ssh-gss.h ]
-+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
-+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
-+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
-+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
-+ <Bugzilla #928>
-+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
-+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
-+ configuration files
-+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
-+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
-+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
-+
-+20060909
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
-+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
-+ only, where they belong
-+ <Bugzilla #1225>
-+
-+20060829
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
-+ variable
-+
-+20060828
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
-+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
-+
-+20060818
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
-+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
-+
-+20060421
-+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
-+ fix compiler errors/warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
-+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
-+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
-+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
-diff --git Makefile.in Makefile.in
-index d327787..dd0502e 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \
- atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-+ kexgssc.o \
- msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o
-
-@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \
- auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
- monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
- auth-krb5.o \
-- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
- loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
-diff --git auth-krb5.c auth-krb5.c
-index 922c66c..91529ea 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
-
- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
-+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-+ int ret, oerrno;
- char ccname[40];
- mode_t old_umask;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
-+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
-+ int tmpfd;
-+#endif
-
- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+ cctemplate, geteuid());
- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- return ENOMEM;
-
-+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- oerrno = errno;
-@@ -251,6 +263,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
- return oerrno;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
-+#endif
-
- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
-diff --git auth2-gss.c auth2-gss.c
-index 93d576b..17d4a3a 100644
---- a/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.18 2012/12/02 20:34:09 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@ static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-+/*
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ int authenticated = 0;
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+ mic.length = len;
-+
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ xfree(mic.value);
-+
-+ return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -244,7 +278,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -279,7 +314,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated =
-+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
- else
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-@@ -294,6 +330,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- }
-
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+ "gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ &options.gss_authentication
-+};
-+
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
-diff --git auth2.c auth2.c
-index e367a10..d259400 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
-@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- &method_none,
- &method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ &method_gsskeyex,
- &method_gssapi,
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
-diff --git clientloop.c clientloop.c
-index c1d1d44..2ef816a 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
- #include "msg.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
-
-@@ -1599,6 +1603,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
- /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- if (!rekeying) {
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
-+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+ need_rekeying = 1;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
- debug("need rekeying");
- xxx_kex->done = 0;
-diff --git configure.ac configure.ac
-index 88dd29e..02f8e3f 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -533,6 +533,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
-+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+ [cc_context_t c;
-+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
-+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
-+ fi],
-+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
-+ )
- m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
- AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
- AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
-diff --git gss-genr.c gss-genr.c
-index 842f385..f9b39cf 100644
---- a/gss-genr.c
-+++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ char *encoded;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
-+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+ OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+ host, client));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+ const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ Buffer buf;
-+ size_t i;
-+ int oidpos, enclen;
-+ char *mechs, *encoded;
-+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+ char deroid[2];
-+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+ xfree(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+ xfree(gss_enc2oid);
-+ }
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+ buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+ oidpos = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
-+
-+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+ if (oidpos != 0)
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+ oidpos++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+ xfree(mechs);
-+ mechs = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ switch (kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ }
-+
-+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+ i++;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
- }
-
- ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
- 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
-
-@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
- }
-
- OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_name_t gssname;
-+ OM_uint32 status;
-+ gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
-+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-+
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
-+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
-+
-+ if (!ctx->major)
-+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+
-+ if (ctx->major)
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+ return(ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+{
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
- void
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
-@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- }
-
- int
--ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
-+ const char *client)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ ctx = &intctx;
-
- /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
-+
- if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
- NULL);
-@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
- return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
-+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
-+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ static gss_name_t name;
-+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
-+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
-+ int equal;
-+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
-+
-+ now = time(NULL);
-+
-+ if (ctxt) {
-+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
-+
-+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
-+ saved_lifetime+= now;
-+ } else {
-+ /* Handle the error */
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (now - last_call < 10)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ last_call = now;
-+
-+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
-+ return 0;
-+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
-+ return 1;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv-krb5.c
-index 5a625ac..e7170ee 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- krb5_principal princ;
- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- int len;
-+ const char *new_ccname;
-
- if (client->creds == NULL) {
- debug("No credentials stored");
-@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- return;
- }
-
-- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
-- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
-- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- return;
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
-+ char *name = NULL;
-+ krb5_error_code problem;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
-+ &principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
-+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
-+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+
-+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+
-+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
-+ ccache))) {
-+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- "Kerberos",
-@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- NULL,
-- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
-
- #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git gss-serv.c gss-serv.c
-index c719c13..380895e 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.23 2011/08/01 19:18:15 markus Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
- char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
- gss_OID_set oidset;
-
-- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-
-- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (-1);
-- }
-+ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
-+ NULL, NULL)))
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
-+ } else {
-+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- }
--
-- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
-- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
--
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (ctx->major);
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
-
- /* Privileged */
-@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-+ gss_OID_set supported;
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+ NULL, NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+ const char *dummy) {
-+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+ int res;
-+
-+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+ return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+ return;
-
- while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -249,8 +286,48 @@ OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- int i = 0;
-+ int equal = 0;
-+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+ new_name, &equal);
-
-- gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!equal) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+ client->name = new_name;
-+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+ client->updated = 1;
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-
- client->mech = NULL;
-
-@@ -265,6 +342,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- if (client->mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
-+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -282,6 +366,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
- /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -329,7 +415,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
-
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- OM_uint32 lmin;
-
-@@ -339,9 +425,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- return 0;
- }
- if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
-- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
- return 1;
-- else {
-+ } else {
- /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -354,14 +442,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- return (0);
- }
-
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
-+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
-- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
-
-- return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
-+ int ok;
-+ int ret;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+ char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+ if (!ok)
-+ return;
-+
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
-+ */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ if (!use_privsep) {
-+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+ &pamconv, &pamh);
-+ if (ret)
-+ return;
-+
-+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+ if (!ret)
-+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+ int ok = 0;
-+
-+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+ else
-+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+ restore_uid();
-+
-+ return ok;
- }
-
- #endif
-diff --git kex.c kex.c
-index 57a79dd..f9e7a9c 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
- #include "monitor.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
- # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-@@ -369,6 +373,20 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
- k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2;
- k->evp_md = kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(k->name);
- #endif
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1;
-+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
-+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1;
-+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
-+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1) == 0) {
-+ k->kex_type = KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1;
-+ k->evp_md = EVP_sha1();
-+#endif
- } else
- fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
- }
-diff --git kex.h kex.h
-index 46731fa..8013ab8 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ enum kex_exchange {
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
- KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_MAX
- };
-
-@@ -131,6 +134,12 @@ struct Kex {
- sig_atomic_t done;
- int flags;
- const EVP_MD *evp_md;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ int gss_deleg_creds;
-+ int gss_trust_dns;
-+ char *gss_host;
-+ char *gss_client;
-+#endif
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
- int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-@@ -158,6 +167,11 @@ void kexgex_server(Kex *);
- void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
- void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+void kexgss_client(Kex *);
-+void kexgss_server(Kex *);
-+#endif
-+
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
- BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
-diff --git kexgssc.c kexgssc.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..39be405
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+ u_char *empty = "";
-+ char *msg;
-+ char *lang;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ int first = 1;
-+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+
-+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_client &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ packet_put_int(min);
-+ packet_put_int(nbits);
-+ packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+ &ret_flags);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+ */
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ if (first) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ first = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+ do {
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+ serverhostkey =
-+ packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ }
-+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+ switch (type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
-+
-+ /* Is there a token included? */
-+ if (packet_get_char()) {
-+ recv_tok.value=
-+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+ } else {
-+ /* No token included */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+ debug("Received Error");
-+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+ min_status = packet_get_int();
-+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+ } else {
-+ /* No data, and not complete */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+ */
-+
-+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+ if (kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ xfree(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
-+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
-+ shared_secret, /* K */
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->evp_md,
-+ kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ dh_server_pub,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+ xfree(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ xfree(serverhostkey);
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+ /* save session id */
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git kexgsss.c kexgsss.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..0c3eeaa
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
-+{
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+ */
-+
-+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+ char *mechs;
-+
-+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+ * into life
-+ */
-+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+ xfree(mechs);
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange");
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ min = packet_get_int();
-+ nbits = packet_get_int();
-+ max = packet_get_int();
-+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, nbits, max);
-+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+ if (dh == NULL)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_write_wait();
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ switch(type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+
-+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect(
-+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+
-+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+ xfree(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ }
-+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+ if (kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ xfree(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash(
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->evp_md,
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh_client_pub,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ } else {
-+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+
-+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+ * just exchanged. */
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git key.c key.c
-index 4cc5c5d..fdfed5c 100644
---- a/key.c
-+++ b/key.c
-@@ -976,6 +976,8 @@ key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
- }
- break;
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+ case KEY_NULL:
-+ return "null";
- }
- return "ssh-unknown";
- }
-@@ -1281,6 +1283,8 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name)
- strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com") == 0) {
- return KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
- #endif
-+ } else if (strcmp(name, "null") == 0) {
-+ return KEY_NULL;
- }
-
- debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
-diff --git key.h key.h
-index ebdf456..4beaf20 100644
---- a/key.h
-+++ b/key.h
-@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ enum types {
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
- KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
-+ KEY_NULL,
- KEY_UNSPEC
- };
- enum fp_type {
-diff --git monitor.c monitor.c
-index 8006b83..d7a782f 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -252,6 +254,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
- {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
-@@ -264,6 +267,12 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
- };
-
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
-+#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
-@@ -372,6 +381,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-@@ -487,6 +500,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1836,6 +1853,13 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-@@ -2042,6 +2066,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- goid.length = len;
-
-@@ -2069,6 +2096,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- in.length = len;
- major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
-@@ -2086,6 +2116,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
- }
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -2097,6 +2128,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
- OM_uint32 ret;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- gssbuf.length = len;
- mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-@@ -2123,7 +2157,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
- {
- int authenticated;
-
-- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-@@ -2136,6 +2174,74 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc data;
-+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ data.length = len;
-+ if (data.length != 20)
-+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+ (int) data.length);
-+
-+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+ session_id2_len = data.length;
-+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+ }
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+ xfree(data.value);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+
-+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+
-+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
-+
-+ xfree(store.filename);
-+ xfree(store.envvar);
-+ xfree(store.envval);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
-+
-+ return(0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #ifdef JPAKE
-diff --git monitor.h monitor.h
-index 2caa469..d4dbc5a 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
- MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 58, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 59,
- MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 60, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 61,
-
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 62, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 63,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 64, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 65,
-+
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
-diff --git monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.c
-index ea654a7..ed8dbda 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
- }
-
- int
--mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- Buffer m;
- int authenticated = 0;
-@@ -1288,6 +1288,51 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ OM_uint32 major;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+ hash->length = len;
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+
-+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return (ok);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #ifdef JPAKE
-diff --git monitor_wrap.h monitor_wrap.h
-index 0c7f2e3..ec9b9b1 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
--int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff --git readconf.c readconf.c
-index 36265e4..375ca32 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@ typedef enum {
- oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
-+ oGssServerIdentity,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -169,10 +171,19 @@ static struct {
- { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
-+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -503,10 +514,30 @@ parse_flag:
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oGssDelegateCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssTrustDns:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case oGssClientIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssServerIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1158,7 +1189,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
-+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
-+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1258,8 +1294,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-diff --git readconf.h readconf.h
-index 8416489..0835cb6 100644
---- a/readconf.h
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -48,7 +48,12 @@ typedef struct {
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
- int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
-+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
-+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
-+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff --git servconf.c servconf.c
-index b2a60fd..cdc0293 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -102,7 +102,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -233,8 +236,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -327,7 +336,9 @@ typedef enum {
- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
-+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
-@@ -393,10 +404,20 @@ static struct {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1049,10 +1070,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sGssCleanupCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case sGssStoreRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1927,7 +1960,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- #endif
- #ifdef JPAKE
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
-diff --git servconf.h servconf.h
-index 870c709..06e21a9 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -110,7 +110,10 @@ typedef struct {
- int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
- * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
-+ int gss_store_rekey;
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
-diff --git ssh-gss.h ssh-gss.h
-index 077e13c..bc6e8f9 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
-
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
-
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
- char *filename;
- char *envvar;
- char *envval;
-+ struct passwd *owner;
- void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
-
-@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
- gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+ gss_name_t name;
- struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int used;
-+ int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
-
- typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
- gss_OID oid; /* client */
- gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
- gss_name_t client; /* server */
-- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
-+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
-
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
-
- int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -117,16 +134,30 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
-
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-diff --git ssh_config ssh_config
-index 1893674..2c06ba7 100644
---- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- # HostbasedAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
- # BatchMode no
- # CheckHostIP yes
- # AddressFamily any
-diff --git ssh_config.5 ssh_config.5
-index 269529c..bd3a712 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -530,11 +530,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-+identity will be used.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
-+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
-+hostname.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
--Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
-+If set to
-+.Dq yes
-+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
-+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
-+credentials to a session on the server.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to
-+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If
-+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-diff --git sshconnect2.c sshconnect2.c
-index 58015c0..1aa8523 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -160,9 +160,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- {
- Kex *kex;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+ char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_host = host;
- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = host;
-+
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
-+ if (gss) {
-+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
- options.ciphers = NULL;
-@@ -197,6 +222,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+ "%s,null", orig);
-+ xfree(gss);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.rekey_limit)
- packet_set_rekey_limit((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit);
-
-@@ -207,10 +243,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ } else {
-+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_kex = kex;
-
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-@@ -306,6 +362,7 @@ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
-
- void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -321,6 +378,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
-
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {"gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ NULL,
-+ &options.gss_authentication,
-+ NULL},
- {"gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- NULL,
-@@ -627,19 +689,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
- static u_int mech = 0;
- OM_uint32 min;
- int ok = 0;
-+ const char *gss_host;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
-+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
-
- /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- * once. */
-
- if (gss_supported == NULL)
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
-+ gss_supported = NULL;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-
- /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
-- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
- ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- } else {
- mech++;
-@@ -736,8 +810,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- {
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-- int oidlen;
-- char *oidv;
-+ u_int oidlen;
-+ u_char *oidv;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -847,6 +921,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt)
- xfree(msg);
- xfree(lang);
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+ static int attempt = 0;
-+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- int
-diff --git sshd.c sshd.c
-index 3e9d176..d8faaeb 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "version.h"
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifdef LIBWRAP
- #include <tcpd.h>
- #include <syslog.h>
-@@ -1645,10 +1649,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
-+#endif
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- exit(1);
-@@ -1976,6 +1983,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- /* Log the connection. */
- verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+ /*
-+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
-+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
-+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
-+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
-+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
-+ *
-+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
-+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
-+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
-+ * same session (bad).
-+ *
-+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
-+ * automatically.
-+ *
-+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
-+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
-+ */
-+ {
-+ OSStatus err = 0;
-+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
-+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+
-+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
-+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
-+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
-+ else {
-+ debug("Creating new security session...");
-+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
-+ &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2357,6 +2418,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
-
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {
-+ char *orig;
-+ char *gss = NULL;
-+ char *newstr = NULL;
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+ * the other key exchange algorithms
-+ */
-+
-+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+ orig = NULL;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_keyex)
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+ else
-+ gss = NULL;
-+
-+ if (gss && orig)
-+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ else if (gss)
-+ newstr = gss;
-+ else if (orig)
-+ newstr = orig;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+ * host key algorithm we support
-+ */
-+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+ if (newstr)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+ else
-+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
-@@ -2364,6 +2467,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
-diff --git sshd_config sshd_config
-index 9cd2fdd..1af2afd 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --git sshd_config.5 sshd_config.5
-index cfa4806..935bb62 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -481,12 +481,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
-+a client authenticates against. If
-+.Dq yes
-+then the client must authenticate against the
-+.Pa host
-+service on the current hostname. If
-+.Dq no
-+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
-+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
-+on multi homed machines.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
-+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
-+and setting it to
-+.Dq no
-+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
-+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
-+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
-+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.3p1-gsskex-all-20130920.patch 2013-10-25 04:14:14 UTC (rev 112514)
@@ -0,0 +1,2934 @@
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ChangeLog.gssapi openssh-5.8p1.new/ChangeLog.gssapi
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ChangeLog.gssapi 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ChangeLog.gssapi 2011-02-12 18:07:10.948345760 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++20110101
++ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
++ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
++
++20100308
++ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
++ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
++ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
++ Watson.
++ -
++
++20100124
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
++ Colin Watson
++
++20090615
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++ sshd.c ]
++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++ Cast data.length before printing
++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++ - [ gss-serv.c ]
++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++ Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
++ function
++
++20061220
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++ ssh-gss.h ]
++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++ <Bugzilla #928>
++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++ configuration files
++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++ only, where they belong
++ <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
++ variable
++
++20060828
++ - [ gss-genr.c ]
++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
++ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++ fix compiler errors/warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ fix uninitialized variable warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ gssgenr.c ]
++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Bugzilla #1220 >
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in openssh-5.8p1.new/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-5.8p1/Makefile.in 2011-02-04 01:42:13.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/Makefile.in 2011-02-12 18:07:10.990611445 +0100
+@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
+ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
++ kexgssc.o \
+ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+ jpake.o schnorr.o ssh-pkcs11.o kr1.o
+
+@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-jpake.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
+ auth-krb5.o \
+- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/auth-krb5.c openssh-5.8p1.new/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/auth-krb5.c 2009-12-21 00:49:22.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/auth-krb5.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.002529804 +0100
+@@ -170,8 +170,13 @@
+
+ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -226,15 +231,22 @@
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
++ int ret;
+ char ccname[40];
+ mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++ int tmpfd, oerrno;
++#endif
+
+ ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++ cctemplate, geteuid());
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ return ENOMEM;
+
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ oerrno = errno;
+@@ -249,6 +261,7 @@
+ return oerrno;
+ }
+ close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/auth2-gss.c openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2-gss.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2-gss.c 2007-12-02 12:59:45.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2-gss.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.030761708 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.16 2007/10/29 00:52:45 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -52,6 +52,40 @@
+ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
++/*
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ int authenticated = 0;
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++ u_int len;
++
++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++ mic.length = len;
++
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++ &gssbuf, &mic))))
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ free(mic.value);
++
++ return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -242,7 +278,8 @@
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -277,7 +314,8 @@
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated =
++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+@@ -292,6 +330,12 @@
+ userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic");
+ }
+
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++ "gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/auth2.c 2010-08-31 14:36:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/auth2.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.043418162 +0100
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@
+ &method_none,
+ &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ &method_gsskeyex,
+ &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/clientloop.c openssh-5.8p1.new/clientloop.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/clientloop.c 2011-01-16 13:18:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/clientloop.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.063578136 +0100
+@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
+ #include "msg.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+
+@@ -1483,6 +1487,15 @@
+ /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+ if (!rekeying) {
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++ need_rekeying = 1;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+ debug("need rekeying");
+ xxx_kex->done = 0;
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/configure.ac openssh-5.8p1.new/configure.ac
+--- openssh-5.8p1/configure.ac 2011-02-04 01:42:14.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/configure.ac 2011-02-12 18:07:11.092748915 +0100
+@@ -514,6 +514,30 @@
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++ [cc_context_t c;
++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
++ fi],
++ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
++ )
+ m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+ AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], 0, [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/gss-genr.c openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/gss-genr.c 2009-06-22 08:11:07.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-genr.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.108432434 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.20 2009/06/22 05:39:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
++typedef struct {
++ char *encoded;
++ gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++ OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++ return NULL;
++
++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++ host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++ const char *host, const char *client) {
++ Buffer buf;
++ size_t i;
++ int oidpos, enclen;
++ char *mechs, *encoded;
++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ char deroid[2];
++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++ EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++ free(gss_enc2oid);
++ }
++
++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++ (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++ buffer_init(&buf);
++
++ oidpos = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++ if (oidpos != 0)
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++ oidpos++;
++ }
++ }
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_free(&buf);
++
++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++ free(mechs);
++ mechs = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++ int i = 0;
++
++ switch (kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ }
++
++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++ i++;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@
+ }
+
+ ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@
+ }
+
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_name_t gssname;
++ OM_uint32 status;
++ gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++ if (!ctx->major)
++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++ if (ctx->major)
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++ return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++ return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@
+ }
+
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
++ const char *client)
+ {
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ ctx = &intctx;
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ NULL);
+@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ static gss_name_t name;
++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++ int equal;
++ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
++
++ now = time(NULL);
++
++ if (ctxt) {
++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++ saved_lifetime+= now;
++ } else {
++ /* Handle the error */
++ }
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (now - last_call < 10)
++ return 0;
++
++ last_call = now;
++
++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++ return 0;
++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2006-09-01 07:38:36.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv-krb5.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.123072516 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.7 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+ int len;
+ const char *errmsg;
++ const char *new_ccname;
+
+ if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -168,11 +169,16 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
+- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -184,6 +190,71 @@
+ return;
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++ char *name = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
++ &principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++
++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++ ccache))) {
++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ "Kerberos",
+@@ -191,7 +262,8 @@
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ NULL,
+- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv.c openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/gss-serv.c 2008-05-19 07:05:07.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/gss-serv.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.135178913 +0100
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.22 2008/05/08 12:02:23 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -81,25 +86,32 @@
+ char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+- if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (-1);
+- }
++ if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (-1);
++ }
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
++ NULL, NULL)))
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
++ } else {
++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ }
+-
+- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (ctx->major);
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -114,6 +126,29 @@
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
++ gss_OID_set supported;
++
++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++ NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++ const char *dummy) {
++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++ int res;
++
++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++ return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++ return;
+
+ while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -247,8 +284,48 @@
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
++ int equal = 0;
++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+- gss_buffer_desc ename;
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++ new_name, &equal);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if (!equal) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++ client->name = new_name;
++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++ client->updated = 1;
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
+
+ client->mech = NULL;
+
+@@ -263,6 +340,13 @@
+ if (client->mech == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
++ if (ctx->client_creds &&
++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -280,6 +364,8 @@
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -327,7 +413,7 @@
+
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+@@ -337,9 +423,11 @@
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++ gssapi_client.used = 1;
++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ return 1;
+- else {
++ } else {
+ /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -352,14 +440,90 @@
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+
+- return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
++ int ok;
++ int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++ char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++ if (!ok)
++ return;
++
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++ */
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ if (!use_privsep) {
++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++ return;
++ }
++
++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ &pamconv, &pamh);
++ if (ret)
++ return;
++
++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
++ gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++ if (!ret)
++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++ int ok = 0;
++
++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
++ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++ return 0;
++
++ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++ else
++ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++ restore_uid();
++
++ return ok;
+ }
+
+ #endif
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kex.c openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/kex.c 2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.149564726 +0100
+@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
+ #include "monitor.h"
+ #include "roaming.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -80,6 +84,11 @@
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, EVP_sha384 },
+ { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, EVP_sha512 },
+ #endif
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, EVP_sha1 },
++#endif
+ { NULL, -1, -1, NULL},
+ };
+
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kex.h openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/kex.h 2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kex.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.161650596 +0100
+@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+ KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
+ KEX_MAX
+ };
+
+@@ -129,6 +132,12 @@
+ int flags;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md;
+ int ec_nid;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ int gss_deleg_creds;
++ int gss_trust_dns;
++ char *gss_host;
++ char *gss_client;
++#endif
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
+@@ -156,6 +165,11 @@
+ void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
+ void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++void kexgss_client(Kex *);
++void kexgss_server(Kex *);
++#endif
++
+ void
+ kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
+ BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kexgssc.c openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgssc.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/kexgssc.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgssc.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.176741991 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++void
++kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
++ DH *dh;
++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++ u_char *empty = "";
++ char *msg;
++ char *lang;
++ int type = 0;
++ int first = 1;
++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++
++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
++ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++ if (kex->gss_client &&
++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ packet_put_int(min);
++ packet_put_int(nbits);
++ packet_put_int(max);
++
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(p);
++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(g);
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++
++ do {
++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++ &ret_flags);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++ }
++
++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity check failed");
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++ */
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ if (first) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ first = 0;
++ } else {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++ do {
++ type = packet_read();
++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++ serverhostkey =
++ packet_get_string(&slen);
++ }
++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ msg_tok.length = strlen;
++
++ /* Is there a token included? */
++ if (packet_get_char()) {
++ recv_tok.value=
++ packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++ } else {
++ /* No token included */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++ }
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++ debug("Received Error");
++ maj_status = packet_get_int();
++ min_status = packet_get_int();
++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++ } else {
++ /* No data, and not complete */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ /*
++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
++ */
++
++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++ if (kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ dh->pub_key, /* e */
++ dh_server_pub, /* f */
++ shared_secret, /* K */
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->evp_md,
++ kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ dh_server_pub,
++ shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++ free(msg_tok.value);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ free(serverhostkey);
++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++ /* save session id */
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ kex_finish(kex);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/kexgsss.c openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgsss.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/kexgsss.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/kexgsss.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.186584789 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++void
++kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
++{
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ /*
++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
++ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++ */
++
++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
++ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
++ DH *dh;
++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++ int type = 0;
++ gss_OID oid;
++ char *mechs;
++
++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++ * into life
++ */
++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
++ free(mechs);
++
++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange");
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ min = packet_get_int();
++ nbits = packet_get_int();
++ max = packet_get_int();
++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++ packet_check_eom();
++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, nbits, max);
++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++ if (dh == NULL)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_write_wait();
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ do {
++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++ type = packet_read();
++ switch(type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++
++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++ break;
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect(
++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++
++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("No client public key");
++
++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ }
++ fatal("accept_ctx died");
++ }
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++ if (kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash(
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->evp_md,
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
++ NULL, 0,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh_client_pub,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ shared_secret,
++ &hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ } else {
++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++ }
++ packet_send();
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++
++ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ kex_finish(kex);
++
++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++ * just exchanged. */
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/key.c openssh-5.8p1.new/key.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/key.c 2011-02-04 01:48:34.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/key.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.202089386 +0100
+@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@
+ { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01 at openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT",
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 },
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
+ { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00",
+ KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
+ { "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00",
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/key.h openssh-5.8p1.new/key.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/key.h 2010-11-05 00:19:49.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/key.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.216270794 +0100
+@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+ KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+ KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
++ KEY_NULL,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+ enum fp_type {
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.c 2010-09-10 03:23:34.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.241713537 +0100
+@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -241,6 +243,7 @@
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+@@ -253,6 +256,12 @@
+ };
+
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+@@ -357,6 +366,10 @@
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+@@ -443,6 +456,10 @@
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1692,6 +1709,13 @@
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+@@ -1898,6 +1922,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ goid.length = len;
+
+@@ -1925,6 +1952,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ in.length = len;
+ major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -1942,6 +1972,7 @@
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -1953,6 +1984,9 @@
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ gssbuf.length = len;
+ mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -1979,7 +2013,11 @@
+ {
+ int authenticated;
+
+- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -1992,6 +2030,74 @@
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc data;
++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 major, minor;
++ u_int len;
++
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ data.length = len;
++ if (data.length != 20)
++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++ (int) data.length);
++
++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++ session_id2_len = data.length;
++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++ }
++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++ free(data.value);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, major);
++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++
++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int ok;
++
++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++ free(store.filename);
++ free(store.envvar);
++ free(store.envval);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++ return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor.h 2008-11-05 06:20:46.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.311728071 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@
+ MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2 = 56, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2 = 57,
+ MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 58, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM = 59,
+ MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 60, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM = 61,
++
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 62, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 63,
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 64, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 65,
+
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2010-08-31 14:41:14.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.359631731 +0100
+@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@
+ }
+
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1249,6 +1249,51 @@
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ OM_uint32 major;
++ u_int len;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++ hash->length = len;
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ int ok;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2009-03-05 14:58:22.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/monitor_wrap.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.407619296 +0100
+@@ -57,8 +57,10 @@
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/readconf.c openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/readconf.c 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.460306621 +0100
+@@ -129,6 +129,8 @@
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
++ oGssServerIdentity,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -169,10 +171,19 @@
+ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -479,10 +490,30 @@
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssTrustDns:
++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oGssClientIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssServerIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssRenewalRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1092,7 +1123,12 @@
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication = -1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1193,8 +1229,14 @@
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/readconf.h openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/readconf.h 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/readconf.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.507187275 +0100
+@@ -46,7 +46,12 @@
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/servconf.c openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/servconf.c 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.533252334 +0100
+@@ -97,7 +97,10 @@
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication=-1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -226,8 +229,14 @@
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -322,7 +331,9 @@
+ sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
+ sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
+@@ -386,10 +397,20 @@
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -944,10 +965,22 @@
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sGssStoreRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1704,7 +1737,10 @@
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+ #ifdef JPAKE
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/servconf.h openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/servconf.h 2010-11-20 05:19:38.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/servconf.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.548572408 +0100
+@@ -97,7 +97,10 @@
+ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++ int gss_store_rekey;
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ssh-gss.h openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh-gss.h 2007-06-12 15:40:39.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh-gss.h 2011-02-12 18:07:11.567306608 +0100
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.10 2007/06/12 08:20:00 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -60,10 +60,22 @@
+
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ char *filename;
+ char *envvar;
+ char *envval;
++ struct passwd *owner;
+ void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+@@ -71,8 +83,11 @@
+ gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ gss_cred_id_t creds;
++ gss_name_t name;
+ struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int used;
++ int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -83,6 +98,7 @@
+ int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -93,10 +109,11 @@
+ gss_OID oid; /* client */
+ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
+ gss_name_t client; /* server */
+- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -116,16 +133,30 @@
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++ const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config 2010-01-12 09:40:27.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config 2011-02-12 18:07:11.580240516 +0100
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+ # AddressFamily any
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-5.8p1/ssh_config.5 2010-12-26 04:26:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/ssh_config.5 2011-02-12 18:07:11.600266821 +0100
+@@ -508,11 +508,43 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
++identity will be used.
++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
++hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c openssh-5.8p1.new/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sshconnect2.c 2010-12-01 02:21:51.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshconnect2.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.623078773 +0100
+@@ -159,9 +159,34 @@
+ {
+ Kex *kex;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++ char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = host;
++
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++ if (gss) {
++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+ logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -196,6 +221,17 @@
+ if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++ "%s,null", orig);
++ free(gss);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
+
+@@ -206,10 +242,30 @@
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ } else {
++ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ xxx_kex = kex;
+
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
+@@ -304,6 +360,7 @@
+ void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+
+ void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -319,6 +376,11 @@
+
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ {"gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ NULL,
++ &options.gss_authentication,
++ NULL},
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+@@ -625,19 +687,31 @@
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
++ const char *gss_host;
++
++ if (options.gss_server_identity)
++ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = authctxt->host;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+
+ if (gss_supported == NULL)
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++ gss_supported = NULL;
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+@@ -734,8 +808,8 @@
+ {
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+- int oidlen;
+- char *oidv;
++ u_int oidlen;
++ u_char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -845,6 +919,48 @@
+ free(msg);
+ free(lang);
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 ms;
++
++ static int attempt = 0;
++ if (attempt++ >= 1)
++ return (0);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++ packet_send();
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++ return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ int
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd.c
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sshd.c 2011-01-11 07:20:31.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd.c 2011-02-12 18:07:11.656005267 +0100
+@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@
+ #include "roaming.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef LIBWRAP
+ #include <tcpd.h>
+ #include <syslog.h>
+@@ -1590,10 +1594,13 @@
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ }
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ }
++#endif
+ if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+@@ -1922,6 +1929,60 @@
+ /* Log the connection. */
+ verbose("Connection from %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++ /*
++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++ *
++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
++ * same session (bad).
++ *
++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++ * automatically.
++ *
++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++ */
++ {
++ OSStatus err = 0;
++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++ else {
++ debug("Creating new security session...");
++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
++ &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2303,6 +2364,48 @@
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = list_hostkey_types();
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {
++ char *orig;
++ char *gss = NULL;
++ char *newstr = NULL;
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ /*
++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++ * the other key exchange algorithms
++ */
++
++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++ orig = NULL;
++
++ if (options.gss_keyex)
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++ else
++ gss = NULL;
++
++ if (gss && orig)
++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ else if (gss)
++ newstr = gss;
++ else if (orig)
++ newstr = orig;
++
++ /*
++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++ * host key algorithm we support
++ */
++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++ if (newstr)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++ else
++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* start key exchange */
+ kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+@@ -2310,6 +2413,13 @@
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config 2010-09-10 03:20:12.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config 2011-02-12 18:07:11.668077725 +0100
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --speed-large-files --minimal -Nru openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-5.8p1/sshd_config.5 2010-12-26 04:26:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-5.8p1.new/sshd_config.5 2011-02-12 18:07:11.685676774 +0100
+@@ -423,12 +423,40 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
++a client authenticates against. If
++.Dq yes
++then the client must authenticate against the
++.Pa host
++service on the current hostname. If
++.Dq no
++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
++on multi homed machines.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
++and setting it to
++.Dq no
++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+ Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+ with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.macosforge.org/pipermail/macports-changes/attachments/20131024/2f535def/attachment-0001.html>
More information about the macports-changes
mailing list