[134753] trunk/dports/net/openssh
ionic at macports.org
ionic at macports.org
Mon Apr 6 17:04:52 PDT 2015
Revision: 134753
https://trac.macports.org/changeset/134753
Author: ionic at macports.org
Date: 2015-04-06 17:04:52 -0700 (Mon, 06 Apr 2015)
Log Message:
-----------
openssh: update to 6.8p1.
Patchfiles:
- launchd.patch,
patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff,
pam.patch:
update context and line references
- 0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch:
update to apply and work with 6.8p1 with slight changes
due to the changed code base
- openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch:
delete
- openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch:
bastardized cross between FreeBSD's patch with the same name
and Fedora's openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch (also referenced in
patch file), which is really openssh-6.8p1-gsskex.patch
- openssh-6.8p1-hpnssh14v5.diff:
copy into MacPorts tree like FreeBSD did and update slightly;
also needs -DHPN_ENABLED to CPPFLAGS now
Modified Paths:
--------------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff
Added Paths:
-----------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.8p1-hpnssh14v5.diff
Removed Paths:
-------------
trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2015-04-06 20:51:02 UTC (rev 134752)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/Portfile 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
PortSystem 1.0
name openssh
-version 6.7p1
+version 6.8p1
+revision 0
categories net
platforms darwin
maintainers nomaintainer
@@ -27,8 +28,8 @@
homepage http://www.openbsd.org/openssh/
checksums ${distfiles} \
- rmd160 53f684254278e43c3049bd2a260c32f178d46728 \
- sha256 b2f8394eae858dabbdef7dac10b99aec00c95462753e80342e530bbb6f725507
+ rmd160 581e7f5dc3848f6247b5f15cd9e61dcb8f1c506b \
+ sha256 3ff64ce73ee124480b5bf767b9830d7d3c03bbcb6abe716b78f0192c37ce160e
master_sites openbsd:OpenSSH/portable \
http://mirror.mcs.anl.gov/openssh/portable/ \
@@ -131,19 +132,25 @@
# http://www.psc.edu/index.php/hpn-ssh
# http://www.freshports.org/security/openssh-portable/ is usually quick in
# updating the HPN patch for new versions, take a look there, too.
- patch_sites-append http://mirror.shatow.net/freebsd/${name}/ \
- http://distcache.freebsd.org/ports-distfiles/
- set hpn_patchfile ${name}-6.7p1-hpnssh14v5.diff.gz
+
+ # Formerly from FreeBSD, now copied over from FreeBSD's ports directory.
+ #patch_sites-append http://mirror.shatow.net/freebsd/${name}/ \
+ # freebsd
+ #set hpn_patchfile ${name}-6.7p1-hpnssh14v5.diff.gz
+ #checksums-append ${hpn_patchfile} \
+ # rmd160 0cf7ffdd9b60d518d76076faf31df6a7a6d4ae52 \
+ # sha256 846ad51577de8308d60dbfaa58ba18d112d0732fdf21063ebc78407fc8e4a7b6
+
+ set hpn_patchfile ${name}-${version}-hpnssh14v5.diff
patchfiles-append ${hpn_patchfile}
- checksums-append ${hpn_patchfile} \
- rmd160 0cf7ffdd9b60d518d76076faf31df6a7a6d4ae52 \
- sha256 846ad51577de8308d60dbfaa58ba18d112d0732fdf21063ebc78407fc8e4a7b6
+
+ configure.cppflags-append -DHPN_ENABLED=1
}
variant gsskex conflicts hpn requires kerberos5 description "Add OpenSSH GSSAPI key exchange patch" {
use_autoreconf yes
patchfiles-append 0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch \
- openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
+ openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch
configure.cppflags-append \
-F/System/Library/Frameworks/DirectoryService.framework \
-F/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework \
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch 2015-04-06 20:51:02 UTC (rev 134752)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/0002-Apple-keychain-integration-other-changes.patch 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---- a/Makefile.in.old
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+--- a/Makefile.in 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/Makefile.in 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SED=@SED@
ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
-@@ -108,6 +109,8 @@
+@@ -112,6 +113,8 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
-@@ -143,6 +146,7 @@
+@@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGET
$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
-@@ -156,8 +160,8 @@
+@@ -160,8 +164,8 @@ libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-@@ -165,11 +169,11 @@
+@@ -169,11 +173,11 @@ sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(S
scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
$(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-@@ -293,7 +297,7 @@
+@@ -309,7 +313,7 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
@@ -61,9 +61,9 @@
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
---- a/audit-bsm.c.old
-+++ b/audit-bsm.c
-@@ -263,7 +263,12 @@
+--- a/audit-bsm.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/audit-bsm.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -263,7 +263,12 @@ bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string,
pid_t pid = getpid();
AuditInfoTermID tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
@@ -77,9 +77,9 @@
uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
}
---- a/auth-pam.c.old
-+++ b/auth-pam.c
-@@ -793,10 +793,11 @@
+--- a/auth-pam.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/auth-pam.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -793,10 +793,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
free(msg);
return (0);
}
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
*num = 0;
---- a/auth.c.old
-+++ b/auth.c
-@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@
+--- a/auth.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/auth.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
@@ -104,19 +104,18 @@
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
---- a/authfd.c.old
-+++ b/authfd.c
-@@ -650,6 +650,29 @@
- return decode_reply(type);
+--- a/authfd.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/authfd.c 2015-04-06 20:46:34.000000000 +0200
+@@ -165,6 +165,29 @@ ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbu
}
-+/*
+ /*
+ * Adds identities using passphrases stored in the keychain. This call is not
+ * meant to be used by normal applications.
+ */
+
+int
-+ssh_add_from_keychain(AuthenticationConnection *auth)
++ssh_add_from_keychain(int agent_fd)
+{
+ Buffer msg;
+ int type;
@@ -124,7 +123,7 @@
+ buffer_init(&msg);
+ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_FROM_KEYCHAIN);
+
-+ if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
++ if (ssh_request_reply(agent_fd, &msg, &msg) == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&msg);
+ return 0;
+ }
@@ -133,12 +132,22 @@
+ return decode_reply(type);
+}
+
- int
- decode_reply(int type)
- {
---- a/authfd.h.old
-+++ b/authfd.h
-@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@
++/*
+ * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
+ * obtained). The argument must have been returned by
+ * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
+--- a/authfd.h 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/authfd.h 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshk
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+
++ssh_add_from_keychain(int agent_fd);
++
+ /* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
+ #define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
+ #define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
+@@ -76,6 +78,9 @@ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshk
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
@@ -148,9 +157,9 @@
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
---- a/config.h.in.old
-+++ b/config.h.in
-@@ -81,6 +81,18 @@
+--- a/config.h.in 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/config.h.in 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +78,18 @@
/* FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD */
#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
@@ -169,9 +178,9 @@
/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
---- a/configure.ac.old
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4766,10 +4766,40 @@
+--- a/configure.ac 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/configure.ac 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -4833,10 +4833,40 @@ AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [
#endif
])
@@ -212,11 +221,11 @@
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
else
---- a/groupaccess.c.old
-+++ b/groupaccess.c
+--- a/groupaccess.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/groupaccess.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
@@ -34,38 +34,67 @@
- #include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+ #include <limits.h>
+#ifdef __APPLE_MEMBERSHIP__
+#include <membership.h>
@@ -289,7 +298,7 @@
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
-@@ -76,16 +105,32 @@
+@@ -76,16 +105,32 @@ ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
/*
* Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
* Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
@@ -322,8 +331,8 @@
return 0;
}
---- a/groupaccess.h.old
-+++ b/groupaccess.h
+--- a/groupaccess.h 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/groupaccess.h 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#ifndef GROUPACCESS_H
#define GROUPACCESS_H
@@ -333,8 +342,8 @@
int ga_match(char * const *, int);
int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *);
void ga_free(void);
---- a/keychain.c.old 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/keychain.c
+--- a/keychain.c 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ b/keychain.c 2015-04-06 20:57:40.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
@@ -822,7 +831,7 @@
+ CFStringRef promptTemplate = NULL, prompt = NULL;
+ UInt32 length;
+ const void *data;
-+ AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
++ int sock = -1;
+ char *result = NULL;
+
+ /* Bail out if KeychainIntegration preference is -bool NO */
@@ -834,7 +843,7 @@
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Bail out if we can't communicate with ssh-agent */
-+ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection()) == NULL)
++ if ((ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Interpret filename with the correct encoding. */
@@ -961,7 +970,7 @@
+ Key *private = key_load_private(filename, result, &comment);
+ if (NULL == private)
+ break;
-+ if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, 0, 0))
++ if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(sock, private, comment, 0, 0))
+ fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
@@ -1013,8 +1022,8 @@
+ CFRelease(promptTemplate);
+ if (prompt)
+ CFRelease(prompt);
-+ if (ac)
-+ ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
++ if (sock != -1)
++ ssh_close_authentication_socket(sock);
+
+ return result;
+
@@ -1030,8 +1039,8 @@
+#endif
+
+}
---- a/keychain.h.old 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/keychain.h
+--- a/keychain.h 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ b/keychain.h 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Apple Inc. All rights reserved.
@@ -1078,21 +1087,21 @@
+int add_identities_using_keychain(
+ int (*add_identity)(const char *, const char *));
+char *keychain_read_passphrase(const char *filename, int oAskPassGUI);
---- a/readconf.c.old
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@
+--- a/readconf.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/readconf.c 2015-04-06 19:59:04.000000000 +0200
+@@ -155,6 +155,9 @@ typedef enum {
oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ oAskPassGUI,
+#endif
- oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+ oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+ oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
- } OpCodes;
-@@ -266,6 +269,9 @@
- { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask },
- { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink },
+@@ -276,6 +279,9 @@ static struct {
+ { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
+ { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ { "askpassgui", oAskPassGUI },
@@ -1100,7 +1109,7 @@
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
-@@ -1358,6 +1364,12 @@
+@@ -1386,6 +1392,12 @@ parse_int:
charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
goto parse_string;
@@ -1113,7 +1122,7 @@
case oProxyUseFdpass:
intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1604,6 +1616,9 @@
+@@ -1667,6 +1679,9 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->request_tty = -1;
options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
@@ -1123,7 +1132,7 @@
options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
-@@ -1778,6 +1793,10 @@
+@@ -1845,6 +1860,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT;
if (options->request_tty == -1)
options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
@@ -1134,10 +1143,10 @@
if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
---- a/readconf.h.old
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@
- struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
+--- a/readconf.h 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/readconf.h 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ typedef struct {
+ char *hostbased_key_types;
char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
+
@@ -1147,8 +1156,8 @@
} Options;
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0
---- a/scp.1.old
-+++ b/scp.1
+--- a/scp.1 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/scp.1 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm scp
@@ -1158,7 +1167,7 @@
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
-@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@
+@@ -95,6 +95,8 @@ Passes the
flag to
.Xr ssh 1
to enable compression.
@@ -1167,8 +1176,8 @@
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
This option is directly passed to
---- a/scp.c.old
-+++ b/scp.c
+--- a/scp.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/scp.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -1179,7 +1188,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
-@@ -114,6 +117,11 @@
+@@ -115,6 +118,11 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
@@ -1191,7 +1200,7 @@
extern char *__progname;
#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384
-@@ -150,6 +158,12 @@
+@@ -151,6 +159,12 @@ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
@@ -1204,7 +1213,7 @@
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
-@@ -395,7 +409,11 @@
+@@ -396,7 +410,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
fflag = tflag = 0;
@@ -1216,7 +1225,7 @@
switch (ch) {
/* User-visible flags. */
case '1':
-@@ -456,6 +474,11 @@
+@@ -457,6 +475,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
showprogress = 0;
break;
@@ -1228,7 +1237,7 @@
/* Server options. */
case 'd':
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
-@@ -505,7 +528,12 @@
+@@ -506,7 +529,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
remin = remout = -1;
do_cmd_pid = -1;
/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
@@ -1241,9 +1250,9 @@
verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
-@@ -751,6 +779,10 @@
+@@ -752,6 +780,10 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
- char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX];
int len;
+#if HAVE_COPYFILE
+ char md_name[MAXPATHLEN];
@@ -1252,7 +1261,7 @@
for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
name = argv[indx];
-@@ -758,12 +790,26 @@
+@@ -759,12 +791,26 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
len = strlen(name);
while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
name[--len] = '\0';
@@ -1279,7 +1288,7 @@
if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) {
syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
goto next;
-@@ -850,6 +896,36 @@
+@@ -851,6 +897,36 @@ next: if (fd != -1) {
else
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
(void) response();
@@ -1316,7 +1325,7 @@
}
}
-@@ -941,6 +1017,10 @@
+@@ -942,6 +1018,10 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
targisdir = 1;
for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
@@ -1327,7 +1336,7 @@
cp = buf;
if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
return;
-@@ -1086,10 +1166,51 @@
+@@ -1087,10 +1167,51 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
}
omode = mode;
mode |= S_IWUSR;
@@ -1379,7 +1388,7 @@
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
(void) close(ofd);
-@@ -1174,6 +1295,29 @@
+@@ -1175,6 +1296,29 @@ bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(er
wrerrno = errno;
}
(void) response();
@@ -1409,7 +1418,7 @@
if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
setimes = 0;
if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) {
-@@ -1235,7 +1379,11 @@
+@@ -1236,7 +1380,11 @@ void
usage(void)
{
(void) fprintf(stderr,
@@ -1421,9 +1430,9 @@
" [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n"
" [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n");
exit(1);
---- a/servconf.c.old
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@
+--- a/servconf.c 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/servconf.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
-@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@
+@@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, i
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
"not exist", line, user);
@@ -1441,9 +1450,9 @@
debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
"at line %d", user, line);
} else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
---- a/session.c.old
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -2113,8 +2113,10 @@
+--- a/session.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/session.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2114,8 +2114,10 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
n_bytes = packet_remaining();
tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes);
@@ -1454,7 +1463,7 @@
/* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
-@@ -2354,9 +2356,11 @@
+@@ -2355,9 +2357,11 @@ session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
if (s->pid != 0)
record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
@@ -1466,18 +1475,18 @@
/*
* Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
---- a/ssh-add.0.old
-+++ b/ssh-add.0
-@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
- ssh-add - adds private key identities to the authentication agent
+--- a/ssh-add.0 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-add.0 2015-04-06 20:00:33.000000000 +0200
+@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ NAME
+ ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent
SYNOPSIS
-- ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-t life] [file ...]
-+ ssh-add [-cDdkKLlXx] [-t life] [file ...]
+- ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...]
++ ssh-add [-cDdkKLlXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...]
ssh-add -s pkcs11
ssh-add -e pkcs11
-@@ -55,6 +55,13 @@
+@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ DESCRIPTION
-l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
agent.
@@ -1491,18 +1500,18 @@
-s pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
---- a/ssh-add.1.old
-+++ b/ssh-add.1
+--- a/ssh-add.1 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-add.1 2015-04-06 20:01:42.000000000 +0200
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-add
-.Op Fl cDdkLlXx
+.Op Fl cDdkLlMmXx
+ .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
.Op Fl t Ar life
.Op Ar
- .Nm ssh-add
-@@ -119,6 +119,13 @@
+@@ -128,6 +128,13 @@ Lists public key parameters of all ident
by the agent.
.It Fl l
Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
@@ -1516,24 +1525,24 @@
.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
---- a/ssh-add.c.old
-+++ b/ssh-add.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
- #include "pathnames.h"
+--- a/ssh-add.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-add.c 2015-04-06 20:59:30.000000000 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+#include "keychain.h"
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
-@@ -98,12 +99,24 @@
+@@ -104,12 +105,25 @@ clear_pass(void)
}
static int
--delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
-+add_from_keychain(AuthenticationConnection *ac)
+-delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only)
++add_from_keychain(int agent_fd)
+{
-+ if (ssh_add_from_keychain(ac) == 0)
++ if (ssh_add_from_keychain(agent_fd) == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "Added keychain identities.\n");
@@ -1541,74 +1550,80 @@
+}
+
+static int
-+delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int keychain, const char *filename, int key_only)
++delete_file(int agent_fd, int keychain, const char *filename, int key_only)
{
- Key *public = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL;
char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ if (keychain)
+ remove_from_keychain(filename);
- public = key_load_public(filename, &comment);
- if (public == NULL) {
- printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename);
-@@ -166,7 +179,7 @@
++
+ if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
+ printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+@@ -179,7 +193,7 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd)
}
static int
--add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only)
-+add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int keychain, const char *filename, int key_only)
+-add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only)
++add_file(int agent_fd, int keychain, const char *filename, int key_only)
{
- Key *private, *cert;
+ struct sshkey *private, *cert;
char *comment = NULL;
-@@ -205,12 +218,16 @@
- if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob, "", filename,
- &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+@@ -223,6 +237,10 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
++
+ if (keychain && private != NULL)
+ store_in_keychain(filename, "");
++
/* try last */
if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
- if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob, pass, filename,
- &private, &comment)) != 0 &&
- r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, filename,
+@@ -232,6 +250,8 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
+ filename, ssh_err(r));
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
+ if (keychain && private != NULL)
+ store_in_keychain(filename, pass);
}
if (comment == NULL)
comment = xstrdup(filename);
-@@ -232,8 +249,11 @@
- r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
- fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s",
- filename, ssh_err(r));
-- if (private != NULL)
-+ if (private != NULL) {
-+ if (keychain)
-+ store_in_keychain(filename, pass);
+@@ -245,8 +265,13 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
+ if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
+ goto fail_load;
+ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
+- filename, &private, NULL)) == 0)
++ filename, &private, NULL)) == 0) {
++ if (private != NULL) {
++ if (keychain)
++ store_in_keychain(filename, pass);
++ }
break;
+ }
- clear_pass();
- snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
- "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment);
-@@ -390,13 +410,13 @@
+ else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+@@ -439,13 +464,13 @@ lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
}
static int
--do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, int key_only, char *file)
-+do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, int keychain, int key_only, char *file)
+-do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file)
++do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int keychain, int key_only, char *file)
{
if (deleting) {
-- if (delete_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
-+ if (delete_file(ac, keychain, file, key_only) == -1)
+- if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1)
++ if (delete_file(agent_fd, keychain, file, key_only) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
-- if (add_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1)
-+ if (add_file(ac, keychain, file, key_only) == -1)
+- if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1)
++ if (add_file(agent_fd, keychain, file, key_only) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
-@@ -418,6 +438,11 @@
+@@ -468,6 +493,11 @@ usage(void)
fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n");
@@ -1620,29 +1635,29 @@
}
int
-@@ -428,6 +453,7 @@
- AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL;
+@@ -479,6 +509,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
- int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
+ int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
+ int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0;
+ int keychain = 0;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
-@@ -446,7 +472,7 @@
- "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n");
+@@ -505,7 +536,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
exit(2);
}
-- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) {
-+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "kKlLcdDxXmMe:s:t:")) != -1) {
+
+- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:s:t:")) != -1) {
++ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "kKlLcdDxXmME:e:s:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
- case 'k':
- key_only = 1;
-@@ -485,6 +511,13 @@
+ case 'E':
+ fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+@@ -550,6 +581,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
goto done;
}
break;
+ case 'm':
-+ if (add_from_keychain(ac) == -1)
++ if (add_from_keychain(agent_fd) == -1)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ case 'M':
@@ -1651,27 +1666,27 @@
default:
usage();
ret = 1;
-@@ -516,7 +549,7 @@
+@@ -598,7 +636,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
default_files[i]);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
continue;
-- if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1)
-+ if (do_file(ac, deleting, keychain, key_only, buf) == -1)
+- if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1)
++ if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, keychain, key_only, buf) == -1)
ret = 1;
else
count++;
-@@ -525,7 +558,7 @@
+@@ -607,7 +645,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
ret = 1;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-- if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, argv[i]) == -1)
-+ if (do_file(ac, deleting, keychain, key_only, argv[i]) == -1)
+- if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only,
++ if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, keychain, key_only,
+ argv[i]) == -1)
ret = 1;
}
- }
---- a/ssh-agent.c.old
-+++ b/ssh-agent.c
-@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@
+--- a/ssh-agent.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-agent.c 2015-04-06 20:34:06.000000000 +0200
+@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -1679,22 +1694,23 @@
+#include <launch.h>
+#endif
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -73,10 +76,12 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "key.h"
+ #include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+ #include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */
+@@ -78,11 +81,13 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "keychain.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-@@ -701,6 +706,61 @@
+@@ -802,6 +807,61 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
@@ -1756,7 +1772,7 @@
/* dispatch incoming messages */
static void
-@@ -795,6 +855,9 @@
+@@ -896,6 +956,9 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
@@ -1766,7 +1782,7 @@
default:
/* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
error("Unknown message %d", type);
-@@ -1034,7 +1097,11 @@
+@@ -1146,7 +1209,11 @@ usage(void)
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
@@ -1778,19 +1794,19 @@
int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
u_int nalloc;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
-@@ -1069,7 +1136,11 @@
+@@ -1181,7 +1248,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
seed_rng();
+#ifdef __APPLE_LAUNCHD__
-+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdklsa:t:")) != -1) {
++ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdklsE:a:t:")) != -1) {
+#else
- while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:t:")) != -1) {
+ while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksE:a:t:")) != -1) {
+#endif
switch (ch) {
- case 'c':
- if (s_flag)
-@@ -1079,6 +1150,11 @@
+ case 'E':
+ fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+@@ -1196,6 +1267,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
@@ -1802,7 +1818,7 @@
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
-@@ -1105,7 +1181,11 @@
+@@ -1222,7 +1298,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
@@ -1814,7 +1830,7 @@
usage();
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
-@@ -1161,6 +1241,53 @@
+@@ -1278,6 +1358,53 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
* Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
* the parent.
*/
@@ -1868,7 +1884,7 @@
prev_mask = umask(0177);
sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
-@@ -1169,6 +1296,14 @@
+@@ -1286,6 +1413,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
cleanup_exit(1);
}
umask(prev_mask);
@@ -1883,7 +1899,7 @@
/*
* Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
-@@ -1243,6 +1378,7 @@
+@@ -1360,6 +1495,7 @@ skip:
pkcs11_init(0);
#endif
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
@@ -1891,7 +1907,7 @@
if (ac > 0)
parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
-@@ -1252,6 +1388,10 @@
+@@ -1369,6 +1505,10 @@ skip:
signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
nalloc = 0;
@@ -1902,9 +1918,9 @@
while (1) {
prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp);
result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp);
---- a/ssh-keysign.8.old
-+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+--- a/ssh-keysign.8 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-keysign.8 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ accessible to others.
Since they are readable only by root,
.Nm
must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
@@ -1914,17 +1930,17 @@
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
---- a/sshconnect1.c.old
-+++ b/sshconnect1.c
-@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
- #include "hostfile.h"
+--- a/sshconnect1.c 2015-04-06 19:54:32.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect1.c 2015-04-06 20:35:06.000000000 +0200
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include "auth.h"
#include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "keychain.h"
/* Session id for the current session. */
u_char session_id[16];
-@@ -262,6 +263,10 @@
+@@ -274,6 +275,10 @@ try_rsa_authentication(int idx)
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment);
for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
@@ -1935,30 +1951,30 @@
passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0);
if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
---- a/sshconnect2.c.old
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
- #include "pathnames.h"
+--- a/sshconnect2.c 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c 2015-04-06 20:40:47.000000000 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+#include "keychain.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
-@@ -1122,6 +1123,10 @@
- snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
- "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename);
- for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+@@ -1143,6 +1144,10 @@ load_identity_file(char *filename, int u
+ if (i == 0)
+ passphrase = "";
+ else {
+#ifdef __APPLE_KEYCHAIN__
+ passphrase = keychain_read_passphrase(filename, options.ask_pass_gui);
+ if (passphrase == NULL)
+#endif
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
- if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) {
- private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC,
---- a/sshd.0.old
-+++ b/sshd.0
-@@ -621,8 +621,7 @@
+ if (*passphrase == '\0') {
+ debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+--- a/sshd.0 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd.0 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -620,8 +620,7 @@ FILES
SEE ALSO
scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
@@ -1968,9 +1984,9 @@
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
---- a/sshd.8.old
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -954,10 +954,7 @@
+--- a/sshd.8 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd.8 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -954,10 +954,7 @@ The content of this file is not sensitiv
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
@@ -1981,9 +1997,9 @@
.Xr sftp-server 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
---- a/sshd.c.old
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2144,6 +2144,12 @@
+--- a/sshd.c 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd.c 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -2220,6 +2220,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
#endif
@@ -1996,7 +2012,7 @@
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_authentication) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
-@@ -2151,12 +2157,6 @@
+@@ -2227,12 +2233,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
restore_uid();
}
#endif
@@ -2009,8 +2025,8 @@
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
---- a/sshd_config.old
-+++ b/sshd_config
+--- a/sshd_config 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd_config 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
# Logging
@@ -2020,7 +2036,7 @@
#LogLevel INFO
# Authentication:
-@@ -68,8 +68,9 @@
+@@ -68,8 +68,9 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
#IgnoreRhosts yes
@@ -2032,7 +2048,7 @@
#PermitEmptyPasswords no
# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
-@@ -94,7 +95,10 @@
+@@ -94,7 +95,10 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
@@ -2044,29 +2060,29 @@
#AllowAgentForwarding yes
#AllowTcpForwarding yes
---- a/sshd_config.0.old
-+++ b/sshd_config.0
-@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@
+--- a/sshd_config.0 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd_config.0 2015-04-06 20:43:47.000000000 +0200
+@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The
-- default is ``yes''.
-+ default is ``no''.
+- default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
++ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
-@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@
+@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ DESCRIPTION
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
-- non-root user. The default is ``no''.
-+ non-root user. The default is ``yes''.
+- non-root user. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
++ non-root user. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
---- a/sshd_config.5.old
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@
+--- a/sshd_config.5 2015-04-06 19:54:33.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd_config.5 2015-04-06 19:56:35.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ are refused if the number of unauthentic
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
The default is
@@ -2075,7 +2091,7 @@
.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
-@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@
+@@ -1428,7 +1428,7 @@ is enabled, you will not be able to run
.Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user.
The default is
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch 2015-04-06 20:51:02 UTC (rev 134752)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/launchd.patch 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -1,8 +1,51 @@
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index 59ad3a2..724acf4 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -313,6 +313,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+--- a/channels.c 2015-04-06 19:40:35.000000000 +0200
++++ b/channels.c 2015-04-06 19:42:48.000000000 +0200
+@@ -4014,15 +4014,35 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
+ * connection to the real X server.
+ */
+
+- /* Check if the display is from launchd. */
+ #ifdef __APPLE__
+- if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
+- sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
+- if (sock < 0)
+- return -1;
++ /* Check if the display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
++ {
++ char path[PATH_MAX];
++ struct stat sbuf;
++ int is_path_to_socket = 0;
++
++ strlcpy(path, display, sizeof(path));
++ if (0 == stat(path, &sbuf)) {
++ is_path_to_socket = 1;
++ } else {
++ char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
++ if (dot) {
++ *dot = '\0';
++ /* screen = atoi(dot + 1); */
++ if (0 == stat(path, &sbuf)) {
++ is_path_to_socket=1;
++ }
++ }
++ }
+
+- /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+- return sock;
++ if (is_path_to_socket) {
++ sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
++ if (sock < 0)
++ return -1;
++
++ /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
++ return sock;
++ }
+ }
+ #endif
+ /*
+--- a/clientloop.c 2015-04-06 19:40:35.000000000 +0200
++++ b/clientloop.c 2015-04-06 19:42:48.000000000 +0200
+@@ -313,6 +313,10 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
struct stat st;
u_int now;
@@ -13,7 +56,7 @@
xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
*_proto = proto;
*_data = data;
-@@ -328,6 +332,33 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+@@ -328,6 +332,33 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set");
return;
}
@@ -47,7 +90,7 @@
/*
* Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
* not match an authorization entry. For this we
-@@ -407,6 +437,9 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
+@@ -407,6 +438,9 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display
if (!got_data) {
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
@@ -57,50 +100,3 @@
logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
"using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
-diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
-index 9efe89c..07153aa 100644
---- a/channels.c
-+++ b/channels.c
-@@ -3576,15 +3576,35 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
- * connection to the real X server.
- */
-
-- /* Check if the display is from launchd. */
- #ifdef __APPLE__
-- if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) {
-- sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display);
-- if (sock < 0)
-- return -1;
-+ /* Check if the display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
-+ {
-+ char path[PATH_MAX];
-+ struct stat sbuf;
-+ int is_path_to_socket = 0;
-+
-+ strlcpy(path, display, sizeof(path));
-+ if (0 == stat(path, &sbuf)) {
-+ is_path_to_socket = 1;
-+ } else {
-+ char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
-+ if (dot) {
-+ *dot = '\0';
-+ /* screen = atoi(dot + 1); */
-+ if (0 == stat(path, &sbuf)) {
-+ is_path_to_socket=1;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ }
-
-- /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
-- return sock;
-+ if (is_path_to_socket) {
-+ sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
-+ if (sock < 0)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
-+ return sock;
-+ }
- }
- #endif
- /*
Deleted: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch 2015-04-06 20:51:02 UTC (rev 134752)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -1,2899 +0,0 @@
---- a/ChangeLog.gssapi.old
-+++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
-@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
-+20110101
-+ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
-+ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
-+
-+20100308
-+ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
-+ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
-+ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
-+ Watson.
-+ -
-+
-+20100124
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
-+ Colin Watson
-+
-+20090615
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
-+ sshd.c ]
-+ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
-+ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
-+ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
-+ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
-+ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
-+ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
-+ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
-+ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
-+ Cast data.length before printing
-+ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
-+
-+20090201
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
-+ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
-+ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
-+ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
-+
-+20080404
-+ - [ gss-serv.c ]
-+ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
-+ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
-+ Stoichkov
-+
-+20070317
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
-+ function
-+
-+20061220
-+ - [ servconf.c ]
-+ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
-+ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
-+
-+20060910
-+ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
-+ ssh-gss.h ]
-+ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
-+ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
-+ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
-+ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
-+ <Bugzilla #928>
-+ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
-+ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
-+ configuration files
-+ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
-+ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
-+ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
-+
-+20060909
-+ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
-+ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
-+ only, where they belong
-+ <Bugzilla #1225>
-+
-+20060829
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
-+ variable
-+
-+20060828
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ]
-+ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
-+
-+20060818
-+ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
-+ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
-+ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
-+
-+20060421
-+ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
-+ fix compiler errors/warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
-+ fix uninitialized variable warnings
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ gssgenr.c ]
-+ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Bugzilla #1220 >
-+ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
-+ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
-+ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
-+ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
-+ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
-+ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
-+ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
---- a/Makefile.in.old
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
- atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
- kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \
-+ kexgssc.o \
- msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
- ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
- kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
-@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@
- auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \
- kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \
-- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o\
- loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
---- a/auth-krb5.c.old
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
-@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@
-
- len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
- authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
-+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#else
- snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
- authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -241,15 +246,22 @@
- #ifndef HEIMDAL
- krb5_error_code
- ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
-- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
-+ int ret;
- char ccname[40];
- mode_t old_umask;
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
-+#else
-+ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
-+ int tmpfd, oerrno;
-+#endif
-
- ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
-- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
-+ cctemplate, geteuid());
- if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
- return ENOMEM;
-
-+#ifndef USE_CCAPI
- old_umask = umask(0177);
- tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
- oerrno = errno;
-@@ -266,6 +278,7 @@
- return oerrno;
- }
- close(tmpfd);
-+#endif
-
- return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
- }
---- a/auth2-gss.c.old
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@
- static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
- static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-+/*
-+ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
-+ */
-+static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ int authenticated = 0;
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
-+ mic.length = len;
-+
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+ &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ free(mic.value);
-+
-+ return (authenticated);
-+}
-+
- /*
- * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
- * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -236,7 +270,8 @@
-
- packet_check_eom();
-
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+ authctxt->pw));
-
- authctxt->postponed = 0;
- dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
-@@ -271,7 +306,8 @@
- gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-
- if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
-- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+ authenticated =
-+ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
- else
- logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
-
-@@ -286,6 +322,12 @@
- userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
- }
-
-+Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+ "gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ &options.gss_authentication
-+};
-+
- Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- "gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
---- a/auth2.c.old
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
-
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- &method_none,
- &method_pubkey,
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ &method_gsskeyex,
- &method_gssapi,
- #endif
- &method_passwd,
---- a/clientloop.c.old
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -111,6 +111,10 @@
- #include "msg.h"
- #include "roaming.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
-
-@@ -1630,6 +1634,15 @@
- /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
- if (!rekeying) {
- channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)) {
-+ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
-+ need_rekeying = 1;
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
- debug("need rekeying");
- xxx_kex->done = 0;
---- a/configure.ac.old
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -584,6 +584,30 @@
- [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
- AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
- [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have the Security Authorization Session API)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
-+ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
-+ AC_DEFINE(USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API, 1,
-+ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
-+ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(no)])
-+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have an in-memory credentials cache)
-+ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
-+ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
-+ [cc_context_t c;
-+ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
-+ [AC_DEFINE(USE_CCAPI, 1,
-+ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
-+ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
-+ AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-+ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
-+ AC_MSG_ERROR(*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***)
-+ fi],
-+ [AC_MSG_RESULT(no)]
-+ )
- m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
- AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
- AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
---- a/gss-genr.c.old
-+++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.22 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -39,12 +39,167 @@
- #include "buffer.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-+typedef struct {
-+ char *encoded;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
-+
-+/*
-+ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
-+ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
-+ */
-+
-+Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
-+
-+static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok() {
-+ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
-+ *
-+ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
-+ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
-+ */
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
-+ OM_uint32 min_status;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
-+ host, client));
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
-+ const char *host, const char *client) {
-+ Buffer buf;
-+ size_t i;
-+ int oidpos, enclen;
-+ char *mechs, *encoded;
-+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-+ char deroid[2];
-+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
-+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
-+ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
-+ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
-+ free(gss_enc2oid);
-+ }
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
-+ (gss_supported->count + 1));
-+
-+ buffer_init(&buf);
-+
-+ oidpos = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
-+ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
-+ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
-+
-+ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
-+ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-+
-+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
-+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
-+ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
-+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
-+
-+ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
-+ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
-+
-+ if (oidpos != 0)
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
-+ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
-+ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
-+ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
-+
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
-+ oidpos++;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
-+ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
-+
-+ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
-+
-+ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
-+ buffer_free(&buf);
-+
-+ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
-+ free(mechs);
-+ mechs = NULL;
-+ }
-+
-+ return (mechs);
-+}
-+
-+gss_OID
-+ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
-+ int i = 0;
-+
-+ switch (kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ }
-+
-+ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
-+ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
-+ i++;
-+
-+ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
-+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
-+
-+ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
-+}
-+
- /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
- int
- ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -197,7 +352,7 @@
- }
-
- ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
-+ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
- 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
-
-@@ -227,8 +382,42 @@
- }
-
- OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_name_t gssname;
-+ OM_uint32 status;
-+ gss_OID_set oidset;
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
-+ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
-+
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
-+ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
-+
-+ if (!ctx->major)
-+ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
-+ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+
-+ if (ctx->major)
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+
-+ return(ctx->major);
-+}
-+
-+OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
- {
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
- GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -236,6 +425,19 @@
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+/* Priviledged when used by server */
-+OM_uint32
-+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+{
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-+ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+}
-+
- void
- ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
- const char *context)
-@@ -249,11 +451,16 @@
- }
-
- int
--ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
-+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
-+ const char *client)
- {
- gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- OM_uint32 major, minor;
- gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
-+ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
-+
-+ if (ctx == NULL)
-+ ctx = &intctx;
-
- /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
-@@ -263,6 +470,10 @@
- ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
- ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
- major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
-+
- if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
- NULL);
-@@ -272,10 +483,67 @@
- GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
- }
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
- ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
-
- return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
-+ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
-+ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
-+ static gss_name_t name;
-+ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
-+ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
-+ int equal;
-+ gss_cred_usage_t usage = GSS_C_INITIATE;
-+
-+ now = time(NULL);
-+
-+ if (ctxt) {
-+ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
-+
-+ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+
-+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
-+ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
-+ saved_lifetime+= now;
-+ } else {
-+ /* Handle the error */
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (now - last_call < 10)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ last_call = now;
-+
-+ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
-+ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
-+ return 0;
-+ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
-+ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
-+ return 1;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c.old
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@
- OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
- int len;
- const char *errmsg;
-+ const char *new_ccname;
-
- if (client->creds == NULL) {
- debug("No credentials stored");
-@@ -181,11 +182,16 @@
- return;
- }
-
-- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
-+ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
-+
- client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
-- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
-- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
-- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
-+#ifdef USE_CCAPI
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = NULL;
-+#else
-+ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "FILE:%s", new_ccname);
-+ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
-+#endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -197,6 +203,71 @@
- return;
- }
-
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
-+ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
-+{
-+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
-+ char *name = NULL;
-+ krb5_error_code problem;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
-+ &principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
-+ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+
-+ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
-+ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
-+
-+ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
-+
-+ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
-+ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
-+ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
-+
-+ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
-+ ccache))) {
-+ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
-+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+
-+ return 1;
-+}
-+
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
- "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
- "Kerberos",
-@@ -204,7 +275,8 @@
- NULL,
- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
- NULL,
-- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
-+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
- };
-
- #endif /* KRB5 */
---- a/gss-serv.c.old
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */
-
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -45,15 +45,20 @@
- #include "channels.h"
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
-
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
- { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
-
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
-- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -100,25 +105,32 @@
- char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
- gss_OID_set oidset;
-
-- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
-+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
-+
-+ if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (-1);
-+ }
-
-- if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (-1);
-- }
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
-+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
-+ NULL, NULL)))
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-
-- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
- return (ctx->major);
-+ } else {
-+ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- }
--
-- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
-- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
-- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
--
-- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
-- return (ctx->major);
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
-
- /* Privileged */
-@@ -133,6 +145,29 @@
- }
-
- /* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms() {
-+ gss_OID_set supported;
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
-+ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
-+ NULL, NULL));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+ const char *dummy) {
-+ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+ int res;
-+
-+ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+ return (res);
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- {
-@@ -142,7 +177,9 @@
- gss_OID_set supported;
-
- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+ return;
-
- while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -268,8 +305,48 @@
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- {
- int i = 0;
-+ int equal = 0;
-+ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+ new_name, &equal);
-
-- gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!equal) {
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-+
-+ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+ client->name = new_name;
-+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+ client->updated = 1;
-+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+ }
-
- client->mech = NULL;
-
-@@ -284,6 +361,13 @@
- if (client->mech == NULL)
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-
-+ if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+ return (ctx->major);
-+ }
-+
- if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -301,6 +385,8 @@
- return (ctx->major);
- }
-
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
- /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -348,7 +434,7 @@
-
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- OM_uint32 lmin;
-
-@@ -358,9 +444,11 @@
- return 0;
- }
- if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
-- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+ gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
- return 1;
-- else {
-+ } else {
- /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -374,14 +462,90 @@
- return (0);
- }
-
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
-+ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
-- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
-- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
-
-- return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
-+ int ok;
-+ int ret;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+ char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+ return;
-+
-+ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+ if (!ok)
-+ return;
-+
-+ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
-+ */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+ if (!use_privsep) {
-+ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+ return;
-+ }
-+
-+ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+ &pamconv, &pamh);
-+ if (ret)
-+ return;
-+
-+ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-+ gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+ if (!ret)
-+ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+ int ok = 0;
-+
-+ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+ else
-+ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+ restore_uid();
-+
-+ return ok;
- }
-
- #endif
---- a/kex.c.old
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@
- #include "roaming.h"
- #include "digest.h"
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
- # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
- # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
-@@ -94,6 +98,11 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
- { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
- #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+#endif
- { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
- };
-
---- a/kex.h.old
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@
- KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
- KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- KEX_C25519_SHA256,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
- KEX_MAX
- };
-
-@@ -135,6 +138,12 @@
- int flags;
- int hash_alg;
- int ec_nid;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ int gss_deleg_creds;
-+ int gss_trust_dns;
-+ char *gss_host;
-+ char *gss_client;
-+#endif
- char *client_version_string;
- char *server_version_string;
- int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
-@@ -167,6 +176,11 @@
- void kexc25519_client(Kex *);
- void kexc25519_server(Kex *);
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+void kexgss_client(Kex *);
-+void kexgss_server(Kex *);
-+#endif
-+
- void
- kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
- BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
---- a/kexgssc.c.old
-+++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_client(Kex *kex) {
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, hashlen, strlen;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
-+ u_char *empty = "";
-+ char *msg;
-+ char *lang;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ int first = 1;
-+ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+
-+ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
-+
-+ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_client &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
-+ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ packet_put_int(min);
-+ packet_put_int(nbits);
-+ packet_put_int(max);
-+
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+
-+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(p);
-+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("BN_new() failed");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(g);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+
-+ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
-+ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
-+
-+ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
-+ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
-+ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+ &ret_flags);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+ }
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+ */
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ if (first) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ first = 0;
-+ } else {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
-+ send_tok.length);
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+ do {
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+ serverhostkey =
-+ packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ }
-+ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+ switch (type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
-+ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ msg_tok.length = strlen;
-+
-+ /* Is there a token included? */
-+ if (packet_get_char()) {
-+ recv_tok.value=
-+ packet_get_string(&strlen);
-+ recv_tok.length = strlen;
-+ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+ } else {
-+ /* No token included */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+ }
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+ debug("Received Error");
-+ maj_status = packet_get_int();
-+ min_status = packet_get_int();
-+ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
-+ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+ } else {
-+ /* No data, and not complete */
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ /*
-+ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+ */
-+
-+ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
-+
-+ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
-+ if (kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ dh->pub_key, /* e */
-+ dh_server_pub, /* f */
-+ shared_secret, /* K */
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string,
-+ kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ dh_server_pub,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+ free(msg_tok.value);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+ if (serverhostkey)
-+ free(serverhostkey);
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+
-+ /* save session id */
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+}
-+
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
---- a/kexgsss.c.old
-+++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
-+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
-+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
-+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "ssh2.h"
-+#include "key.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "dh.h"
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "misc.h"
-+#include "servconf.h"
-+
-+extern ServerOptions options;
-+
-+void
-+kexgss_server(Kex *kex)
-+{
-+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+ */
-+
-+ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+ u_int slen, klen, kout, hashlen;
-+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
-+ DH *dh;
-+ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+ int type = 0;
-+ gss_OID oid;
-+ char *mechs;
-+
-+ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
-+
-+ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
-+ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
-+ * into life
-+ */
-+ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+ free(mechs);
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
-+ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
-+ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
-+
-+ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
-+ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group1();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ dh = dh_new_group14();
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ debug("Doing group exchange");
-+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
-+ min = packet_get_int();
-+ nbits = packet_get_int();
-+ max = packet_get_int();
-+ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
-+ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
-+ packet_check_eom();
-+ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+ min, nbits, max);
-+ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
-+ if (dh == NULL)
-+ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ packet_write_wait();
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
-+
-+ do {
-+ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+ type = packet_read();
-+ switch(type) {
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+
-+ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
-+ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
-+
-+ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+ break;
-+ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
-+ recv_tok.length = slen;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ packet_disconnect(
-+ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+ type);
-+ }
-+
-+ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+ free(recv_tok.value);
-+
-+ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+ fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ }
-+ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+ }
-+ fatal("accept_ctx died");
-+ }
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
-+ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
-+
-+ klen = DH_size(dh);
-+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
-+ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
-+ if (kout < 0)
-+ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
-+
-+ shared_secret = BN_new();
-+ if (shared_secret == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
-+
-+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
-+ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
-+
-+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
-+ free(kbuf);
-+
-+ switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+ kex_dh_hash(
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
-+ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
-+ kexgex_hash(
-+ kex->hash_alg,
-+ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
-+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
-+ NULL, 0,
-+ min, nbits, max,
-+ dh->p, dh->g,
-+ dh_client_pub,
-+ dh->pub_key,
-+ shared_secret,
-+ &hash, &hashlen
-+ );
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
-+ }
-+
-+ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+
-+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
-+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
-+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
-+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
-+ }
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = hash;
-+ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
-+ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
-+ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
-+ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
-+
-+ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
-+ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
-+ } else {
-+ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
-+ }
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+ else
-+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+ DH_free(dh);
-+
-+ kex_derive_keys_bn(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
-+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+ kex_finish(kex);
-+
-+ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+ * just exchanged. */
-+ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+}
-+#endif /* GSSAPI */
---- a/monitor.c.old
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -178,6 +178,8 @@
- int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
- int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
-+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -255,11 +257,18 @@
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
- #endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
- };
-
- struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
-+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
-+#endif
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- #endif
-@@ -374,6 +383,10 @@
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
-@@ -482,6 +495,10 @@
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
-+#endif
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-@@ -1861,6 +1878,13 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- #endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
-@@ -2068,6 +2092,9 @@
- OM_uint32 major;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- goid.length = len;
-
-@@ -2095,6 +2122,9 @@
- OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- in.length = len;
- major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
-@@ -2112,6 +2142,7 @@
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
- }
- return (0);
- }
-@@ -2123,6 +2154,9 @@
- OM_uint32 ret;
- u_int len;
-
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
- gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- gssbuf.length = len;
- mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-@@ -2149,7 +2183,11 @@
- {
- int authenticated;
-
-- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
-+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-@@ -2162,5 +2200,73 @@
- /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-+{
-+ gss_buffer_desc data;
-+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
-+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
-+
-+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
-+ data.length = len;
-+ if (data.length != 20)
-+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
-+ (int) data.length);
-+
-+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
-+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
-+ session_id2_len = data.length;
-+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
-+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
-+ }
-+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
-+
-+ free(data.value);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
-+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
-+
-+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
-+
-+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-+
-+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
-+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
-+
-+ return (0);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
-+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-+
-+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
-+
-+ free(store.filename);
-+ free(store.envvar);
-+ free(store.envval);
-+
-+ buffer_clear(m);
-+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
-+
-+ return(0);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
---- a/monitor.h.old
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
- MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
- MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
-
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 62, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 63,
-+ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 64, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 65,
-+
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
- MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
---- a/monitor_wrap.c.old
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@
- }
-
- int
--mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
- {
- Buffer m;
- int authenticated = 0;
-@@ -1298,5 +1298,50 @@
- debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
- return (authenticated);
- }
-+
-+OM_uint32
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ OM_uint32 major;
-+ u_int len;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
-+
-+ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
-+ hash->length = len;
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return(major);
-+}
-+
-+int
-+mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
-+{
-+ Buffer m;
-+ int ok;
-+
-+ buffer_init(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
-+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
-+
-+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
-+
-+ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
-+
-+ buffer_free(&m);
-+
-+ return (ok);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
---- a/monitor_wrap.h.old
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
- gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
--int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
-+int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
- #endif
-
- #ifdef USE_PAM
---- a/readconf.c.old
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@
- oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
- oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
- oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
-+ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
-+ oGssServerIdentity,
- oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
- oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
- oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -188,10 +190,19 @@
- { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
- #if defined(GSSAPI)
- { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
-+ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
- { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
-+ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
- #endif
- { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
- { "usersh", oDeprecated },
-@@ -871,10 +882,30 @@
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oGssDelegateCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case oGssTrustDns:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case oGssClientIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssServerIdentity:
-+ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
-+ goto parse_string;
-+
-+ case oGssRenewalRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case oBatchMode:
- intptr = &options->batch_mode;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1550,7 +1581,12 @@
- options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
- options->gss_authentication = -1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
-+ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
-+ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -1676,8 +1712,14 @@
- options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
- options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
-+ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 1;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
---- a/readconf.h.old
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@
- int challenge_response_authentication;
- /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
- int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
- int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
-+ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
-+ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
-+ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
-+ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
- int password_authentication; /* Try password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
---- a/servconf.c.old
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -109,7 +109,10 @@
- options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
- options->gss_authentication=-1;
-+ options->gss_keyex = -1;
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
- options->password_authentication = -1;
- options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
-@@ -250,8 +253,14 @@
- options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
- if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
- options->gss_authentication = 0;
-+ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-+ options->gss_keyex = 0;
- if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
- options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
-+ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
-+ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
-+ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
- if (options->password_authentication == -1)
- options->password_authentication = 0;
- if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -352,7 +361,9 @@
- sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
- sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
- sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
-- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
-+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
-+ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
-+ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
-@@ -421,10 +432,20 @@
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #else
- { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- #endif
-+ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
- { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1104,10 +1125,22 @@
- intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssKeyEx:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sGssCleanupCreds:
- intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
- goto parse_flag;
-
-+ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
-+ case sGssStoreRekey:
-+ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
-+ goto parse_flag;
-+
- case sPasswordAuthentication:
- intptr = &options->password_authentication;
- goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2042,7 +2075,10 @@
- #endif
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
-+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
- #endif
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
---- a/servconf.h.old
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -113,7 +113,10 @@
- int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
- * authenticated with Kerberos. */
- int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
-+ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
- int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-+ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
-+ int gss_store_rekey;
- int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
- * authentication. */
- int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
---- a/ssh-gss.h.old
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
-
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
-
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
-+
- typedef struct {
- char *filename;
- char *envvar;
- char *envval;
-+ struct passwd *owner;
- void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
-
-@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@
- gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+ gss_name_t name;
- struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+ int used;
-+ int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
-
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@
- int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
-
- typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@
- gss_OID oid; /* client */
- gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
- gss_name_t client; /* server */
-- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
-+ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
-
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
-
- int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -119,16 +136,30 @@
- void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
-
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+ const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
-+ const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok();
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
---- a/ssh_config.old
-+++ b/ssh_config
-@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
- # HostbasedAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIAuthentication no
- # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
-+# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-+# GSSAPITrustDNS no
- # BatchMode no
- # CheckHostIP yes
- # AddressFamily any
---- a/ssh_config.5.old
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -701,11 +701,43 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
-+GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
-+identity will be used.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
-+If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
-+connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
-+expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
-+hostname.
- .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
- Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
- The default is
- .Dq no .
--Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
-+If set to
-+.Dq yes
-+then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
-+ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
-+credentials to a session on the server.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
-+Set to
-+.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
-+the name of the host being connected to. If
-+.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
-+command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
---- a/sshconnect2.c.old
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -160,9 +160,34 @@
- char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- Kex *kex;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
-+ char *gss_host = NULL;
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_host = host;
- xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = host;
-+
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
-+ if (gss) {
-+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
- logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
- options.ciphers = NULL;
-@@ -200,6 +225,17 @@
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+ "%s,null", orig);
-+ free(gss);
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
- (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
-@@ -214,10 +250,30 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
- #endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
- kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
-+ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
-+ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ } else {
-+ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- xxx_kex = kex;
-
- dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex);
-@@ -307,6 +363,7 @@
- void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
- void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-+int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
- #endif
-
- void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
-@@ -322,6 +379,11 @@
-
- Authmethod authmethods[] = {
- #ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {"gssapi-keyex",
-+ userauth_gsskeyex,
-+ NULL,
-+ &options.gss_authentication,
-+ NULL},
- {"gssapi-with-mic",
- userauth_gssapi,
- NULL,
-@@ -618,19 +680,31 @@
- static u_int mech = 0;
- OM_uint32 min;
- int ok = 0;
-+ const char *gss_host;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_server_identity)
-+ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
-+ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
-+ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
-+ else
-+ gss_host = authctxt->host;
-
- /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
- * once. */
-
- if (gss_supported == NULL)
-- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
-+ gss_supported = NULL;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-
- /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
- while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
- /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
- if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
- ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
-- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
-+ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
-+ options.gss_client_identity)) {
- ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
- } else {
- mech++;
-@@ -727,8 +801,8 @@
- {
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
- Gssctxt *gssctxt;
-- int oidlen;
-- char *oidv;
-+ u_int oidlen;
-+ u_char *oidv;
-
- if (authctxt == NULL)
- fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
-@@ -837,6 +911,48 @@
- free(msg);
- free(lang);
- }
-+
-+int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
-+{
-+ Buffer b;
-+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
-+ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+ OM_uint32 ms;
-+
-+ static int attempt = 0;
-+ if (attempt++ >= 1)
-+ return (0);
-+
-+ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
-+ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
-+ "gssapi-keyex");
-+
-+ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
-+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
-+
-+ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ return (0);
-+ }
-+
-+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
-+ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
-+ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
-+ packet_send();
-+
-+ buffer_free(&b);
-+ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
-+
-+ return (1);
-+}
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
-
- int
---- a/sshd.c.old
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -123,6 +123,10 @@
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "version.h"
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #ifndef O_NOCTTY
- #define O_NOCTTY 0
- #endif
-@@ -1752,10 +1756,13 @@
- logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
- }
-+#ifndef GSSAPI
-+ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
- if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
- logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
- options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
- }
-+#endif
- if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
- logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
- exit(1);
-@@ -2067,6 +2074,60 @@
- remote_ip, remote_port,
- get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
-
-+#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
-+ /*
-+ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
-+ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
-+ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
-+ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
-+ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
-+ *
-+ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
-+ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
-+ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
-+ * same session (bad).
-+ *
-+ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
-+ * automatically.
-+ *
-+ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
-+ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
-+ */
-+ {
-+ OSStatus err = 0;
-+ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
-+ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+
-+ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
-+ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
-+ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
-+ else {
-+ debug("Creating new security session...");
-+ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+
-+ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
-+ &sattrs);
-+ if (err)
-+ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) err);
-+ else
-+ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
-+ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
-+ }
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /*
- * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
- * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
-@@ -2489,6 +2550,48 @@
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- list_hostkey_types());
-
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ {
-+ char *orig;
-+ char *gss = NULL;
-+ char *newstr = NULL;
-+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+ * the other key exchange algorithms
-+ */
-+
-+ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+ orig = NULL;
-+
-+ if (options.gss_keyex)
-+ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+ else
-+ gss = NULL;
-+
-+ if (gss && orig)
-+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+ else if (gss)
-+ newstr = gss;
-+ else if (orig)
-+ newstr = orig;
-+
-+ /*
-+ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+ * host key algorithm we support
-+ */
-+ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+ if (newstr)
-+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+ else
-+ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+ }
-+#endif
-+
- /* start key exchange */
- kex = kex_setup(myproposal);
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-@@ -2499,6 +2602,13 @@
- kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
- #endif
- kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+ }
-+#endif
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
- kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
---- a/sshd_config.old
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@
- # GSSAPI options
- #GSSAPIAuthentication no
- #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
-+#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
-
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
---- a/sshd_config.5.old
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -527,12 +527,40 @@
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
-+Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
-+doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
-+The default is
-+.Dq no .
-+Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
- .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
- Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
- on logout.
- The default is
- .Dq yes .
- Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
-+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
-+a client authenticates against. If
-+.Dq yes
-+then the client must authenticate against the
-+.Pa host
-+service on the current hostname. If
-+.Dq no
-+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
-+machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
-+on multi homed machines.
-+The default is
-+.Dq yes .
-+Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
-+and setting it to
-+.Dq no
-+may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
-+.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
-+Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
-+successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
-+or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
-+.Dq no .
- .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
- Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
- with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
---- a/sshkey.c.old
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@
- KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 },
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
- { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00 at openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00",
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
- { "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00",
---- a/sshkey.h.old
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
- KEY_ED25519_CERT,
- KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
- KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
-+ KEY_NULL,
- KEY_UNSPEC
- };
-
Copied: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch (from rev 134752, trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20140907.patch)
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -0,0 +1,3217 @@
+From 1c1b6fa17982eb622e2c4e8f4a279f2113f57413 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Simon Wilkinson <simon at sxw.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2014 16:09:48 +0000
+Subject: GSSAPI key exchange support
+
+This patch has been rejected upstream: "None of the OpenSSH developers are
+in favour of adding this, and this situation has not changed for several
+years. This is not a slight on Simon's patch, which is of fine quality, but
+just that a) we don't trust GSSAPI implementations that much and b) we don't
+like adding new KEX since they are pre-auth attack surface. This one is
+particularly scary, since it requires hooks out to typically root-owned
+system resources."
+
+However, quite a lot of people rely on this in Debian, and it's better to
+have it merged into the main openssh package rather than having separate
+-krb5 packages (as we used to have). It seems to have a generally good
+security history.
+
+Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242
+Last-Updated: 2014-10-07
+
+Patch-Name: gssapi.patch
+
+
+Updated by: Mihai Moldovan <ionic at macports.org>
+Patch-Name: openssh-6.7p1-gsskex-all-20141021-284f364.patch
+Abstract: Updated for OpenSSH 6.8p1 with MacPorts patches for integration
+ with Apple's launchd, pam, sandbox and KeyChain.
+ WARNING: the commit ID does NOT match this patch. It is merely
+ provided for reference.
+Last-Updated: 2015-04-07
+X-Ref: http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/openssh.git/tree/openssh-6.6p1-gsskex.patch?id=c5163162d3ad57a983f359e7db4e0560c83960d5
+---
+ ChangeLog.gssapi | 113 +++++++++++++++++++
+ Makefile.in | 3 +-
+ auth-krb5.c | 17 ++-
+ auth2-gss.c | 48 +++++++-
+ auth2.c | 2 +
+ clientloop.c | 13 +++
+ config.h.in | 6 +
+ configure | 57 ++++++++++
+ configure.ac | 24 ++++
+ gss-genr.c | 275 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ gss-serv-krb5.c | 85 ++++++++++++--
+ gss-serv.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ kex.c | 16 +++
+ kex.h | 14 +++
+ kexgssc.c | 332 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ kexgsss.c | 290 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ monitor.c | 108 +++++++++++++++++-
+ monitor.h | 3 +
+ monitor_wrap.c | 47 +++++++-
+ monitor_wrap.h | 4 +-
+ readconf.c | 42 +++++++
+ readconf.h | 5 +
+ servconf.c | 38 ++++++-
+ servconf.h | 3 +
+ ssh-gss.h | 41 ++++++-
+ ssh_config | 2 +
+ ssh_config.5 | 34 +++++-
+ sshconnect2.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++-
+ sshd.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++
+ sshd_config | 2 +
+ sshd_config.5 | 28 +++++
+ sshkey.c | 3 +-
+ sshkey.h | 1 +
+ 33 files changed, 2052 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ChangeLog.gssapi
+ create mode 100644 kexgssc.c
+ create mode 100644 kexgsss.c
+
+diff --git a/ChangeLog.gssapi b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..f117a33
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ChangeLog.gssapi
+@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
++20110101
++ - Finally update for OpenSSH 5.6p1
++ - Add GSSAPIServerIdentity option from Jim Basney
++
++20100308
++ - [ Makefile.in, key.c, key.h ]
++ Updates for OpenSSH 5.4p1
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Include GSSAPI options in the sshd -T configuration dump, and flag
++ some older configuration options as being unsupported. Thanks to Colin
++ Watson.
++ -
++
++20100124
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ Adapt to deal with additional element in Authmethod structure. Thanks to
++ Colin Watson
++
++20090615
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c monitor.c sshconnect2.c
++ sshd.c ]
++ Fix issues identified by Greg Hudson following a code review
++ Check return value of gss_indicate_mechs
++ Protect GSSAPI calls in monitor, so they can only be used if enabled
++ Check return values of bignum functions in key exchange
++ Use BN_clear_free to clear other side's DH value
++ Make ssh_gssapi_id_kex more robust
++ Only configure kex table pointers if GSSAPI is enabled
++ Don't leak mechanism list, or gss mechanism list
++ Cast data.length before printing
++ If serverkey isn't provided, use an empty string, rather than NULL
++
++20090201
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c kex.h kexgssc.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh-gss.h
++ ssh_config.5 sshconnet2.c ]
++ Add support for the GSSAPIClientIdentity option, which allows the user
++ to specify which GSSAPI identity to use to contact a given server
++
++20080404
++ - [ gss-serv.c ]
++ Add code to actually implement GSSAPIStrictAcceptCheck, which had somehow
++ been omitted from a previous version of this patch. Reported by Borislav
++ Stoichkov
++
++20070317
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Remove C99ism, where new_ccname was being declared in the middle of a
++ function
++
++20061220
++ - [ servconf.c ]
++ Make default for GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck be Yes, to match previous, and
++ documented, behaviour. Reported by Dan Watson.
++
++20060910
++ - [ gss-genr.c kexgssc.c kexgsss.c kex.h monitor.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
++ ssh-gss.h ]
++ add support for gss-group14-sha1 key exchange mechanisms
++ - [ gss-serv.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config sshd_config.5 ]
++ Add GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck option to allow the disabling of
++ acceptor principal checking on multi-homed machines.
++ <Bugzilla #928>
++ - [ sshd_config ssh_config ]
++ Add settings for GSSAPIKeyExchange and GSSAPITrustDNS to the sample
++ configuration files
++ - [ kexgss.c kegsss.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c ]
++ Code cleanup. Replace strlen/xmalloc/snprintf sequences with xasprintf()
++ Limit length of error messages displayed by client
++
++20060909
++ - [ gss-genr.c gss-serv.c ]
++ move ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred() and ssh_gssapi_server_ctx to be server
++ only, where they belong
++ <Bugzilla #1225>
++
++20060829
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ Fix CCAPI credentials cache name when creating KRB5CCNAME environment
++ variable
++
++20060828
++ - [ gss-genr.c ]
++ Avoid Heimdal context freeing problem
++ <Fixed upstream 20060829>
++
++20060818
++ - [ gss-genr.c ssh-gss.h sshconnect2.c ]
++ Make sure that SPENGO is disabled
++ <Bugzilla #1218 - Fixed upstream 20060818>
++
++20060421
++ - [ gssgenr.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ a few type changes (signed versus unsigned, int versus size_t) to
++ fix compiler errors/warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ kexgssc.c, sshconnect2.c ]
++ fix uninitialized variable warnings
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ gssgenr.c ]
++ pass oid to gss_display_status (helpful when using GSSAPI mechglue)
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Bugzilla #1220 >
++ - [ gss-serv-krb5.c ]
++ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5 should be #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <Fixed upstream 20060304>
++ - [ readconf.c, readconf.h, ssh_config.5, sshconnect2.c
++ add client-side GssapiKeyExchange option
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ - [ sshconnect2.c ]
++ add support for GssapiTrustDns option for gssapi-with-mic
++ (from jbasney AT ncsa.uiuc.edu)
++ <gssapi-with-mic support is Bugzilla #1008>
+diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+index 06be3d5..086d8dd 100644
+--- a/Makefile.in
++++ b/Makefile.in
+@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \
+ kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+ kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \
+- kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o
++ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o \
++ kexgssc.o
+
+ SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \
+@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passw
+ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+- auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
++ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \
+diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+index 0089b18..ec47869 100644
+--- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -183,8 +183,13 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
+
+ len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+ authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "API:%s",
++ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#else
+ snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+ authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -241,15 +246,22 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ #ifndef HEIMDAL
+ krb5_error_code
+ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+- int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
++ int ret, oerrno;
+ char ccname[40];
+ mode_t old_umask;
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ char cctemplate[] = "API:krb5cc_%d";
++#else
++ char cctemplate[] = "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX";
++ int tmpfd;
++#endif
+
+ ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+- "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
++ cctemplate, geteuid());
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+ return ENOMEM;
+
++#ifndef USE_CCAPI
+ old_umask = umask(0177);
+ tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+ oerrno = errno;
+@@ -266,6 +278,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_c
+ return oerrno;
+ }
+ close(tmpfd);
++#endif
+
+ return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+ }
+diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+index 447f896..284f364 100644
+--- a/auth2-gss.c
++++ b/auth2-gss.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.22 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -53,6 +53,40 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_
+ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt);
+ static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+
++/*
++ * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
++ */
++static int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ int authenticated = 0;
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
++ u_int len;
++
++ mic.value = packet_get_string(&len);
++ mic.length = len;
++
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ /* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++ &gssbuf, &mic))))
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ free(mic.value);
++
++ return (authenticated);
++}
++
+ /*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+@@ -238,7 +272,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
+
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++ authctxt->pw));
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -274,7 +309,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+- authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
++ authenticated =
++ PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw));
+ else
+ logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+@@ -290,6 +326,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
++ "gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ &options.gss_authentication
++};
++
+ Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+ "gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+index d9b440a..2f0d565 100644
+--- a/auth2.c
++++ b/auth2.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
+
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ &method_none,
+ &method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ &method_gsskeyex,
+ &method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ &method_passwd,
+diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+index 397c965..f9175e3 100644
+--- a/clientloop.c
++++ b/clientloop.c
+@@ -114,6 +114,10 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+
+@@ -1630,6 +1634,15 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_cha
+ /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
+ if (!rekeying) {
+ channel_after_select(readset, writeset);
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(NULL)) {
++ debug("credentials updated - forcing rekey");
++ need_rekeying = 1;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) {
+ debug("need rekeying");
+ active_state->kex->done = 0;
+diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
+index 16d6206..a9a8b7a 100644
+--- a/config.h.in
++++ b/config.h.in
+@@ -1635,6 +1635,9 @@
+ /* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+ #undef USE_BTMP
+
++/* platform uses an in-memory credentials cache */
++#undef USE_CCAPI
++
+ /* Use libedit for sftp */
+ #undef USE_LIBEDIT
+
+@@ -1650,6 +1653,9 @@
+ /* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+ #undef USE_PIPES
+
++/* platform has the Security Authorization Session API */
++#undef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++
+ /* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+ #undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+diff --git a/configure b/configure
+index 6815388..ea5f200 100755
+--- a/configure
++++ b/configure
+@@ -7209,6 +7209,63 @@ cat >>confdefs.h <<\_ACEOF
+ #define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE 1
+ _ACEOF
+
++ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have the Security Authorization Session API" >&5
++$as_echo_n "checking if we have the Security Authorization Session API... " >&6; }
++ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
++/* end confdefs.h. */
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++int
++main ()
++{
++SessionCreate(0, 0);
++ ;
++ return 0;
++}
++_ACEOF
++if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
++ ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++
++$as_echo "#define USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API 1" >>confdefs.h
++
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
++$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
++else
++ ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
++$as_echo "no" >&6; }
++fi
++rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
++ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have an in-memory credentials cache" >&5
++$as_echo_n "checking if we have an in-memory credentials cache... " >&6; }
++ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
++/* end confdefs.h. */
++#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>
++int
++main ()
++{
++cc_context_t c;
++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);
++ ;
++ return 0;
++}
++_ACEOF
++if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
++
++$as_echo "#define USE_CCAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
++
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
++$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++ as_fn_error $? "*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***" "$LINENO" 5
++ fi
++else
++ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
++$as_echo "no" >&6; }
++
++fi
++rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ fi
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 67c4486..90e81e1 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -620,6 +620,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("
+ [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+ AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+ [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have the Security Authorization Session API])
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE([#include <Security/AuthSession.h>],
++ [SessionCreate(0, 0);],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="yes"
++ AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API], [1],
++ [platform has the Security Authorization Session API])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
++ [ac_cv_use_security_session_api="no"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
++ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have an in-memory credentials cache])
++ AC_TRY_COMPILE(
++ [#include <Kerberos/Kerberos.h>],
++ [cc_context_t c;
++ (void) cc_initialize (&c, 0, NULL, NULL);],
++ [AC_DEFINE([USE_CCAPI], [1],
++ [platform uses an in-memory credentials cache])
++ LIBS="$LIBS -framework Security"
++ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
++ if test "x$ac_cv_use_security_session_api" = "xno"; then
++ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Need a security framework to use the credentials cache API ***])
++ fi],
++ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]
++ )
+ m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+ AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+ AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+index b39281b..1e569ad 100644
+--- a/gss-genr.c
++++ b/gss-genr.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -40,12 +40,167 @@
+ #include "buffer.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh2.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+ extern u_char *session_id2;
+ extern u_int session_id2_len;
+
++typedef struct {
++ char *encoded;
++ gss_OID oid;
++} ssh_gss_kex_mapping;
++
++/*
++ * XXX - It would be nice to find a more elegant way of handling the
++ * XXX passing of the key exchange context to the userauth routines
++ */
++
++Gssctxt *gss_kex_context = NULL;
++
++static ssh_gss_kex_mapping *gss_enc2oid = NULL;
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void) {
++ return (gss_enc2oid != NULL);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Return a list of the gss-group1-sha1 mechanisms supported by this program
++ *
++ * We test mechanisms to ensure that we can use them, to avoid starting
++ * a key exchange with a bad mechanism
++ */
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *host, const char *client) {
++ gss_OID_set gss_supported;
++ OM_uint32 min_status;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &gss_supported)))
++ return NULL;
++
++ return(ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism,
++ host, client));
++}
++
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_supported, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *check,
++ const char *host, const char *client) {
++ Buffer buf;
++ size_t i;
++ int oidpos, enclen;
++ char *mechs, *encoded;
++ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++ char deroid[2];
++ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_md5();
++ EVP_MD_CTX md;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid != NULL) {
++ for (i = 0; gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL; i++)
++ free(gss_enc2oid[i].encoded);
++ free(gss_enc2oid);
++ }
++
++ gss_enc2oid = xmalloc(sizeof(ssh_gss_kex_mapping) *
++ (gss_supported->count + 1));
++
++ buffer_init(&buf);
++
++ oidpos = 0;
++ for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
++ if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
++ (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++
++ deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
++ deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
++
++ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, deroid, 2);
++ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++ gss_supported->elements[i].length);
++ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
++
++ encoded = xmalloc(EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++ enclen = __b64_ntop(digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md),
++ encoded, EVP_MD_size(evp_md) * 2);
++
++ if (oidpos != 0)
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, ',');
++ buffer_append(&buf, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID,
++ sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1);
++ buffer_append(&buf, encoded, enclen);
++
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = &(gss_supported->elements[i]);
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = encoded;
++ oidpos++;
++ }
++ }
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].oid = NULL;
++ gss_enc2oid[oidpos].encoded = NULL;
++
++ buffer_put_char(&buf, '\0');
++
++ mechs = xmalloc(buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_get(&buf, mechs, buffer_len(&buf));
++ buffer_free(&buf);
++
++ if (strlen(mechs) == 0) {
++ free(mechs);
++ mechs = NULL;
++ }
++
++ return (mechs);
++}
++
++gss_OID
++ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *ctx, char *name, int kex_type) {
++ int i = 0;
++
++ switch (kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ if (strlen(name) < sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID))
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ name += sizeof(KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID) - 1;
++ break;
++ default:
++ return GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ }
++
++ while (gss_enc2oid[i].encoded != NULL &&
++ strcmp(name, gss_enc2oid[i].encoded) != 0)
++ i++;
++
++ if (gss_enc2oid[i].oid != NULL && ctx != NULL)
++ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(ctx, gss_enc2oid[i].oid);
++
++ return gss_enc2oid[i].oid;
++}
++
+ /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+ int
+ ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+@@ -198,7 +353,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
+ }
+
+ ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
++ ctx->client_creds, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+ 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+@@ -228,8 +383,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
+ }
+
+ OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_name_t gssname;
++ OM_uint32 status;
++ gss_OID_set oidset;
++
++ gssbuf.value = (void *) name;
++ gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
++
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf,
++ GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &gssname);
++
++ if (!ctx->major)
++ ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ gssname, 0, oidset, GSS_C_INITIATE,
++ &ctx->client_creds, NULL, NULL);
++
++ gss_release_name(&status, &gssname);
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++
++ if (ctx->major)
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++
++ return(ctx->major);
++}
++
++OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+ {
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+ GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -237,6 +426,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++/* Priviledged when used by server */
++OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++{
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ return -1;
++
++ ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
++ gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++
++ return (ctx->major);
++}
++
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+ const char *context)
+@@ -250,11 +452,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const cha
+ }
+
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
++ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host,
++ const char *client)
+ {
+ gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
++ Gssctxt *intctx = NULL;
++
++ if (ctx == NULL)
++ ctx = &intctx;
+
+ /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -264,6 +471,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
+ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+ ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+ major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) && client)
++ major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
++
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
+ NULL);
+@@ -273,10 +484,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ }
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
+ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+ return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *ctxt) {
++ static gss_name_t saved_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ static OM_uint32 saved_lifetime = 0;
++ static gss_OID saved_mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
++ static gss_name_t name;
++ static OM_uint32 last_call = 0;
++ OM_uint32 lifetime, now, major, minor;
++ int equal;
++
++ now = time(NULL);
++
++ if (ctxt) {
++ debug("Rekey has happened - updating saved versions");
++
++ if (saved_name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &saved_name);
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &saved_name, &saved_lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++
++ if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
++ saved_mech = ctxt->oid;
++ saved_lifetime+= now;
++ } else {
++ /* Handle the error */
++ }
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (now - last_call < 10)
++ return 0;
++
++ last_call = now;
++
++ if (saved_mech == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_inquire_cred(&minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++ &name, &lifetime, NULL, NULL);
++ if (major == GSS_S_CREDENTIALS_EXPIRED)
++ return 0;
++ else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ major = gss_compare_name(&minor, saved_name, name, &equal);
++ gss_release_name(&minor, &name);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
++ return 0;
++
++ if (equal && (saved_lifetime < lifetime + now - 10))
++ return 1;
++
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 795992d..fd8b371 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ krb5_error_code problem;
+ krb5_principal princ;
+ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+- int len;
+ const char *errmsg;
++ const char *new_ccname, *new_cctype;
+
+ if (client->creds == NULL) {
+ debug("No credentials stored");
+@@ -181,11 +181,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+ return;
+ }
+
+- client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
++ new_cctype = krb5_cc_get_type(krb_context, ccache);
++ new_ccname = krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache);
++
+ client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+- len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+- client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+- snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
++#ifdef USE_CCAPI
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "API:%s", new_ccname);
++ client->store.filename = NULL;
++#else
++ if (new_ccname[0] == ':')
++ new_ccname++;
++ xasprintf(&client->store.envval, "%s:%s", new_cctype, new_ccname);
++ if (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0) {
++ char *p;
++ p = strrchr(client->store.envval, '/');
++ if (p)
++ *p = '\0';
++ }
++ if ((strcmp(new_cctype, "FILE") == 0) || (strcmp(new_cctype, "DIR") == 0))
++ client->store.filename = xstrdup(new_ccname);
++#endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+@@ -194,9 +209,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+
+ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+
++ client->store.data = krb_context;
++
+ return;
+ }
+
++int
++ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store,
++ ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_principal principal = NULL;
++ char *name = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(krb_context, store->envval, &ccache))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ /* Find out who the principal in this cache is */
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb_context, ccache,
++ &principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_get_principal(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_unparse_name(krb_context, principal, &name))) {
++ logit("krb5_unparse_name(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++
++ if (strcmp(name,client->exportedname.value)!=0) {
++ debug("Name in local credentials cache differs. Not storing");
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++ return 0;
++ }
++ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krb_context, name);
++
++ /* Name matches, so lets get on with it! */
++
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, principal))) {
++ logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s",
++ krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ krb5_free_principal(krb_context, principal);
++
++ if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds,
++ ccache))) {
++ logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed. Sorry!");
++ krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+ "Kerberos",
+@@ -204,7 +286,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+ NULL,
+ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+ NULL,
+- &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds,
++ &ssh_gssapi_krb5_updatecreds
+ };
+
+ #endif /* KRB5 */
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 5c59924..50fa438 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.28 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -44,15 +44,21 @@
+ #include "channels.h"
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
+
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+ { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL,
++ {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+- { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++ { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -99,25 +105,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+ char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
+ gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+- gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++ if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
++ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
++
++ if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (-1);
++ }
+
+- if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) {
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (-1);
+- }
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
++ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
++ NULL, NULL)))
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+- if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+ gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+ return (ctx->major);
++ } else {
++ ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+-
+- if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+- ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL)))
+- ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+-
+- gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+- return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ /* Privileged */
+@@ -132,6 +145,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
+ }
+
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
++ gss_OID_set supported;
++
++ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported);
++ return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported, &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech,
++ NULL, NULL));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++ const char *dummy) {
++ Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++ int res;
++
++ res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++ return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -141,7 +177,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
+ gss_OID_set supported;
+
+ gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++ return;
+
+ while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -267,8 +305,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ int i = 0;
++ int equal = 0;
++ gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++ gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++ if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++ (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++ ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++ NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
+
+- gss_buffer_desc ename;
++ ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++ new_name, &equal);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
++ if (!equal) {
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
++
++ debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++ gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++ gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++ client->name = new_name;
++ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++ client->updated = 1;
++ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++ }
+
+ client->mech = NULL;
+
+@@ -283,6 +361,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ if (client->mech == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
++ if (ctx->client_creds &&
++ (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++ ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++ return (ctx->major);
++ }
++
+ if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -300,6 +385,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
++ gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -310,11 +397,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ {
+- if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
+- /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
+- debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+- gssapi_client.store.filename);
+- unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
++ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++ krb5_error_code problem;
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
++ if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++ } else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
++ debug("%s: krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s", __func__,
++ krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++ } else {
++ krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
++ gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
++ }
+ }
+ }
+
+@@ -347,7 +443,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
+
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+@@ -357,9 +453,11 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+- if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++ if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++ gssapi_client.used = 1;
++ gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ return 1;
+- else {
++ } else {
+ /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -373,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ * *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ * *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
++ struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+- ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+- gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++ return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+
+- return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
++ int ok;
++ int ret;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++ struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++ char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++ if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++ gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++ return;
++
++ ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
++
++ if (!ok)
++ return;
++
++ debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++ /* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++ * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++ * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++ */
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++ if (!use_privsep) {
++ debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
++ return;
++ }
++
++ ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ &pamconv, &pamh);
++ if (ret)
++ return;
++
++ xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
++ gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++ ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++ if (!ret)
++ pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++ int ok = 0;
++
++ /* Check we've got credentials to store */
++ if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++ return 0;
++
++ gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++ temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++ if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++ ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++ else
++ debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++ restore_uid();
++
++ return ok;
+ }
+
+ #endif
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index a173e70..891852b 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,10 @@
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
+ # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256)
+ # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256
+@@ -97,6 +101,14 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+ { NULL, -1, -1, -1},
+ };
++static const struct kexalg kexalg_prefixes[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ { KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++ { KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++#endif
++ { NULL, -1, -1, -1 },
++};
+
+ char *
+ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+@@ -129,6 +141,12 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ return k;
+ }
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ for (k = kexalg_prefixes; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++ if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
++ return k;
++ }
++#endif
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 4c40ec8..c179a4d 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -93,6 +93,11 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+ KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+ KEX_C25519_SHA256,
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
++#endif
+ KEX_MAX
+ };
+
+@@ -139,6 +144,12 @@ struct kex {
+ u_int flags;
+ int hash_alg;
+ int ec_nid;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ int gss_deleg_creds;
++ int gss_trust_dns;
++ char *gss_host;
++ char *gss_client;
++#endif
+ char *client_version_string;
+ char *server_version_string;
+ int (*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
+@@ -184,6 +195,11 @@ int kexecdh_server(struct ssh *);
+ int kexc25519_client(struct ssh *);
+ int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
++int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
++#endif
++
+ int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *);
+diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..92a31c5
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/kexgssc.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++
++int
++kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh) {
++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, gssbuf, msg_tok, *token_ptr;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt;
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
++ u_int klen, kout, slen = 0, strlen;
++ DH *dh;
++ BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++ u_char *kbuf;
++ u_char *serverhostkey = NULL;
++ u_char *empty = "";
++ char *msg;
++ char *lang;
++ int type = 0;
++ int first = 1;
++ int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++ size_t hashlen;
++
++ /* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
++ if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
++ == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++ if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++ fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++ if (kex->gss_client &&
++ ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++ fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange\n");
++ nbits = dh_estimate(kex->we_need * 8);
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ packet_put_int(min);
++ packet_put_int(nbits);
++ packet_put_int(max);
++
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++
++ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(p);
++ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("BN_new() failed");
++ packet_get_bignum2(g);
++ packet_check_eom();
++
++ if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++ fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++
++ dh = dh_new_group(g, p);
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ /* Step 1 - e is dh->pub_key */
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ /* This is f, we initialise it now to make life easier */
++ dh_server_pub = BN_new();
++ if (dh_server_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_server_pub == NULL");
++
++ token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++
++ do {
++ debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++ maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
++ &ret_flags);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++ }
++
++ /* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++ if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++ /* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++ /* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity check failed");
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++ * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++ */
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ if (first) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ first = 0;
++ } else {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value,
++ send_tok.length);
++ }
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++
++ /* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++ do {
++ type = packet_read();
++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++ debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++ serverhostkey =
++ packet_get_string(&slen);
++ }
++ } while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++
++ switch (type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
++ debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_server_pub);
++ msg_tok.value = packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ msg_tok.length = strlen;
++
++ /* Is there a token included? */
++ if (packet_get_char()) {
++ recv_tok.value=
++ packet_get_string(&strlen);
++ recv_tok.length = strlen;
++ /* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++ if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: received token when complete");
++ } else {
++ /* No token included */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++ }
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
++ debug("Received Error");
++ maj_status = packet_get_int();
++ min_status = packet_get_int();
++ msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ lang = packet_get_string(NULL);
++ fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s",msg);
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++ token_ptr = &recv_tok;
++ } else {
++ /* No data, and not complete */
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ /*
++ * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++ * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
++ */
++
++ if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
++ fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++
++ /* Check f in range [1, p-1] */
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_server_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad server public DH value");
++
++ /* compute K=f^x mod p */
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, dh);
++ if ((int)kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_client: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexdh_client: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash( kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ dh->pub_key, /* e */
++ dh_server_pub, /* f */
++ shared_secret, /* K */
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->hash_alg,
++ kex->client_version_string,
++ kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ (serverhostkey ? serverhostkey : empty), slen,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ dh_server_pub,
++ shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ /* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++ packet_disconnect("Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++ free(msg_tok.value);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++ if (serverhostkey)
++ free(serverhostkey);
++ BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
++
++ /* save session id */
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++ ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ return kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++}
++
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..6a0ece8
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/kexgsss.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
++ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
++ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
++ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
++ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++
++#include <string.h>
++
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++
++#include "xmalloc.h"
++#include "buffer.h"
++#include "ssh2.h"
++#include "key.h"
++#include "cipher.h"
++#include "kex.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "packet.h"
++#include "dh.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "misc.h"
++#include "servconf.h"
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "digest.h"
++
++extern ServerOptions options;
++
++int
++kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++ struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++ int r = 0;
++
++ OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
++
++ /*
++ * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
++ * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
++ * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
++ * activating this non-standard behaviour.
++ */
++
++ OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++ gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
++ u_int slen, klen, kout;
++ u_char *kbuf;
++ DH *dh;
++ int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++ BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++ BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
++ int type = 0;
++ gss_OID oid;
++ char *mechs;
++ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++ size_t hashlen;
++
++ /* Initialise GSSAPI */
++
++ /* If we're rekeying, privsep means that some of the private structures
++ * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
++ * into life
++ */
++ if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
++ if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms())) {
++ free(mechs);
++ }
++ }
++
++ debug2("%s: Identifying %s", __func__, kex->name);
++ oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
++ if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++ fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++
++ debug2("%s: Acquiring credentials", __func__);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++ fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
++
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group1();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ dh = dh_new_group14();
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ debug("Doing group exchange");
++ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++ min = packet_get_int();
++ nbits = packet_get_int();
++ max = packet_get_int();
++ min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
++ max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
++ packet_check_eom();
++ if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
++ fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
++ min, nbits, max);
++ dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++ if (dh == NULL)
++ packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching group found");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->p);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->g);
++ packet_send();
++
++ packet_write_wait();
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ dh_gen_key(dh, kex->we_need * 8);
++
++ do {
++ debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
++ type = packet_read();
++ switch(type) {
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
++ if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
++ fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++
++ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL)
++ fatal("dh_client_pub == NULL");
++
++ packet_get_bignum2(dh_client_pub);
++
++ /* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++ break;
++ case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
++ recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen);
++ recv_tok.length = slen;
++ break;
++ default:
++ packet_disconnect(
++ "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
++ type);
++ }
++
++ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
++ &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++
++ free(recv_tok.value);
++
++ if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
++ fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++ if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
++ fatal("No client public key");
++
++ if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++ debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ }
++ } while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
++ if (send_tok.length > 0) {
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE);
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ packet_send();
++ }
++ fatal("accept_ctx died");
++ }
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++ fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++ fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++ if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh_client_pub))
++ packet_disconnect("bad client public DH value");
++
++ klen = DH_size(dh);
++ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
++ kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, dh);
++ if ((int)kout < 0)
++ fatal("DH_compute_key: failed");
++
++ shared_secret = BN_new();
++ if (shared_secret == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_new failed");
++
++ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL)
++ fatal("kexgss_server: BN_bin2bn failed");
++
++ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
++ free(kbuf);
++
++ hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++ switch (kex->kex_type) {
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++ case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++ kex_dh_hash(
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ NULL, 0, /* Change this if we start sending host keys */
++ dh_client_pub, dh->pub_key, shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ case KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1:
++ kexgex_hash(
++ kex->hash_alg,
++ kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string,
++ buffer_ptr(kex->peer), buffer_len(kex->peer),
++ buffer_ptr(kex->my), buffer_len(kex->my),
++ NULL, 0,
++ min, nbits, max,
++ dh->p, dh->g,
++ dh_client_pub,
++ dh->pub_key,
++ shared_secret,
++ hash, &hashlen
++ );
++ break;
++ default:
++ fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
++ }
++
++ BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
++
++ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
++ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
++ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
++ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
++ }
++
++ gssbuf.value = hash;
++ gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt,&gssbuf,&msg_tok))))
++ fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE);
++ packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key);
++ packet_put_string(msg_tok.value,msg_tok.length);
++
++ if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++ packet_put_char(1); /* true */
++ packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length);
++ } else {
++ packet_put_char(0); /* false */
++ }
++ packet_send();
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++ gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++ gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++ else
++ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++
++ DH_free(dh);
++
++ kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
++ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++ r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++ /* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++ * just exchanged. */
++ if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++ return r;
++}
++#endif /* GSSAPI */
+diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+index dbe29f1..b0896ef 100644
+--- a/monitor.c
++++ b/monitor.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer
+ int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+ int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
++int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+@@ -234,11 +236,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ #endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+ };
+
+ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
++ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
++#endif
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ #endif
+@@ -353,6 +362,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+@@ -461,6 +474,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
++#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+@@ -1860,6 +1877,13 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *p
+ # endif
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+@@ -1959,6 +1983,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ goid.length = len;
+
+@@ -1986,6 +2013,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
+ OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ in.length = len;
+ major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+@@ -2003,6 +2033,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffe
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+ }
+@@ -2014,6 +2045,9 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ u_int len;
+
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ gssbuf.length = len;
+ mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+@@ -2040,7 +2074,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+ {
+ int authenticated;
+
+- authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
++ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+@@ -2053,5 +2091,73 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
++{
++ gss_buffer_desc data;
++ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 major, minor;
++ u_int len;
++
++ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
++ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
++
++ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
++ data.length = len;
++ if (data.length != 20)
++ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
++ (int) data.length);
++
++ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
++ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
++ session_id2_len = data.length;
++ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
++ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
++ }
++ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
++
++ free(data.value);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, major);
++ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
++
++ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
++
++ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
++
++ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
++ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
++
++ return (0);
++}
++
++int
++mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
++ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int ok;
++
++ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
++
++ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
++
++ free(store.filename);
++ free(store.envvar);
++ free(store.envval);
++
++ buffer_clear(m);
++ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
++
++ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
++
++ return(0);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+index 5bc41b5..7f32b0c 100644
+--- a/monitor.h
++++ b/monitor.h
+@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
++ MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
++
+ };
+
+ struct mm_master;
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+index 45dc169..e476f0d 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c
+@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
+ }
+
+ int
+-mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw)
+ {
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+@@ -1085,5 +1085,50 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+ }
++
++OM_uint32
++mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *data, gss_buffer_desc *hash)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ OM_uint32 major;
++ u_int len;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++ buffer_put_string(&m, data->value, data->length);
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, &m);
++
++ major = buffer_get_int(&m);
++ hash->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
++ hash->length = len;
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return(major);
++}
++
++int
++mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store)
++{
++ Buffer m;
++ int ok;
++
++ buffer_init(&m);
++
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->filename ? store->filename : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envvar ? store->envvar : "");
++ buffer_put_cstring(&m, store->envval ? store->envval : "");
++
++ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, &m);
++
++ ok = buffer_get_int(&m);
++
++ buffer_free(&m);
++
++ return (ok);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+index 18c2501..a4e9d24 100644
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h
+@@ -58,8 +58,10 @@ BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(K
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+ gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+-int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
++int mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *);
+ #endif
+
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 7948ce1..9127e93 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ typedef enum {
+ oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+ oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+ oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
++ oGssTrustDns, oGssKeyEx, oGssClientIdentity, oGssRenewalRekey,
++ oGssServerIdentity,
+ oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+ oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+ oHashKnownHosts,
+@@ -194,10 +196,19 @@ static struct {
+ { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+ #if defined(GSSAPI)
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oGssKeyEx },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oGssTrustDns },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oGssClientIdentity },
++ { "gssapiserveridentity", oGssServerIdentity },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oGssRenewalRekey },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", oUnsupported },
+ { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapitrustdns", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapiclientidentity", oUnsupported },
++ { "gssapirenewalforcesrekey", oUnsupported },
+ #endif
+ { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+ { "usersh", oDeprecated },
+@@ -898,10 +909,30 @@ parse_time:
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oGssDelegateCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case oGssTrustDns:
++ intptr = &options->gss_trust_dns;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oGssClientIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_client_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssServerIdentity:
++ charptr = &options->gss_server_identity;
++ goto parse_string;
++
++ case oGssRenewalRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_renewal_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case oBatchMode:
+ intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -1613,7 +1644,12 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication = -1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_trust_dns = -1;
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = -1;
++ options->gss_client_identity = NULL;
++ options->gss_server_identity = NULL;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+@@ -1743,8 +1779,14 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
++ if (options->gss_trust_dns == -1)
++ options->gss_trust_dns = 0;
++ if (options->gss_renewal_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_renewal_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index 0b9cb77..0e29889 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -45,7 +45,12 @@ typedef struct {
+ int challenge_response_authentication;
+ /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* Try GSS key exchange */
+ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
++ int gss_trust_dns; /* Trust DNS for GSS canonicalization */
++ int gss_renewal_rekey; /* Credential renewal forces rekey */
++ char *gss_client_identity; /* Principal to initiate GSSAPI with */
++ char *gss_server_identity; /* GSSAPI target principal */
+ int password_authentication; /* Try password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index b7f3294..cb3c831 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -114,7 +114,10 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+ options->gss_authentication=-1;
++ options->gss_keyex = -1;
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
++ options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ options->password_authentication = -1;
+ options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+ options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+@@ -269,8 +272,14 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+ if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+ options->gss_authentication = 0;
++ if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
++ options->gss_keyex = 0;
+ if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+ options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
++ if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
++ options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
++ if (options->gss_store_rekey == -1)
++ options->gss_store_rekey = 0;
+ if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+ options->password_authentication = 0;
+ if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+@@ -391,7 +400,9 @@ typedef enum {
+ sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+ sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
++ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
++ sGssKeyEx, sGssStoreRekey,
++ sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ sHostCertificate,
+@@ -462,10 +473,20 @@ static struct {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #else
+ { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapicleanupcreds", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapikeyexchange", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ #endif
++ { "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++ { "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1166,10 +1187,22 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssKeyEx:
++ intptr = &options->gss_keyex;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sGssCleanupCreds:
+ intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++ case sGssStrictAcceptor:
++ intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sGssStoreRekey:
++ intptr = &options->gss_store_rekey;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
+ case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+@@ -2125,7 +2158,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ #endif
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssKeyEx, o->gss_keyex);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
++ dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ #endif
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 766db3a..f8265a8 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -115,7 +115,10 @@ typedef struct {
+ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
+ * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
++ int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
+ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
++ int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
++ int gss_store_rekey;
+ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
+ * authentication. */
+ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a99d7f0..914701b 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.11 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -61,10 +61,22 @@
+
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT 30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE 31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE 32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY 33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR 34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ 40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP 41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID "gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID "gss-gex-sha1-"
++
+ typedef struct {
+ char *filename;
+ char *envvar;
+ char *envval;
++ struct passwd *owner;
+ void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+@@ -72,8 +84,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ gss_cred_id_t creds;
++ gss_name_t name;
+ struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++ int used;
++ int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +99,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++ int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +110,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ gss_OID oid; /* client */
+ gss_cred_id_t creds; /* server */
+ gss_name_t client; /* server */
+- gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* server */
++ gss_cred_id_t client_creds; /* both */
+ } Gssctxt;
+
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+
+ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -119,16 +136,32 @@ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++ const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
++ const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+index 03a228f..228e5ab 100644
+--- a/ssh_config
++++ b/ssh_config
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
+ # HostbasedAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ # GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
++# GSSAPIKeyExchange no
++# GSSAPITrustDNS no
+ # BatchMode no
+ # CheckHostIP yes
+ # AddressFamily any
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index f9ede7a..e6649ac 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -743,11 +743,43 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI may be used. When using
++GSSAPI key exchange the server need not have a host key.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIClientIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI client identity that ssh should use when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the default
++identity will be used.
++.It Cm GSSAPIServerIdentity
++If set, specifies the GSSAPI server identity that ssh should expect when
++connecting to the server. The default is unset, which means that the
++expected GSSAPI server identity will be determined from the target
++hostname.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+ Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+-Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIRenewalForcesRekey
++If set to
++.Dq yes
++then renewal of the client's GSSAPI credentials will force the rekeying of the
++ssh connection. With a compatible server, this can delegate the renewed
++credentials to a session on the server.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++.It Cm GSSAPITrustDns
++Set to
++.Dq yes to indicate that the DNS is trusted to securely canonicalize
++the name of the host being connected to. If
++.Dq no, the hostname entered on the
++command line will be passed untouched to the GSSAPI library.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++This option only applies to protocol version 2 connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index 68f7f4f..7b478f1 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -161,9 +161,34 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ char *orig = NULL, *gss = NULL;
++ char *gss_host = NULL;
++#endif
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = host;
++
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host, options.gss_client_identity);
++ if (gss) {
++ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) {
+ logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults.");
+ options.ciphers = NULL;
+@@ -201,6 +226,17 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++ if (options.gss_keyex && gss) {
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++ "%s,null", orig);
++ free(gss);
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+ packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
+ (time_t)options.rekey_interval);
+@@ -219,10 +255,30 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_client;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->gss_deleg_creds = options.gss_deleg_creds;
++ kex->gss_trust_dns = options.gss_trust_dns;
++ kex->gss_client = options.gss_client_identity;
++ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++ kex->gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ } else {
++ kex->gss_host = gss_host;
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
+
+ if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) {
+@@ -314,6 +370,7 @@ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32
+ int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *);
+ int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+ int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *);
++int userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt);
+ #endif
+
+ void userauth(Authctxt *, char *);
+@@ -329,6 +386,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++ {"gssapi-keyex",
++ userauth_gsskeyex,
++ NULL,
++ &options.gss_authentication,
++ NULL},
+ {"gssapi-with-mic",
+ userauth_gssapi,
+ NULL,
+@@ -635,19 +697,31 @@ userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ static u_int mech = 0;
+ OM_uint32 min;
+ int ok = 0;
++ const char *gss_host;
++
++ if (options.gss_server_identity)
++ gss_host = options.gss_server_identity;
++ else if (options.gss_trust_dns)
++ gss_host = get_canonical_hostname(1);
++ else
++ gss_host = authctxt->host;
+
+ /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+ * once. */
+
+ if (gss_supported == NULL)
+- gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported);
++ if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported))) {
++ gss_supported = NULL;
++ return 0;
++ }
+
+ /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) {
+ /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 &&
+ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+- &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) {
++ &gss_supported->elements[mech], gss_host,
++ options.gss_client_identity)) {
+ ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+ } else {
+ mech++;
+@@ -744,8 +818,8 @@ input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_
+ {
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+- int oidlen;
+- char *oidv;
++ u_int oidlen;
++ u_char *oidv;
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+@@ -858,6 +932,48 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
+ free(lang);
+ return 0;
+ }
++
++int
++userauth_gsskeyex(Authctxt *authctxt)
++{
++ Buffer b;
++ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
++ gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++ OM_uint32 ms;
++
++ static int attempt = 0;
++ if (attempt++ >= 1)
++ return (0);
++
++ if (gss_kex_context == NULL) {
++ debug("No valid Key exchange context");
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service,
++ "gssapi-keyex");
++
++ gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b);
++ gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b);
++
++ if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_sign(gss_kex_context, &gssbuf, &mic))) {
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ return (0);
++ }
++
++ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service);
++ packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name);
++ packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length);
++ packet_send();
++
++ buffer_free(&b);
++ gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
++
++ return (1);
++}
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ int
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 481d001..e6706a8 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@
+ #include "version.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++#include <Security/AuthSession.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifndef O_NOCTTY
+ #define O_NOCTTY 0
+ #endif
+@@ -1822,10 +1826,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
+ }
++#ifndef GSSAPI
++ /* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
+ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+ logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
+ options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
+ }
++#endif
+ if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
+ logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+ exit(1);
+@@ -2139,6 +2146,60 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ remote_ip, remote_port,
+ get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
+
++#ifdef USE_SECURITY_SESSION_API
++ /*
++ * Create a new security session for use by the new user login if
++ * the current session is the root session or we are not launched
++ * by inetd (eg: debugging mode or server mode). We do not
++ * necessarily need to create a session if we are launched from
++ * inetd because Panther xinetd will create a session for us.
++ *
++ * The only case where this logic will fail is if there is an
++ * inetd running in a non-root session which is not creating
++ * new sessions for us. Then all the users will end up in the
++ * same session (bad).
++ *
++ * When the client exits, the session will be destroyed for us
++ * automatically.
++ *
++ * We must create the session before any credentials are stored
++ * (including AFS pags, which happens a few lines below).
++ */
++ {
++ OSStatus err = 0;
++ SecuritySessionId sid = 0;
++ SessionAttributeBits sattrs = 0;
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid, &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("Current Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++
++ if (inetd_flag && !(sattrs & sessionIsRoot))
++ debug("Running in inetd mode in a non-root session... "
++ "assuming inetd created the session for us.");
++ else {
++ debug("Creating new security session...");
++ err = SessionCreate(0, sessionHasTTY | sessionIsRemote);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionCreate() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++
++ err = SessionGetInfo(callerSecuritySession, &sid,
++ &sattrs);
++ if (err)
++ error("SessionGetInfo() failed with error %.8X",
++ (unsigned) err);
++ else
++ debug("New Session ID is %.8X / Session Attributes are %.8X",
++ (unsigned) sid, (unsigned) sattrs);
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2568,6 +2629,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+ list_hostkey_types());
+
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ {
++ char *orig;
++ char *gss = NULL;
++ char *newstr = NULL;
++ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++ /*
++ * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++ * the other key exchange algorithms
++ */
++
++ if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++ orig = NULL;
++
++ if (options.gss_keyex)
++ gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++ else
++ gss = NULL;
++
++ if (gss && orig)
++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++ else if (gss)
++ newstr = gss;
++ else if (orig)
++ newstr = orig;
++
++ /*
++ * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++ * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++ * host key algorithm we support
++ */
++ if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
++
++ if (newstr)
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++ else
++ fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++ }
++#endif
++
+ /* start key exchange */
+ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
+ fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
+@@ -2582,6 +2685,13 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++ if (options.gss_keyex) {
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++ }
++#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+index e9045bc..d9b8594 100644
+--- a/sshd_config
++++ b/sshd_config
+@@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
+ # GSSAPI options
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
++#GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
++#GSSAPIKeyExchange no
+
+ # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+ # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index fd44abe..c8b43da 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -564,12 +564,40 @@ Specifies whether user authentication ba
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
++Specifies whether key exchange based on GSSAPI is allowed. GSSAPI key exchange
++doesn't rely on ssh keys to verify host identity.
++The default is
++.Dq no .
++Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
+ .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+ on logout.
+ The default is
+ .Dq yes .
+ Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
++Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
++a client authenticates against. If
++.Dq yes
++then the client must authenticate against the
++.Pa host
++service on the current hostname. If
++.Dq no
++then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
++machine's default store. This facility is provided to assist with operation
++on multi homed machines.
++The default is
++.Dq yes .
++Note that this option applies only to protocol version 2 GSSAPI connections,
++and setting it to
++.Dq no
++may only work with recent Kerberos GSSAPI libraries.
++.It Cm GSSAPIStoreCredentialsOnRekey
++Controls whether the user's GSSAPI credentials should be updated following a
++successful connection rekeying. This option can be used to accepted renewed
++or updated credentials from a compatible client. The default is
++.Dq no .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ as a comma-separated pattern list.
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index fdd0c8a..1a96eae 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] =
+ { "ssh-dss-cert-v00 at openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00",
+ KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 },
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++ { "null", "null", KEY_NULL, 0, 0 },
+ { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 }
+ };
+
+@@ -204,7 +205,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_o
+ const struct keytype *kt;
+
+ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+- if (kt->name == NULL)
++ if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ continue;
+ if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
+ continue;
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index 450b30c..b573e7f 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
++++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+ KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+ KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+ KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
++ KEY_NULL,
+ KEY_UNSPEC
+ };
+
Added: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.8p1-hpnssh14v5.diff
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.8p1-hpnssh14v5.diff (rev 0)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/openssh-6.8p1-hpnssh14v5.diff 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -0,0 +1,1290 @@
+--- a/HPN-README 1969-12-31 18:00:00.000000000 -0600
++++ b/HPN-README 2015-04-01 22:16:49.869215000 -0500
+@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
++Notes:
++
++MULTI-THREADED CIPHER:
++The AES cipher in CTR mode has been multithreaded (MTR-AES-CTR). This will allow ssh installations
++on hosts with multiple cores to use more than one processing core during encryption.
++Tests have show significant throughput performance increases when using MTR-AES-CTR up
++to and including a full gigabit per second on quad core systems. It should be possible to
++achieve full line rate on dual core systems but OS and data management overhead makes this
++more difficult to achieve. The cipher stream from MTR-AES-CTR is entirely compatible with single
++thread AES-CTR (ST-AES-CTR) implementations and should be 100% backward compatible. Optimal
++performance requires the MTR-AES-CTR mode be enabled on both ends of the connection.
++The MTR-AES-CTR replaces ST-AES-CTR and is used in exactly the same way with the same
++nomenclature.
++Use examples: ssh -caes128-ctr you at host.com
++ scp -oCipher=aes256-ctr file you at host.com:~/file
++
++NONE CIPHER:
++To use the NONE option you must have the NoneEnabled switch set on the server and
++you *must* have *both* NoneEnabled and NoneSwitch set to yes on the client. The NONE
++feature works with ALL ssh subsystems (as far as we can tell) *AS LONG AS* a tty is not
++spawned. If a user uses the -T switch to prevent a tty being created the NONE cipher will
++be disabled.
++
++The performance increase will only be as good as the network and TCP stack tuning
++on the reciever side of the connection allows. As a rule of thumb a user will need
++at least 10Mb/s connection with a 100ms RTT to see a doubling of performance. The
++HPN-SSH home page describes this in greater detail.
++
++http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh
++
++BUFFER SIZES:
++
++If HPN is disabled the receive buffer size will be set to the
++OpenSSH default of 64K.
++
++If an HPN system connects to a nonHPN system the receive buffer will
++be set to the HPNBufferSize value. The default is 2MB but user adjustable.
++
++If an HPN to HPN connection is established a number of different things might
++happen based on the user options and conditions.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = up to 64MB
++This is the default state. The HPN buffer size will grow to a maximum of 64MB
++as the TCP receive buffer grows. The maximum HPN Buffer size of 64MB is
++geared towards 10GigE transcontinental connections.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = TCP receive buffer value.
++Users on non-autotuning systesm should disable TCPRcvBufPoll in the
++ssh_cofig and sshd_config
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCP receive buffer and HPNBufferSize.
++This would be the system defined TCP receive buffer (RWIN).
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll disabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
++Generally there is no need to set both.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf NOT Set
++HPN Buffer Size = grows to HPNBufferSize
++The buffer will grow up to the maximum size specified here.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize SET, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = minmum of TCPRcvBuf and HPNBufferSize.
++Generally there is no need to set both of these, especially on autotuning
++systems. However, if the users wishes to override the autotuning this would be
++one way to do it.
++
++Conditions: HPNBufferSize NOT Set, TCPRcvBufPoll enabled, TCPRcvBuf SET
++HPN Buffer Size = TCPRcvBuf.
++This will override autotuning and set the TCP recieve buffer to the user defined
++value.
++
++
++HPN Specific Configuration options
++
++TcpRcvBuf=[int]KB client
++ set the TCP socket receive buffer to n Kilobytes. It can be set up to the
++maximum socket size allowed by the system. This is useful in situations where
++the tcp receive window is set low but the maximum buffer size is set
++higher (as is typical). This works on a per TCP connection basis. You can also
++use this to artifically limit the transfer rate of the connection. In these
++cases the throughput will be no more than n/RTT. The minimum buffer size is 1KB.
++Default is the current system wide tcp receive buffer size.
++
++TcpRcvBufPoll=[yes/no] client/server
++ enable of disable the polling of the tcp receive buffer through the life
++of the connection. You would want to make sure that this option is enabled
++for systems making use of autotuning kernels (linux 2.4.24+, 2.6, MS Vista)
++default is yes.
++
++NoneEnabled=[yes/no] client/server
++ enable or disable the use of the None cipher. Care must always be used
++when enabling this as it will allow users to send data in the clear. However,
++it is important to note that authentication information remains encrypted
++even if this option is enabled. Set to no by default.
++
++NoneSwitch=[yes/no] client
++ Switch the encryption cipher being used to the None cipher after
++authentication takes place. NoneEnabled must be enabled on both the client
++and server side of the connection. When the connection switches to the NONE
++cipher a warning is sent to STDERR. The connection attempt will fail with an
++error if a client requests a NoneSwitch from the server that does not explicitly
++have NoneEnabled set to yes. Note: The NONE cipher cannot be used in
++interactive (shell) sessions and it will fail silently. Set to no by default.
++
++HPNDisabled=[yes/no] client/server
++ In some situations, such as transfers on a local area network, the impact
++of the HPN code produces a net decrease in performance. In these cases it is
++helpful to disable the HPN functionality. By default HPNDisabled is set to no.
++
++HPNBufferSize=[int]KB client/server
++ This is the default buffer size the HPN functionality uses when interacting
++with nonHPN SSH installations. Conceptually this is similar to the TcpRcvBuf
++option as applied to the internal SSH flow control. This value can range from
++1KB to 64MB (1-65536). Use of oversized or undersized buffers can cause performance
++problems depending on the length of the network path. The default size of this buffer
++is 2MB.
++
++
++Credits: This patch was conceived, designed, and led by Chris Rapier (rapier at psc.edu)
++ The majority of the actual coding for versions up to HPN12v1 was performed
++ by Michael Stevens (mstevens at andrew.cmu.edu). The MT-AES-CTR cipher was
++ implemented by Ben Bennet (ben at psc.edu) and improved by Mike Tasota
++ (tasota at gmail.com) an NSF REU grant recipient for 2013.
++ This work was financed, in part, by Cisco System, Inc., the National
++ Library of Medicine, and the National Science Foundation.
+--- a/channels.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/channels.c 2015-04-03 15:51:59.599537000 -0500
+@@ -183,6 +183,12 @@ static void port_open_helper(Channel *c,
+ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
+ static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
+
++
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++static int hpn_disabled = 0;
++static int hpn_buffer_size = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
++#endif
++
+ /* -- channel core */
+
+ Channel *
+@@ -333,6 +339,9 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int r
+ c->local_window_max = window;
+ c->local_consumed = 0;
+ c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ c->dynamic_window = 0;
++#endif
+ c->remote_id = -1;
+ c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
+ c->remote_window = 0;
+@@ -837,11 +846,41 @@ channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *
+ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++static u_int
++channel_tcpwinsz(void)
++{
++ u_int32_t tcpwinsz = 0;
++ socklen_t optsz = sizeof(tcpwinsz);
++ int ret = -1;
++
++ /* if we aren't on a socket return 128KB */
++ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
++ return (128*1024);
++ ret = getsockopt(packet_get_connection_in(),
++ SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &tcpwinsz, &optsz);
++ /* return no more than SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX */
++ if (ret == 0 && tcpwinsz > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
++ tcpwinsz = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
++ debug2("tcpwinsz: %d for connection: %d", tcpwinsz,
++ packet_get_connection_in());
++ return (tcpwinsz);
++}
++#endif
++
+ static void
+ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
+ {
+ u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize();
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* check buffer limits */
++ if (!c->tcpwinsz || c->dynamic_window > 0)
++ c->tcpwinsz = channel_tcpwinsz();
++
++ limit = MIN(limit, 2 * c->tcpwinsz);
++#endif
++
+ if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
+ limit > 0 &&
+ buffer_len(&c->input) < limit &&
+@@ -1846,6 +1885,20 @@ channel_check_window(Channel *c)
+ c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+ c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
+ c->local_consumed > 0) {
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* adjust max window size if we are in a dynamic environment */
++ if (c->dynamic_window && (c->tcpwinsz > c->local_window_max)) {
++ u_int addition = 0;
++
++ /*
++ * grow the window somewhat aggressively to maintain
++ * pressure
++ */
++ addition = 1.5*(c->tcpwinsz - c->local_window_max);
++ c->local_window_max += addition;
++ c->local_consumed += addition;
++ }
++#endif
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST);
+ packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
+ packet_put_int(c->local_consumed);
+@@ -2794,6 +2847,17 @@ channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen
+ return addr;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++void
++channel_set_hpn(int external_hpn_disabled, int external_hpn_buffer_size)
++{
++ hpn_disabled = external_hpn_disabled;
++ hpn_buffer_size = external_hpn_buffer_size;
++ debug("HPN Disabled: %d, HPN Buffer Size: %d", hpn_disabled,
++ hpn_buffer_size);
++}
++#endif
++
+ static int
+ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd,
+ int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+@@ -2918,6 +2982,17 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int typ
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * explicitly test for hpn disabled option. if true use smaller
++ * window size.
++ */
++ if (!hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
++ hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
++ 0, "port listener", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "port listener", 1);
+@@ -3952,6 +4027,14 @@
+ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
+ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+ sock = socks[n];
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!hpn_disabled)
++ nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
++ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
++ hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
++ 0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ nc = channel_new("x11 listener",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+--- a/channels.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/channels.h 2015-04-03 13:58:44.472717000 -0500
+@@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ struct Channel {
+ u_int local_maxpacket;
+ int extended_usage;
+ int single_connection;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int dynamic_window;
++ u_int tcpwinsz;
++#endif
+
+ char *ctype; /* type */
+
+@@ -311,4 +315,9 @@ void chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *);
+ void chan_write_failed(Channel *);
+ void chan_obuf_empty(Channel *);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++/* hpn handler */
++void channel_set_hpn(int, int);
++#endif
++
+ #endif
+--- a/cipher.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/cipher.c 2015-04-03 16:22:04.972592000 -0500
+@@ -244,7 +244,13 @@ ciphers_valid(const char *names)
+ for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+ (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+ c = cipher_by_name(p);
+- if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) {
++ if (c == NULL || (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 &&
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ c->number != SSH_CIPHER_NONE
++#else
++ 1
++#endif
++ )) {
+ free(cipher_list);
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -545,6 +551,9 @@ cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c
+
+ switch (c->number) {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
++#endif
+ case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+@@ -593,6 +602,9 @@ cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *c
+
+ switch (c->number) {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case SSH_CIPHER_NONE:
++#endif
+ case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_DES:
+ case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH:
+--- a/clientloop.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/clientloop.c 2015-04-03 17:29:40.618489000 -0500
+@@ -1943,6 +1943,15 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_t
+ sock = x11_connect_display();
+ if (sock < 0)
+ return NULL;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* again is this really necessary for X11? */
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("x11",
++ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size,
++ CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("x11",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
+@@ -1968,6 +1977,14 @@ client_request_agent(const char *request
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ return NULL;
+ }
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
++ SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
++ "authentication agent connection", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("authentication agent connection",
+ SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
+@@ -1998,6 +2015,12 @@ client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int
+ return -1;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ c->datagram = 1;
+--- a/compat.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/compat.c 2015-04-03 16:39:57.665699000 -0500
+@@ -177,6 +177,14 @@ compat_datafellows(const char *version)
+ debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* Check to see if the remote side is OpenSSH and not HPN */
++ if (strstr(version,"OpenSSH") != NULL &&
++ strstr(version,"hpn") == NULL) {
++ datafellows |= SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW;
++ debug("Remote is NON-HPN aware");
++ }
++#endif
+ return check[i].bugs;
+ }
+ }
+--- a/compat.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/compat.h 2015-04-03 16:39:34.780416000 -0500
+@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@
+ #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000
+ #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++#define SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW 0x20000000
++#endif
+
+ void enable_compat13(void);
+ void enable_compat20(void);
+--- a/configure.ac 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/configure.ac 2015-04-03 16:36:28.916502000 -0500
+@@ -4238,6 +4238,25 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
+ ]
+ ) # maildir
+
++#check whether user wants HPN support
++HPN_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(hpn,
++ [ --with-hpn Enable HPN support],
++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++ AC_DEFINE(HPN_ENABLED,1,[Define if you want HPN support.])
++ HPN_MSG="yes"
++ fi ]
++)
++#check whether user wants NONECIPHER support
++NONECIPHER_MSG="no"
++AC_ARG_WITH(nonecipher,
++ [ --with-nonecipher Enable NONECIPHER support],
++ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
++ AC_DEFINE(NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED,1,[Define if you want NONECIPHER support.])
++ NONECIPHER_MSG="yes"
++ fi ]
++)
++
+ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
+ disable_ptmx_check=yes
+@@ -4905,6 +4924,8 @@ echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack
+ echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+ echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+ echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
++echo " HPN support: $HPN_MSG"
++echo " NONECIPHER support: $NONECIPHER_MSG"
+
+ echo ""
+
+--- a/kex.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/kex.c 2015-04-03 17:06:44.032682000 -0500
+@@ -587,6 +587,13 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+ u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
+ int r, first_kex_follows;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ /* XXX: Could this move into the lower block? */
++ int auth_flag;
++
++ auth_flag = ssh_packet_authentication_state(ssh);
++ debug ("AUTH STATE IS %d", auth_flag);
++#endif
+
+ if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0 ||
+ (r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
+@@ -635,6 +642,17 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
+ sprop[ncomp])) != 0)
+ goto out;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ debug("REQUESTED ENC.NAME is '%s'", newkeys->enc.name);
++ if (strcmp(newkeys->enc.name, "none") == 0) {
++ debug("Requesting NONE. Authflag is %d", auth_flag);
++ if (auth_flag == 1) {
++ debug("None requested post authentication.");
++ } else {
++ fatal("Pre-authentication none cipher requests are not allowed.");
++ }
++ }
++#endif
+ debug("kex: %s %s %s %s",
+ ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+ newkeys->enc.name,
+--- a/myproposal.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/myproposal.h 2015-04-03 16:43:33.747402000 -0500
+@@ -171,6 +171,10 @@
+ #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib at openssh.com,zlib"
+ #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++#define KEX_ENCRYPT_INCLUDE_NONE KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT ",none"
++#endif
++
+ #define KEX_CLIENT \
+ KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
+ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
+--- a/packet.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/packet.c 2015-04-03 16:10:57.002066000 -0500
+@@ -2199,6 +2199,24 @@ ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh,
+ }
+ }
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++/* this supports the forced rekeying required for the NONE cipher */
++int rekey_requested = 0;
++void
++packet_request_rekeying(void)
++{
++ rekey_requested = 1;
++}
++
++int
++ssh_packet_authentication_state(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++ struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
++
++ return(state->after_authentication);
++}
++#endif
++
+ #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
+ int
+ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2207,6 +2225,12 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh
+
+ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+ return 0;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (rekey_requested == 1) {
++ rekey_requested = 0;
++ return 1;
++ }
++#endif
+ return
+ (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+ (state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
+--- a/packet.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/packet.h 2015-04-03 16:10:34.728161000 -0500
+@@ -188,6 +188,11 @@ int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh,
+ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh);
+ const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp);
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++void packet_request_rekeying(void);
++int ssh_packet_authentication_state(struct ssh *ssh);
++#endif
++
+ /* OLD API */
+ extern struct ssh *active_state;
+ #include "opacket.h"
+--- a/readconf.c 2015-04-01 22:07:18.135435000 -0500
++++ b/readconf.c 2015-04-03 15:10:44.188916000 -0500
+@@ -153,6 +153,12 @@ typedef enum {
+ oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
+ oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming,
+ oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ oHPNDisabled, oHPNBufferSize, oTcpRcvBufPoll, oTcpRcvBuf,
++#endif
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ oNoneSwitch, oNoneEnabled,
++#endif
+ oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+ oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+ oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+@@ -275,6 +281,16 @@ static struct {
+ { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash },
+ { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
+ { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ { "noneenabled", oNoneEnabled },
++ { "noneswitch", oNoneSwitch },
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ { "tcprcvbufpoll", oTcpRcvBufPoll },
++ { "tcprcvbuf", oTcpRcvBuf },
++ { "hpndisabled", oHPNDisabled },
++ { "hpnbuffersize", oHPNBufferSize },
++#endif
+ { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+
+ { NULL, oBadOption }
+@@ -904,6 +920,44 @@ parse_time:
+ intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ case oHPNDisabled:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oHPNBufferSize:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
++ goto parse_int;
++
++ case oTcpRcvBufPoll:
++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case oTcpRcvBuf:
++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf;
++ goto parse_int;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case oNoneEnabled:
++ intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ /* we check to see if the command comes from the */
++ /* command line or not. If it does then enable it */
++ /* otherwise fail. NONE should never be a default configuration */
++ case oNoneSwitch:
++ if(strcmp(filename,"command-line") == 0) {
++ intptr = &options->none_switch;
++ goto parse_flag;
++ } else {
++ error("NoneSwitch is found in %.200s.\nYou may only use this configuration option from the command line", filename);
++ error("Continuing...");
++ debug("NoneSwitch directive found in %.200s.", filename);
++ return 0;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+ intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+@@ -1665,6 +1719,16 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ options->request_tty = -1;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ options->none_switch = -1;
++ options->none_enabled = -1;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf = -1;
++#endif
+ options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
+ options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
+ options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
+@@ -1819,6 +1883,35 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+ if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+ options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (options->none_switch == -1)
++ options->none_switch = 0;
++ if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++ options->none_enabled = 0;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++ options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size > -1) {
++ /* if a user tries to set the size to 0 set it to 1KB */
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
++ /* limit the buffer to 64MB */
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size > 64*1024) {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 64*1024*1024;
++ debug("User requested buffer larger than 64MB. Request"
++ " reverted to 64MB");
++ } else
++ options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
++ debug("hpn_buffer_size set to %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
++ }
++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf == 0)
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf = 1;
++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf > -1)
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf *=1024;
++ if (options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll == -1)
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = 1;
++#endif
+ if (options->control_master == -1)
+ options->control_master = 0;
+ if (options->control_persist == -1) {
+--- a/readconf.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/readconf.h 2015-04-03 13:47:45.670125000 -0500
+@@ -105,6 +105,16 @@ typedef struct {
+ int clear_forwardings;
+
+ int enable_ssh_keysign;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ int none_switch; /* Use none cipher */
++ int none_enabled; /* Allow none to be used */
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int tcp_rcv_buf; /* user switch to set tcp recv buffer */
++ int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* Option to poll recv buf every window transfer */
++ int hpn_disabled; /* Switch to disable HPN buffer management */
++ int hpn_buffer_size; /* User definable size for HPN buffer window */
++#endif
+ int64_t rekey_limit;
+ int rekey_interval;
+ int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+--- a/scp.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/scp.c 2015-04-02 16:51:25.108407000 -0500
+@@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ source(int argc, char **argv)
+ off_t i, statbytes;
+ size_t amt, nr;
+ int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
+- char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX];
++ char *last, *name, buf[16384], encname[PATH_MAX];
+ int len;
+
+ for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
+ off_t size, statbytes;
+ unsigned long long ull;
+ int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
+- char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048];
++ char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[16384];
+ struct timeval tv[2];
+
+ #define atime tv[0]
+--- a/servconf.c 2015-04-01 22:07:18.142441000 -0500
++++ b/servconf.c 2015-04-03 16:32:16.114236000 -0500
+@@ -159,6 +159,14 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+ options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
+ options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ options->none_enabled = -1;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll = -1;
++ options->hpn_disabled = -1;
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = -1;
++#endif
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+ options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+ options->version_addendum = NULL;
+@@ -321,6 +329,57 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ }
+ if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+ options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ if (options->none_enabled == -1)
++ options->none_enabled = 0;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options->hpn_disabled == -1)
++ options->hpn_disabled = 0;
++
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size == -1) {
++ /*
++ * option not explicitly set. Now we have to figure out
++ * what value to use.
++ */
++ if (options->hpn_disabled == 1) {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++ } else {
++ int sock, socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++
++ /*
++ * get the current RCV size and set it to that
++ * create a socket but don't connect it
++ * we use that the get the rcv socket size
++ */
++ sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ close(sock);
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++ debug ("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options->hpn_buffer_size);
++ }
++ } else {
++ /*
++ * we have to do this incase the user sets both values in a
++ * contradictory manner. hpn_disabled overrrides
++ * hpn_buffer_size
++ */
++ if (options->hpn_disabled <= 0) {
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size == 0)
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 1;
++ /* limit the maximum buffer to 64MB */
++ if (options->hpn_buffer_size > 64*1024) {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = 64*1024*1024;
++ } else {
++ options->hpn_buffer_size *= 1024;
++ }
++ } else
++ options->hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++ }
++#endif
++
+ if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+ options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY;
+ if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+@@ -396,6 +455,12 @@ typedef enum {
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+ sHostCertificate,
+ sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ sNoneEnabled,
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ sTcpRcvBufPoll, sHPNDisabled, sHPNBufferSize,
++#endif
+ sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+ sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+ sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+@@ -524,6 +589,14 @@ static struct {
+ { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ { "noneenabled", sNoneEnabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ { "hpndisabled", sHPNDisabled, SSHCFG_ALL },
++ { "hpnbuffersize", sHPNBufferSize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++ { "tcprcvbufpoll", sTcpRcvBufPoll, SSHCFG_ALL },
++#endif
+ { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -1108,6 +1181,25 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ case sNoneEnabled:
++ intptr = &options->none_enabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ case sTcpRcvBufPoll:
++ intptr = &options->tcp_rcv_buf_poll;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sHPNDisabled:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_disabled;
++ goto parse_flag;
++
++ case sHPNBufferSize:
++ intptr = &options->hpn_buffer_size;
++ goto parse_int;
++#endif
++
+ case sRhostsRSAAuthentication:
+ intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication;
+ goto parse_flag;
+--- a/servconf.h 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/servconf.h 2015-04-03 13:48:37.316827000 -0500
+@@ -169,6 +169,15 @@ typedef struct {
+
+ int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ int none_enabled; /* enable NONE cipher switch */
++#endif
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int tcp_rcv_buf_poll; /* poll tcp rcv window in autotuning kernels*/
++ int hpn_disabled; /* disable hpn functionality. false by default */
++ int hpn_buffer_size; /* set the hpn buffer size - default 3MB */
++#endif
++
+ int permit_tun;
+
+ int num_permitted_opens;
+--- a/serverloop.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/serverloop.c 2015-04-03 17:14:15.182548000 -0500
+@@ -1051,6 +1051,12 @@ server_request_tun(void)
+ sock = tun_open(tun, mode);
+ if (sock < 0)
+ goto done;
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
++ options.hpn_buffer_size, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
++ else
++#endif
+ c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+ CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+ c->datagram = 1;
+@@ -1088,6 +1094,10 @@ server_request_session(void)
+ c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+ -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+ 0, "server-session", 1);
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll && !options.hpn_disabled)
++ c->dynamic_window = 1;
++#endif
+ if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+ debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+ channel_free(c);
+--- a/session.c 2015-04-01 22:07:18.149110000 -0500
++++ b/session.c 2015-04-03 17:09:02.984097000 -0500
+@@ -2329,6 +2329,14 @@ session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, in
+ */
+ if (s->chanid == -1)
+ fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (!options.hpn_disabled)
++ channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
++ fdout, fdin, fderr,
++ ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
++ 1, is_tty, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++ else
++#endif
+ channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
+ fdout, fdin, fderr,
+ ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+--- a/sftp.1 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/sftp.1 2015-04-01 22:16:49.921688000 -0500
+@@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ diagnostic messages from
+ Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+ Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+ but will increase memory usage.
+-The default is 64 outstanding requests.
++The default is 256 outstanding requests providing for 8MB
++of outstanding data with a 32KB buffer.
+ .It Fl r
+ Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
+ Note that
+--- a/sftp.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/sftp.c 2015-04-03 17:16:00.959795000 -0500
+@@ -71,7 +71,11 @@ typedef void EditLine;
+ #include "sftp-client.h"
+
+ #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 256 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
++#else
+ #define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
++#endif
+
+ /* File to read commands from */
+ FILE* infile;
+--- a/ssh.c 2015-04-01 22:07:18.166356000 -0500
++++ b/ssh.c 2015-04-03 17:16:34.114673000 -0500
+@@ -885,6 +885,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ break;
+ case 'T':
+ options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * ensure that the user doesn't try to backdoor a
++ * null cipher switch on an interactive session
++ * so explicitly disable it no matter what.
++ */
++ options.none_switch = 0;
++#endif
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ line = xstrdup(optarg);
+@@ -1831,9 +1839,85 @@ ssh_session2_open(void)
+ if (!isatty(err))
+ set_nonblock(err);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * we need to check to see if what they want to do about buffer
++ * sizes here. In a hpn to nonhpn connection we want to limit
++ * the window size to something reasonable in case the far side
++ * has the large window bug. In hpn to hpn connection we want to
++ * use the max window size but allow the user to override it
++ * lastly if they disabled hpn then use the ssh std window size
++
++ * so why don't we just do a getsockopt() here and set the
++ * ssh window to that? In the case of a autotuning receive
++ * window the window would get stuck at the initial buffer
++ * size generally less than 96k. Therefore we need to set the
++ * maximum ssh window size to the maximum hpn buffer size
++ * unless the user has specifically set the tcprcvbufpoll
++ * to no. In which case we *can* just set the window to the
++ * minimum of the hpn buffer size and tcp receive buffer size
++ */
++
++ if (tty_flag)
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++ else
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = 2*1024*1024;
++
++ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_LARGEWINDOW) {
++ debug("HPN to Non-HPN Connection");
++ } else {
++ int sock, socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll <= 0) {
++ sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ close(sock);
++ debug("socksize %d", socksize);
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++ debug ("HPNBufferSize set to TCP RWIN: %d",
++ options.hpn_buffer_size);
++ } else {
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0) {
++ /*
++ * create a socket but don't connect it.
++ * we use that the get the rcv socket size
++ */
++ sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
++ /*
++ * if they are using the tcp_rcv_buf option
++ * attempt to set the buffer size to that
++ */
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf)
++ setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf,
++ sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf));
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ close(sock);
++ debug("socksize %d", socksize);
++ options.hpn_buffer_size = socksize;
++ debug ("HPNBufferSize set to user TCPRcvBuf: "
++ "%d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++ }
++ }
++ }
++
++ debug("Final hpn_buffer_size = %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++
++ window = options.hpn_buffer_size;
++
++ channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++#else
+ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++#endif
++
+ packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+ if (tty_flag) {
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
++#endif
+ window >>= 1;
+ packetmax >>= 1;
+ }
+@@ -1842,6 +1926,12 @@ ssh_session2_open(void)
+ window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+ "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf_poll > 0 && !options.hpn_disabled) {
++ c->dynamic_window = 1;
++ debug ("Enabled Dynamic Window Scaling");
++ }
++#endif
+ debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self);
+
+ channel_send_open(c->self);
+--- a/sshconnect.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/sshconnect.c 2015-04-03 16:32:38.204744000 -0500
+@@ -266,6 +266,31 @@ ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
+ kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
+ }
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++/*
++ * Set TCP receive buffer if requested.
++ * Note: tuning needs to happen after the socket is
++ * created but before the connection happens
++ * so winscale is negotiated properly -cjr
++ */
++static void
++ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(int sock)
++{
++ void *buf = (void *)&options.tcp_rcv_buf;
++ int sz = sizeof(options.tcp_rcv_buf);
++ int socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++
++ debug("setsockopt Attempting to set SO_RCVBUF to %d", options.tcp_rcv_buf);
++ if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, buf, sz) >= 0) {
++ getsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ debug("setsockopt SO_RCVBUF: %.100s %d", strerror(errno), socksize);
++ } else
++ error("Couldn't set socket receive buffer to %d: %.100s",
++ options.tcp_rcv_buf, strerror(errno));
++}
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
+ */
+@@ -282,6 +307,11 @@ ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct
+ }
+ fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ if (options.tcp_rcv_buf > 0)
++ ssh_set_socket_recvbuf(sock);
++#endif
++
+ /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+ if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged)
+ return sock;
+@@ -523,11 +553,23 @@ send_client_banner(int connection_out, i
+ {
+ /* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+ if (compat20) {
+- xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
+- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
++ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s\r\n",
++ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options.hpn_disabled ? "" : SSH_HPN
++#else
++ ""
++#endif
++ );
+ } else {
+- xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n",
+- PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION);
++ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s\n",
++ PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options.hpn_disabled ? "" : SSH_HPN
++#else
++ ""
++#endif
++ );
+ }
+ if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
+ strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
+--- a/sshconnect2.c 2015-03-17 00:49:20.000000000 -0500
++++ b/sshconnect2.c 2015-04-03 16:54:23.936298000 -0500
+@@ -80,6 +80,14 @@
+ extern char *client_version_string;
+ extern char *server_version_string;
+ extern Options options;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++struct kex *xxx_kex;
++
++/* tty_flag is set in ssh.c. use this in ssh_userauth2 */
++/* if it is set then prevent the switch to the null cipher */
++
++extern int tty_flag;
++#endif
+
+ /*
+ * SSH2 key exchange
+@@ -153,13 +161,16 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
++static const char *myproposal_default[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ void
+ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ {
+- char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ struct kex *kex;
+ int r;
+
++ memcpy(&myproposal, &myproposal_default, sizeof(myproposal));
++
+ xxx_host = host;
+ xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+
+@@ -222,6 +233,10 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
+ kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
+ kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ xxx_kex = kex;
++#endif
++
+ dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
+
+ if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) {
+@@ -423,6 +438,29 @@ ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, co
+ pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt);
+ dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
+
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ /*
++ * if the user wants to use the none cipher do it
++ * post authentication and only if the right conditions are met
++ * both of the NONE commands must be true and there must be no
++ * tty allocated.
++ */
++ if ((options.none_switch == 1) && (options.none_enabled == 1)) {
++ if (!tty_flag) { /* no null on tty sessions */
++ debug("Requesting none rekeying...");
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = "none";
++ kex_prop2buf(xxx_kex->my, myproposal);
++ packet_request_rekeying();
++ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: ENABLED NONE CIPHER\n");
++ } else {
++ /* requested NONE cipher when in a tty */
++ debug("Cannot switch to NONE cipher with tty allocated");
++ fprintf(stderr, "NONE cipher switch disabled when a TTY is allocated\n");
++ }
++ }
++#endif
++
+ debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
+ }
+
+--- a/sshd.c 2015-04-01 22:07:18.190233000 -0500
++++ b/sshd.c 2015-04-03 17:17:03.227774000 -0500
+@@ -430,8 +430,11 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in
+ minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
+ }
+
+- xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
++ xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s%s",
+ major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ options.hpn_disabled ? "" : SSH_HPN,
++#endif
+ *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
+ options.version_addendum, newline);
+
+@@ -1156,6 +1159,10 @@ server_listen(void)
+ int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
+ struct addrinfo *ai;
+ char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ int socksize;
++ socklen_t socksizelen = sizeof(socksize);
++#endif
+
+ for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+@@ -1196,6 +1203,13 @@ server_listen(void)
+
+ debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
++ &socksize, &socksizelen);
++ debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize);
++ debug("HPN Buffer Size: %d", options.hpn_buffer_size);
++#endif
++
+ /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+@@ -2139,6 +2153,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ remote_ip, remote_port,
+ get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port());
+
++#ifdef HPN_ENABLED
++ /* set the HPN options for the child */
++ channel_set_hpn(options.hpn_disabled, options.hpn_buffer_size);
++#endif
++
+ /*
+ * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+ * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
+@@ -2538,6 +2557,12 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+ if (options.ciphers != NULL) {
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers;
++#ifdef NONE_CIPHER_ENABLED
++ } else if (options.none_enabled == 1) {
++ debug ("WARNING: None cipher enabled");
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = KEX_ENCRYPT_INCLUDE_NONE;
++#endif
+ }
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]);
+--- a/sshd_config 2015-04-01 22:07:18.248858000 -0500
++++ b/sshd_config 2015-04-01 22:16:49.932279000 -0500
+@@ -125,6 +125,20 @@ UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox # Defaul
+ # override default of no subsystems
+ Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server
+
++# the following are HPN related configuration options
++# tcp receive buffer polling. disable in non autotuning kernels
++#TcpRcvBufPoll yes
++
++# disable hpn performance boosts
++#HPNDisabled no
++
++# buffer size for hpn to non-hpn connections
++#HPNBufferSize 2048
++
++
++# allow the use of the none cipher
++#NoneEnabled no
++
+ # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+ #Match User anoncvs
+ # X11Forwarding no
+--- a/version.h 2015-04-01 22:07:18.258955000 -0500
++++ b/version.h 2015-04-02 16:51:25.209617000 -0500
+@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
+
+ #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
+ #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
++#define SSH_HPN "-hpn14v5"
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch 2015-04-06 20:51:02 UTC (rev 134752)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/pam.patch 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
---- a/servconf.c 2014-03-17 00:22:44.000000000 -0700
-+++ b/servconf.c 2014-03-17 00:31:30.000000000 -0700
-@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@
- {
+--- a/servconf.c 2015-04-06 19:46:29.000000000 +0200
++++ b/servconf.c 2015-04-06 19:48:26.000000000 +0200
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
- options->use_pam = 0;
Modified: trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff
===================================================================
--- trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff 2015-04-06 20:51:02 UTC (rev 134752)
+++ trunk/dports/net/openssh/files/patch-sshd.c-apple-sandbox-named-external.diff 2015-04-07 00:04:52 UTC (rev 134753)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---- a/sshd.c 2014-03-17 00:22:44.000000000 -0700
-+++ b/sshd.c 2014-03-17 00:32:54.000000000 -0700
-@@ -711,11 +711,18 @@
+--- a/sshd.c 2015-04-06 19:51:36.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd.c 2015-04-06 19:51:53.000000000 +0200
+@@ -714,11 +714,18 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
/* Demote the child */
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