security projects thoughts

[Jeff Johnson]

On Apr 18, 2011, at 1:02 PM, Bayard Bell wrote:

> On 18 Apr 2011, at 17:45, Jeff Johnson wrote:
> 
>>> Sorry, there's a gap in explicitness here. What's done to prevent the robo-signer and/or build system from accepting arbitrary content? This isn't relying on a trusted network, presumably there's some idea of who's allowed to request a build and specify its content, even if the source is redistributed under the robo-signer's signature, no?
>>> 
>> 
>> You are best off controlling the submission channel, not muck-a-bout with
>> the non-repudiable signature, which guranatees no tampering after, not before,
>> the build occurs.
> 
> I think our gap here is semantic: I'm considering the submission system integral to the build system (which the split horizons and backwards/forwards language probably didn't clarify), whereas you view it as something distinct. It's the submission system, which decides whose arbitrary instructions to mint as a branded package, that I'm trying to ask after at this point because I like what you've already described and sense that it would fit.
> 

Yes I'm splitting the question into two parts (just like Jordan), one
part of which is solavble with a non-repudiable signature
model, and the other issues become more solvable (becuase
narrower in scope).

>> You better believe that I don't put my credit
>> card numbers in RPM (even though you can find my phone number if you look carefully ;-)
> 
> We're still getting to know each other via an mailing list format, so I'm not asking for your number at this stage. ;->
> 

The more serious point is this:
	Package management needs origin authentication.
credit card numbers and NSA secrets need other forms of protection that
packages based on FL/OSS software simply do not need.

73 de Jeff

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