upgrade to openssl 3.0.0

[Christopher Jones]

I’m working on the basic changes to implement my suggestion at the moment. Once that is there testing specific ports against version 3 ’the canaries’ will be trivial. more in a bit.

> On 6 Oct 2021, at 5:40 pm, Ken Cunningham <ken.cunningham.webuse at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> For whoever gets up the enthusiasm to take on the storm of nay-sayers:
> 
> Although I found about 90% of the 100 or so ports I tried built without any changes against openssl 3.0.0 (rust, cargo, qt5, qt4-mac, etc, etc), and the rest were easy < 5 min fixes to use our openssl11 port, I noted in the openssl 3 migration guide that the FIPS mode is disabled by default on the openssl 3 build, and has to be expressly enabled.
> 
> I recall that most of the (very few) build failures I saw were in fact FIPS failures, so enabling that module might fix a bunch of them.
> 
> Best,
> 
> Ken
> 
> 
> On Tue, Oct 5, 2021 at 12:54 PM Fred Wright <fw at fwright.net <mailto:fw at fwright.net>> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, 4 Oct 2021, Christopher Jones wrote:
> >> On 4 Oct 2021, at 5:54 pm, Ken Cunningham <ken.cunningham.webuse at gmail.com <mailto:ken.cunningham.webuse at gmail.com>> wrote:
> >>
> >> I was hoping to move this along for the overwhelming benefit of the 
> >> license, but TBH the push-back so far is 99.99% negative about moving 
> >> to openssl 3.0.0 this year, so too controversial for me to get involved 
> >> with. I'll sit back for six to twelve months and see what you guys work 
> >> out over the coming year.
> >
> > All the more reason to follow my suggested migration path then I would 
> > say, as it allows an openssl30 port to be made available, and those 
> > ports that wish to can use it via the new PG, but it doesn’t have to 
> > become the default until some later date.
> 
> The PR thread contained (approximately) the following two statements:
> 
> 1) Unless v3 is the default, nobody will bother to use it.
> 
> 2) Everybody is really, *really* anxious to move to v3 for the more 
> permissive license.
> 
> Clearly those two statements are in conflict.
> 
> At Google, we had a process called "canarying".  Although technically a 
> misnomer, it referred to the "canary in the coal mine" concept, with the 
> idea that rolling out new stuff with possible issues should start small, 
> so that problems could be found (and hopefully fixed) before they caused 
> large-scale breakage.
> 
> If the OpenSSL folks were committed to maintaining backward compatibility, 
> then none of this nonsense would be necessary, but it's clear that they're 
> not.  And there's no reason to assume that they won't pull the same crap 
> again in the future (having done so at least twice already), so having a 
> mechanism for multiple coexisting OpenSSL "major" versions could have 
> long-term value beyond the v3 transition.
> 
> > TBH I also was quite dubious of making 3.0.0 the default any time ’soon’
> 
> I agree, especially if the only end benefit is the license.  Remember, 
> OpenSSL is the poster child for why *not* to assume that that newer is 
> more secure. :-)
> 
> Fred Wright

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